Oil and Gas in Africa

On each topic, the articles are in chronological order.

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Bottom of the Barrel: Africa's Oil Boom and the Poor. Report by Catholic Relief Services, 2003. Summary (PDF)   Full Report (PDF)  Portuguese

African Bishops' Statement on Oil and Poverty (PDF)

Poverty Reduction or Poverty Exacerbation? World Bank Group Support for Extractive Industries in Africa, by Scott Pegg, April 2003. (PDF)

Time for Transparency: Coming clean on oil, mining and gas revenues from Global Witness details scandals in Kazakhstan, Congo Brazzaville, Angola, Equatorial Guinea and Nauru. March 2004. Entire paper (PDF)  Portuguese

Publish What You Pay special report on Africa, January 2006

AFRICA PERSPECTIVE

Source:  Oil and Gas Journal.  June 11, 2001, p. 86

African countries collectively hold only one tenth of the proved oil reserves and one fifth of the proved gas reserves of the Middle East, but Africa is beginning to pull ahead from its traditional low ranking among the world's regions in production and reserves.

STATISTICS

Africa's crude and condensate production has neared 7 million b/d in recent months after remaining nearly flat at 6 million b/d for the 1970s, 1980s, and much of the 1990s.

The recent gains stem from good increases in Sudan, Nigeria, and Algeria. Large increases are on the way in the next few years mainly from world class fields off Angola, Algerian fields, Nigerian deepwater fields, and Chad.

African oil and condensate reserves were 75 billion bbl at the beginning of this year, having returned to about the same level as in 1971. At that time the main players were the same: Algeria and Nigeria with about 30 billion bbl each and Libya a distant third with 9 billion bbl.

In a recent monthly estimate, OGJ put Africa's gas production at 350 bcfd in March 2001, up from the year 2000 average of 274 bcfd.  Algeria provides 70% of Africa's total gas output, and Egypt is second with 13%. Gas development and utilization initiatives in several countries portend further production gains this decade.

Africa's gas reserves at 394 tcf are more than double the 191 tcf evident in 1971. The continent's refining capacity, now more than 3.2 million b/d, was still less than 1 million b/d as recently as 1970.

BIG AND SMALL PROJECTS

Large projects are driving Africa's production growth for the most part. A major share of oil production growth will come from projects attached to large oil field discoveries off Angola, Nigeria, and Equatorial Guinea the last 4 years.

One report indicated the magnitude of what is in store off West Africa the next 5 years . The list includes 176 field developments fueling a production increase of as much as 3 million b/d, including 192 new platforms with more than 700 platform wells, close to 300 new subsea well installations installed or on order, and as much as 4,000 km in new pipelines.

West Africa had 633 platforms at the time of the study. North Africa has already seen large oil production gains from staged developments of a string of discoveries by Anadarko Petroleum Corp., Agip SPA, and others in the Ghadames and Illizi basins of Algeria, the opening and initiation of production from the Murzuk basin of far southwestern Libya, and large oil and gas developments in Egypt's Western Desert.

A Talisman Energy Inc. group is producing well above 200,000 b/d from southern Sudan, and more discoveries have been reported there. Within 2 years a separate group will start up a large heavy oil development project in Chad.

On the gas side, projects to make use of gas now being flared are mandated in much of West Africa.   Algeria is supplementing its already large pipeline shipments of gas to Europe with the In Amenas and In Salah projects, both under development hundreds of kilometers from Hassi R'Mel.

A string of gas and gas-condensate fields is being developed in Egypt's Nile Delta, where deepwater exploration is at an early stage.

South Africa, Tanzania, Mozambique, and Namibia are trying to get fledgling gas infrastructure projects off the ground.

OUTLOOK

As long as oil and gas prices hold up, exploration could also flourish in Africa's nonproducing and lightly producing areas. These stretch across the continent from Morocco and nonproducing coastal countries to its south, through Niger, Chad, and Central African Republic, to sub-Saharan countries north of South Africa.

West Africa overall

OFFSHORE OIL DEVELOPMENT

OilWatch Bulletin 13, February 2001

Capital investment in field developments off West Africa is anticipated to outpace spending in all other offshore oil and gas provinces in the next decade, leaping five-fold to roughly $10 billion per annum by 2005, according to a new report from UK analysts Douglas-Westwood Ltd. and data specialists Infield Systems Ltd.

Dominic Harbinson, who co-authored the Offshore West Africa Report with Roger Knight, said: ‘Within the foreseeable future, capital investment could eclipse that in established regions such as the North Sea and the Gulf of Mexico.’ Knight said the ‘remarkable series’ of deepwater discoveries over recent years mean that 2000-2005 will establish the region as a ‘world leader in terms of offshore E&P activities.’

The authors expect French megamajor TotalFinaElf SA -- which holds close to a third of the estimated 15.8 billion bbl of reserves slated to be brought onstream off West Africa in the next 5 years -- to take up the dominant position of operatorship in the region. Soon- to-be-merged ChevronTexaco Corp., the US's ExxonMobil Corp., and Anglo-Dutch energy giant Royal/Dutch Shell Group are shaping up to be the province's other major players within this time frame.

THE MAIN OFFSHORE PROJECTS IN WESTERN AFRICA

São Tomé and Príncipe Enacts Model Oil Revenue Management Law

Earth Institute News, Columbia University, USA
7 January 2005

Contact: Katie Mastriani  212-854-1244 or km644@columbia.edu
Contact: Joseph C. Bell, Hogan & Hartson LLP  202 637 5780 or jcbell@hhlaw.com

On December 29, 2004, São Tomé and Príncipe President Fradique de Menezes signed a law that establishes a new international standard for transparency and control of oil revenues. The law, adopted unanimously by the National Assembly, governs the receipt, investment and use by São Tomé and Príncipe of oil payments to best promote the economic and social progress of the country. It provides for the establishment of an oil fund to be held by an international custodial bank into which all oil payments are to be made. The law limits the amount of annual withdrawals from the fund and restricts expenditures to national development, poverty reduction and strengthening of good governance. A portion of the monies paid into the fund will be retained to create a permanent reserve to foster development even after oil resources have been exhausted.

At the signing, the President speaking of the law said, "Nothing will be hidden, nothing will be wasted." Arlindo Carvalho, the Minister of Natural Resources and Environment added, "This law will permit us to manage our petroleum resources in a sustainable way so that not only the current generation, but also future generations, will benefit." Carlos Neves, the Chairman of the Oil Commission in charge of drafting the law, stated "The law is very important for our development because it guarantees that we will use potential petroleum resources in a rational, balanced and controlled way."

A team of experts from the Earth Institute and Hogan & Hartson LLP, working pro bono, assisted São Tomé and Príncipe in its year-long effort to develop and enact the new law.

Responding to the news, Jeffrey D. Sachs, Director of the Earth Institute at Columbia University, said, “All too often oil resources have been misused. This law, by creating new standards of transparency and accountability, can help São Tomé and Príncipe avoid the pitfalls of being an oil exporter and ensure that its potential oil resources are used for sustainable economic development benefiting the people of São Tomé and Príncipe. I congratulate President de Menezes and the National Assembly on this effort. It will certainly become a model for others.”

Joseph Bell, leader of the Earth Institute team and partner at Hogan & Hartson LLP, said, “In adopting this law, São Tomé and Príncipe has established itself as the leader in the development of transparent and responsible systems for the management of oil revenues. The law is a major step forward in the country’s efforts to use its potential oil resources wisely.”

The activities of the fund are to be fully transparent with public access to all information regarding payments into and out of the fund, as well as the holdings of the fund. In addition, the law provides for all oil related contracts to be subject to public tender and to be made public. It also prescribes severe penalties for violations.

As an innovation, all of this information including information about the fund is intended to be available to the general public through web access as well as through a new public information office. Additionally, the law mandates certain public integrity and compliance-related contractual provisions, creates a rule against conflicts of interests and requires internal and external audits of the oil fund.

The law incorporates the transparency principles adopted by President de Menezes and President Obasanjo of Nigeria in the Abuja Joint Declaration, issued in July 2004, which among other things requires public disclosure of receipts from oil companies in unprecedented detail. It also creates a new Public Oversight Committee which includes representatives of civil society to monitor the government’s implementation of the law.

The work conducted by the Earth Institute was funded by the Open Society Institute.

São Tomé and Príncipe is Africa’s smallest democracy. Located off the West Coast of Africa, it shares with its neighbors significant potential oil resources. Initial exploration is now being initiated in the Joint Development Zone shared with Nigeria. Copies of the legislation are available at http://www.earthinstitute.columbia.edu/cgsd/STP/index_stp.htm.

The Earth Institute at Columbia University is the world’s leading academic center for the integrated study of the Earth, its environment and society. The Earth Institute builds upon excellence in the core disciplines—earth sciences, biological sciences, engineering sciences, social sciences and health sciences—and stresses cross-disciplinary approaches to complex problems. Through its research, training and global partnerships, it mobilizes science and technology to advance sustainable development, while placing special emphasis on the needs of the world’s poor. For more information, visit www.earth.columbia.edu .

SAO TOME AND NIGERIA SIGN OIL EXPLORATION DEAL

It has been reported that Sao Tome and Principe and Nigeria have signed a shared offshore oil exploration deal, ending a dispute over their maritime border.

According to Sao Tome government officials, Nigeria will hold a 60% stake in the 2,500-meter deep operations to be launched in 2004 near the island of Principe, about 240 kilometers off the coast of Gabon.

MBendi - Information for Africa
Oil, Chemicals and Energy News, 22 Feb.2001

A Patrol Boat Goes Missing, And Tiny São Tomé Is Left Without a Coast Guard
Nigeria Has It, but Won't Return It; Are Power Politics Over Oil at Play?

Asian Wall Street Journal, 3-5 January 2003, Front Page
By Michael M. Phillips

CALABAR, Nigeria -- On the morning of June 21, 2001, the people of the tiny nation of São Tomé and Principe awoke to discover that their Coast Guard was missing.

It wasn't until a year later that they learned that their Coast Guard, a single, 8.4 meter patrol boat made in Arkansas (USA), was at a Nigerian navy base here on the Calabar River, more than 500 kilometers from home.

Now, 18 months after the boat disappeared, the case has degenerated into a diplomatic standoff rooted in oil and rife with geopolitical maneuvering. They "promised to repair it and send it back," complains São Toméan President Fradique de Menezes, who adds that he has on several occasions pleaded personally with Nigeria's president for the boat's return. But "nothing has been done," Mr. de Menezes says.

Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo's spokesman, Chunji Oseni, says he has no information about the boat. Vice Admiral Samuel Afolayan, head of Nigeria's navy, says through an aide that the boat's fate is in the hands of the politicians, not the military. He refuses to allow outsiders to see it. "It's very sensitive," says the aide.

On the face of it, the mysterious journey of the patrol boat Falcon is hardly the stuff of an international incident. After all, the boat, built by SeaArk Marine Inc., in Monticello, Arkansas, has seats for just four crewmen, carries no deck gun, and was unmanned when it disappeared from anchor in São Tomé's harbor.

But everything that happens in the former Portuguese colony has taken on a new weight since the world discovered that below São Tomé's waters lie an estimated four billion barrels of crude oil. That is one reason the Bush administration suddenly views São Tomé as a new strategic ally far from the turbulent Middle East.

São Tomé fears that by holding hostage its Coast Guard, Nigeria is trying to intimidate it to gain leverage over the potential wealth lying beneath their shared frontier in the Gulf of Guinea. At the moment, the two countries are supposed to jointly develop the oil in those waters, subject to a 2001 treaty.

Clear Disadvantage

It is a battle in which the two-island nation -- often referred to as simply São Tomé -- is clearly outgunned. São Tomé, whose population of 150,000 earns a per-capita average of $280 a year, is a newcomer to the oil business. Nigeria, population 130 million, is the largest sub-Saharan oil producer and the fifth-largest oil supplier to the U.S.

Nigeria also hasn't been particularly shy about advancing its oil interests in the region. In October, Nigeria refused to submit to a World Court decision awarding the disputed oil-rich Bakassi peninsula to neighboring Cameroon. Though fighting that flared up in the late 1990s has subsided, Nigerian soldiers with automatic rifles still patrol around the border south of Calabar. The United Nations is now mediating.

The facts surrounding the Falcon's disappearance are murky. As part of a State Department aid program, the U.S. bought it from SeaArk for $121,000, plus shipping, and delivered it in 1992 to help São Tomé fend off encroaching European fishing boats. The boat, which has a diminutive red cabin and blue police-style bubble light, was designed to cruise the coast. Its twin Volvo engines deliver a top speed of 64 kilometers an hour, but it was frequently idle in port for lack of fuel.

One theory is that the Falcão, as it is called in Portuguese, blew out to sea and drifted into Nigerian waters. Everyone remembers there being a storm that June night, although some say it wasn't strong enough to dislodge an anchored boat from the sheltered harbor. Another theory, espoused by some São Toméans, is that Nigerian pirates -- an everyday hazard in the Gulf of Guinea -- slipped into port and made off with it. In any case, São Toméans noticed it missing in the morning and, navy-less, had no other boat in which to give chase.

An Intimidating Offer

Six weeks later, Nigeria sent word to São Tomé -- the details of who sent the message and how aren't clear -- that it had the boat. According to some accounts, Nigeria also said the boat needed repairs. Only in the past few months did Nigeria tell São Toméan authorities where the boat was docked. The São Toméans are torn between fear and irritation. They need good relations with Nigeria, which São Toméan officials say has made an intimidating offer of 200 troops to "defend" São Tomé.

But they are upset with Nigeria, which they claim is violating the terms of the joint oil-development treaty. Under that agreement – which gave Nigeria 60% of the oil and sole ownership of the most promising offshore bloc -- Nigeria agreed vaguely to provide São Tomé a regular oil allocation with a minimum value of $100 million annually, but so far hasn't. Nor has Nigeria equipped and trained the São Toméan Coast Guard as promised.

Another irritant for São Tomé: the influx of Nigerian immigrants and smugglers, who sneak ashore at night on oceangoing canoes. Locals say the main market in the town of São Tomé has been invaded by Nigerians selling canned food, plastic sandals, alcohol and other products-without paying local duties. But now that the Falcon has disappeared, São Tomé has no way to stop them at sea, and no immigration police to round them up on shore.

Mr. de Menezes, the São Toméan president, apparently believes power politics are behind the boat's abduction, and, as leader of a could-be oil power, he is playing his own political hand as best he can. Aware of the American interest in diversifying energy sources away from the volatile Middle East, he has offered to host a U.S. military base. In July, he invited Gen. Carlton Fulford, deputy commander in chief of the U.S. European Command, to the island, and asked the general to intercede with Nigeria in the matter of the migrating Falcon.

"The Americans promised to get it fixed," says Victor Monteiro, São Tomé's defense minister at the time.

Cameroon

CONTRACTING OUT OF HUMAN RIGHTS: The Chad–Cameroon pipeline project Amnesty International, September 2005

BAKASSI: 'YAOUNDE HAS THE MIGHT, WILL FOR WAR'

By Appolonia Emeanua

February 21, 2002

Cameroon's Minister of Special Duties at the Presidency, Professor Ngole Ngole said his country has the might and the will to prosecute a war with Nigeria over its claim on the Bakassi Peninsula. Speaking in an interview on the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) yesterday, Ngole said Bakassi is of great concern to Cameroon.

‘As far as we know,’ the minister stressed, ‘we are serious. We have the might and we have the will and the 16 million people of Cameroon are behind the government to defend the territorial integrity of our country. Therefore it is not a joking matter.’ He was responding to a question on whether Cameroon can stand the might of Nigeria should war break out over the disputed peninsula for which both nations have been at each others throat for about 10 years.

Explaining the rationale behind Cameroon's decision to deploy troops to the disputed territory despite the dissatisfaction of the soldiers there, Ngole said although his country does not have a foreign policy of warfare, it is obliged to defend its territorial integrity by positioning defensive troops in order to check Nigeria's offensive and aggression.

The Special duties minister accused Nigeria of adventurism concerning its claim on the Peninsula. ‘Even our Nigerian brothers know that Bakassi has always remained part of Cameroonian territory. What has been going on since their invasion of that piece of Cameroonian territory amounts to nothing but adventurism and we hope that the International Court of Justice will put an end to it so that the two countries will continue to enjoy cordial and neighbourly relations,’ he said.

He, however, expressed the desire to see a quick resolution of the Bakassi case at the International Court of Justice at the Hague. ‘The sooner the decision from the international court, the better.’ He said the decision will make it possible for Cameroonian troops to return to their normal position.

Similarly, he expressed the hope that Nigeria will equally respect what ever decision is reached at the Hague and get ‘their troops out of our territory and return to their normal Nigerian position.’

When asked whether Cameroon will take it gracefully if it loses the case, Ngole who was evasive said Nigeria knows that Bakassi has always remained part of Cameroonian territory. However, he expressed confidence in the proceedings of the case at the Hague.

Speaking further on his impressions of the proceedings, he said, ‘Cameroon trusts the International Court of Justice and sees the process going on right now as natural and we are hopeful and confident that the proceedings at the International Court of Justice will favour Cameroon.’ He said the International Court of Justice will be at the side of justice and international law and that it will favour Cameroon because Bakassi is an integral part of Cameroon,' adding, 'and it has been since colonial time.’

Furthermore, he said his country wishes to continue to be good neighbors to Nigeria. ‘We want to continue to extend our traditional hospitality to over 3 million Nigerians in Cameroon,’ he stressed, adding, ‘Our two countries continue to enjoy cordial diplomatic relations.’

Fighting between Nigeria and Cameroon over Bakassi area first flared in 1994, and both countries now have a large military presence there. The two countries have clashed several times over the peninsula since 1994, when Cameroon asked the Court to rule on sovereignty.

On the other hand, Nigeria contested the case and also argued that the court has no jurisdiction over the issue. Subsequently, The International Court of Justice decided that it does have jurisdiction to hear the case.

The dispute dates back more than a-hundred years, when the colonial powers in the region left the status of the peninsula undecided after agreeing on the rest of the border between their colonies. The Bakassi Peninsula, is thought to hold significant reserves of oil.

http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/natres/oil/nigeria/2002/0301bakassi.htm

Benin

The upstream oil industry is of potential importance to the Benin economy. The Sèmè oil field off Cotonou came on line in 1982 with a production of 8,000 bpd from two wells. Production tapered off to an average of 1,900 bpd in 1996.  The oil field was officially shut in in December1998.  In 1999 Zetah Oil Company was awarded a licence to redevelop the Sèmè oilfield. The Sèmè gas reserves are estimated at 80 billion cubic feet.

The Benin government held a licensing round in 1998. The investment code of Benin is considered to be very strict and a new investment code has been proposed with more beneficial fiscal terms in order to encourage investors.

The downstream oil industry is dependent on refined petroleum products imported from neighbouring Nigeria.  Oil-derived products supply the large majority of the country's commercial energy needs. In 1995 the oil market was liberalised. A new storage terminal in the port of Cotonou was opened in late 1999.

Benin is one of the countries involved in the planned West African gas pipeline running from Nigeria to Cote d`Ivoire.

The Ministry of Mines and Energy controls the oil and gas industry in Benin.

UPSTREAM

The upstream oil industry is of potential importance to the Benin economy. The Sèmè oil field off Cotonou came on line in 1982 with a production of 8,000 bpd from two wells. However production tapered off to an average of 1,900 bpd in 1996 and the field was shut in for evaluation by Addax Petroleum (Benin) in 1997.  The Ministry of Mines and Energy stated that the oil field was officially shut in in December 1998. In 1999, Zetah Oil Company was awarded a licence to redevelop the Sèmè oilfield and feasibility studies are now under way.

The major players involved in the upstream industry include Abacan Resources Corporation, Archean Benin Energy Sarl, Deminoil and Thomson & Van Eck International Pty Ltd, the independent company, Salah Salim Trading Enterprises and Zetah Oil Company.

In the year 2000, Abacan filed for bankruptcy as it failed to obtain further financing for its current and projected operations including those in Benin. Abacan relinquished its rights to Block 1, but it still holds the title to Block 4.  Deminoil, a Cape Town based company, may lose its rights to onshore Block A as it has not fulfilled its work commitments. Despite this it appears that Deminoil wishes to increase the size of its permit, which seems unlikely as the government is threatening to rescind the concession.

DOWNSTREAM

Official figures for petroleum product consumption do not include the considerable smuggling of petroleum products from neighbouring Nigeria where prices are significantly lower.

A new oil terminal, with a 55 000 cubic metre crude oil capacity, was opened in the Beninois port of Cotonou at the end of 1999. The terminal was built by Addax and Oryx Group, a Swiss firm, at the cost of approximately $15 million (11 billion CFA francs). It is planned that the terminal will serve Benin as well as the landlocked countries of Niger, Burkina Faso and Mali.

Importation, distribution and marketing of fuels products is carried out by the national oil company Sonacop (Societe Nationale de Commercialization des Produits Petroliers), the only oil company in Benin.

Sources:  www.mbendi.co.za

Equatorial Guinea

The Mineral Industries of Equatorial Guinea and Sao Tome (PDF), 2002

A Touch of Crude, Mother Jones Magazine, January 2005.

Time for Transparency: Coming clean on oil, mining and gas revenues from Global Witness, March 2004. Entire paper (PDF)  Portuguese

Background

Sources: U.S. Oil Politics in the 'Kuwait of Africa'. The Nation. April 22, 2002. by Ken Silverstein . www.mbendi.co.za

Before 1980, a few wells were drilled in the offshore area of Equatorial Guinea. One of the wells, Alba-1, drilled by Mobil Oil in the late 1960's had a significant oil show.

After 1980, various exploratory wells were drilled in the offshore acreage off Bioko Island and the mainland Rio Muni enclave. The wells in Bioko were drilled by GEPSA, a joint venture company formed by the governments of Equatorial Guinea and Spain, with Repsol as the operator. In 1984, Repsol discovered a significant accumulation of gas and condensate offshore Bioko but withdrew later because it did not comply with its contractual commitments.

In the offshore Rio Muni area, Elf drilled several wells, some of them with oil and gas shows. In April 1990 the Ministry of Mines and Energy entered into a production sharing contract with Walter International Equatorial Guinea Inc who drilled two development wells, Alba-2 and Alba-3, in the area of GEPSA's 1984 discovery. Production from these wells came on stream in 1991 at a rate totalling 7,500 bpd. In 1995, Walter International later sold all its rights to CMS Nomeco International Equatorial Guinea Inc (CMS Nomeco), a Houston based company who then became operator of the field.

Mobil Oil, in consortium with Ocean Energy (then United Meridian Corporation) signed a production sharing contract with the Ministry of Mines and Energy in 1992, for Block B, located northwest of Bioko Island. Five wells were drilled and a significant field, Zafiro, with an estimated output of 10,500 b/d of oil and 3.4 mcfd of gas was discovered. In 1999, production from Zafiro had risen to 80,000 bpd. In 1999, work began on extending the facilities of the Zafiro FPSO vessel in order to extend the life of the Zafiro field by 10 years. Mobil and Ocean Energy plan to increase output from Zafiro to 120,000 bpd. The PSA for Block B was renegotiated between Mobil and Ocean Energy and the government of Equatorial Guinea to allow the government to acquire a 5% interest in Block B.

Exploration continued on Block B and resulted in the Jade, Opalo, Topacio, Amatista, Rubi and Serpentina discoveries. Production has started at Jade (10,000 bpd) and Opalo (24,000 bpd).

Discoveries on Block D include Tsavorita and Ambar, both of which need to be confirmed as commercial discoveries.

The Ministry of Mines and Energy conducted the Deep Water Licensing Round in late 1998 / early 1999 for areas to the south and west of Bioko and west of Rio Muni in water depths of 200m to 2,000m.

Exploration is continuing in the Rio Muni Basin and Bioko Basins. Ocean Energy is exploring in Blocks A, C and D. Braspetro (the international arm of Petrobras) is exploring in Block E in partnership with Elf Hydrocarbures Guinee Equatoriale. In May 1999, Mobil Equatorial Guinea gained operatorship and a 47% interest in Block C under a farmout agreement with Ocean Energy and its partner SK Corporation of Seoul, Korea.

Within a few years the country could be producing as much as 500,000 barrels a day which would make it sub-Saharan Africa's third-largest producer behind Nigeria and Angola. Due to oil, Equatorial Guinea's economy is projected to grow by 34 percent this year. United States buys almost two-thirds of Equatorial Guinea's petroleum.

Equatorial Guinea gained independence in 1968 from Spain. The country's first ruler was Francisco Macias Nguema, who banned opposition parties and in 1970 appointed himself "President for Life". As many as 50,000 people, roughly 10 percent of the population, were murdered during the Macias years, and 80,000 fled the country. In 1979 was overthrown and subsequently executed by Obiang, his nephew.

Obiang was no reformer: As head of the National Guard and later commander of the armed forces, he played a major role in carrying out the terrible repression of the Macias years. And while he hasn't ruled as brutally as his predecessor, he's been sufficiently cruel that one Western diplomat has called him "a known murderer."

Dallas-based Triton has interest in the country. Largely due to its Equatorial Guinea stake, Triton was recently purchased by oil giant Amerada Hess, and Musselman is here with that company's chairman, John Hess, for meetings with Obiang.

During the cold war, the United States viewed Africa as a major battleground with the Soviet Union and poured billions of dollars of economic and military aid into the continent. After the collapse of Communism, though, American interest waned. As recently as 1995, a Pentagon report concluded that the United States had "very little traditional strategic interests in Africa." But during the past few years, Africa has become a growing source of American oil imports--especially West Africa, which in oil parlance is considered to include Angola as well as Nigeria, Congo Republic, Gabon, Cameroon and now Equatorial Guinea. The United States already buys 15 percent of its oil from West Africa--nearly as much as comes from Saudi Arabia--a figure expected to grow to 20 percent within the next five years and, according to the National Intelligence Council, to as high as 25 percent by 2015.

The Bush Administration's national energy policy, released last May, predicted that West Africa would become "one of the fastest-growing sources of oil and gas for the American market." The year before, Paul Michael Wihbey of Washington's Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies described West Africa as "an area of vital US interest" in testimony before Congress. He proposed the creation of a new South Atlantic Military Command that would "permit the US Navy and armed forces to more easily project power to defend American interests and allies in West Africa." The September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon further heightened American attention to Africa, with national security planners urging that the United States seek to diversify supplies of oil away from the Middle East.

In January the Council on Foreign Relations hosted an event on the growing importance of Africa ("America's Response to Terrorism: Managing Africa's Oil Revenues in a Changing Global Climate"), and Wihbey's institute held a similar affair. The latter, at downtown Washington's tony University Club, was attended by oil company executives, Bush Administration officials, corporate lobbyists and representatives from a number of African embassies, including Teodoro Biyogo Nsue, Equatorial Guinea's ambassador to the United States (and General Obiang's brother-in-law).

Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs from USA Walter Kansteiner in a introductory talk in a meeting last January, said "African oil is a national strategic interest," he told the crowd. "It's people like you who will...bring the oil home." Other speakers included Lieut. Col. Karen Kwiatkowski, an Air Force officer assigned to the Defence Secretary's office, who said the United States needs to step up military training for African oil producers so that those countries can "secure their property, their investment and our investment."

In Mid 90s, several US companies found significant petroleum reserves off the coast of Equatorial Guinea. Subsequent discoveries led firms such as ExxonMobil and Chevron, as well as small independents like Ocean Energy, Vanco and Triton, to invest a collective $5 billion in Equatorial Guinea. Sweetening the deal for the oil companies is the fact that the Obiang regime gave them as much as 87 percent of the oil receipts. (That figure has now dropped to about 75 percent, but it's still far above what they get in much of the Third World, which is frequently 50 percent or less.)

As US economic interests grew, a slow political shift in Washington-Malabo relations emerged. In June of 2000, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation approved $373 million in loan guarantees for construction of a methanol plant in Equatorial Guinea, its largest program ever in sub-Saharan Africa. Two US companies--Noble Affiliates and Marathon--together hold an 86 percent share in the plant. Five months later, Louisiana Representative William Jefferson led the first-ever Congressional delegation to Equatorial Guinea, taking along representatives of Baton Rouge-based Shaw Global Energy Services. Several Congressional staffers also traveled to the country, among them Malik Chaka, a top aide to Representative Ed Royce, chairman of the House Subcommittee on Africa. "There's still a great deal of room for improvement in terms of democracy and transparency, but they are desirous of closer relations with the United States," he says. "We need to take advantage of that by working with them."

Last November Bush quietly authorized the opening of a new US Embassy in Malabo (one site being considered is on land owned by the oil companies), a huge victory for the Obiang regime.

Meanwhile, the State Department has given the green light--barring unforeseen Congressional opposition--to a program under which Military Professional Resources Inc. (MPRI), a private firm led by high-ranking Pentagon retirees, will train a Guinean Coast Guard that can protect the offshore oilfields. "They do have a poor human rights record, but so did the Nazi government, and we did pretty well with Germany after World War II," says retired general Ed Soyster, a former head of the Defence Intelligence Agency who works at MPRI.

Bush's decision to reopen the US Embassy was taken soon after he received a plea to do so from the oil industry. "It is important to underscore that most of the oil and gas concessions awarded in Equatorial Guinea to date, have been awarded to US firms," said a memo drafted on behalf of the oil companies and sent to Bush last year. "This is in stark contrast to neighboring countries in the region, where the United States has consistently lost out to French and other European and Asian competitors."

In addition to direct lobbying, the oil industry sought to improve Obiang's image by hiring the services of Bruce McColm, a former head of Freedom House who now runs the Institute for Democratic Strategies (IDS), a Virginia-based nonprofit whose stated mission is "strengthening democratic institutions." The Obiang regime's most tireless champion, McColm works closely with the government, which now pays him directly. (According to its latest nonprofit tax form, the IDS spent $223,000 in 2000, of which all but $10,000 went toward its Equatorial Guinea work.)

In 2000 McColm sent a team of observers to monitor Equatorial Guinea's municipal elections, which it reported to be basically free and fair. "Electoral officials should be recognised for discharging their responsibilities in an effective and transparent manner," said an IDS press release at the time. "Observers generally felt that the positives of this election far outweighed the negatives." This was in marked contrast to a UN report that said the electoral campaign "was characterised by the omnipresence of the [ruling] party, voting in public and the intimidating presence of the armed forces."

The oil companies have also worked through the Corporate Council on Africa, which represents companies with investments on the continent. Last year the council published a "Country Profile" of Equatorial Guinea, which was paid for by six oil companies and AfricaGlobal, a DC lobby shop that at the time represented Obiang. The guidebook not only promotes the country as a new investment hot spot but also claims that the Obiang regime "has taken significant measures to encourage political diversity and address human and worker rights issues."

The oil companies pay extremely well by local standards--between $500 and $1,000 a month--but they have created relatively few jobs, as only a handful of Guineans have the training for the highly technical offshore work. Much of Malabo's population is unemployed, or they work as street vendors.

THE OIL COMPANIES

In October 1999, Triton Energy (85%) and Energy Africa (15%) announced a significant discovery in Block G, the Ceiba oilfield. The first three wells, Ceiba-3, Ceiba-4 and Ceiba 5 encountered thiovk, high quality sands and also confirmed the lateral extent of the reservoir to the north and north west of the original discovery . Ceiba-6 was drilled as a step out to the south east, but intersected reservoir sands below the oil water contact. The Ceiba field will be produced to a FPSO with an initial capacity of 60,000 bpd.

Initial reserve estimates for the Ceiba field are between 300,000 and 500,000 barrels of oil. Phase 1 of the development of the Ceiba field has been contracted to Stolt Offshore who will install the 37 mile pipeline and subsea umbilicals. The development of this field is scheduled for production to begin by the end of 2000. Triton Energy and Energy Africa will be exploring both Blocks G and F extensively in the light of this discovery, and have identified numerous potential targets from seismics. An additional six exploration wells are to be drilled, of which four should be completed by end March 2001.

In March 2000, Vanco Energy Company, through its subsidiary, Vanco International Ltd, signed a production sharing contract for the Corisco Deep Block. The target is a turbidite trend with a structural setting similar to the Ceiba discovery. There are also a number of salt supported structures that are of interest.

In the wake of the Ceiba discovery and Vanco’s contract, Chevron, in May, signed a production sharing contract for Block L. Block L is on trend with the Ceiba discovery.

NATURAL GAS

Equatorial Guinea has proven natural gas reserves of 1.3Tcf located mainly in the Alba and Zafiro fields. Following its recent offshore exploration success, the government of Equatorial Guinea plans to implement projects for the utilisation of gas from its offshore fields for power generation, domestic consumption and the manufacture of LPG, in an effort to reduce its dependence on oil products for its commercial energy requirements.

In Janury 1997, LPG was produced using gas and condensate from the Alba gas field. Initial output from the $20 million plant was 1,700 bpd of LPG plus 400 bpd of condensate. The plant is operated by CMS Nomeco and has a capacity to extract 2,400 bpd of LPG from 104 MMcf/d of gas.

Gas from CMS Nomeco’s Alba block will be used in the new Methanol plant being built on Bioko Island by the Atlantic Methanol Production Company (AMPCO). The gas produced from the Alba field has been flared since condensate production started in 1991.

One of the bigger risks for companies exploring offshore is the problem associated with the complex maritime boundaries created by Equatorial Guinea’s ownership of Bioko and the smaller islands within the Gulf of Guinea.

Nigeria is currently in dispute with Equatorial Guinea over its sole ownership of the Zafiro oil field discovered by Mobil on Block B. Nigeria claims that the Zafiro oilfield straddles the border between the two countries. In Nigeria, Elf made the Ekanga discovery on Block OML 102 which lies just 3.5 kilometres north of Zafiro. Equatorial Guinea claims, however that the Ekanga wells were drilled in her territorial waters in Block B.

Nigeria has an ongoing border dispute with Cameroon with is currently at the International Court of Justice(ICJ) in the Hague. Equatorial Guinea has made an appeal at this hearing for the ICJ to consider its interests in the Gulf of Guinea as well since the outcome of this dispute will directly affect Equatorial Guinea.

Equatorial Guinea has an unresolved dispute with Gabon over the disputed sovereignty of the islands in Corisco Bay. Its dispute with Sao Tome appears to be moving towards resolution, with an in principle agreement to applying the equidistance principle of delineating the maritime boundary.

LEGISLATION

Petroleum licensing is governed by the 1981 Hydrocarbons Law, amended in 1998, and taxation is covered by the general tax provisions of 1986, amended in 1988, 1991 and 1997.

Contracts governing the exploration and exploitation of hydrocarbons are based on the Model Petroleum Production Sharing Contract, revised and updated in 1998.

This contract allows for an initial exploration term of 5 years followed by two terms of 3 and 2 years extendable on a yearly basis for up to a total of 8 years. Relinquishment of 40% after the first three years and a further 25% at the end of the five year term. Production sharing is based upon the contractors pre-tax return and is negotiable. The contractors can propose other forms of sharing. The signature, commercial discovery and production bonuses are negotiable. The production bonus and signature bonus are both recoverable. Annual surface rentals range between $1.00 per hectare for water depths less than 200 metres and $0.50 per hectare for water depths greater than 200m

Mauritania

See also Mauritania's Poor Skeptical on Oil Riches, Washington Post, August 2005
Woodside may face probe on Mauritania, The Australian, May 2006

HARDMAN RESOURCES AND WOODSIDE SECURE DRILLING CONTRACT FOR OFFSHORE MAURITANEAN WELLS

Hardman Resources Ltd ("Hardman") is pleased to advise that Joint Venture Operator Woodside Mauritania Pty Ltd ("Woodside") has signed a rig contract for the drilling ship Deep Water Discovery to drill in offshore Mauritania during 2002.

The contract allows for the drilling of two firm wells plus options for two additional wells commencing in the third quarter 2002. The rig is contracted to arrive in Mauritania within a two month window of August/September 2002 with the exact date to be determined by the completion of the rig's current programme in West Africa.

As previously announced, the Joint Venture participants and the Mauritanian authorities have agreed on the 2002 work programme, which includes the acquisition of extensive 3D seismic and the drilling of up to four deep water wells (two firm and two contingent) as follows:

3D Seismic Acquisition: acquisition of large 3D seismic is currently in progress as follows:

This new seismic data will further delineate the petroleum prospectivity of the deep water basin in areas adjacent to the existing 3D seismic data, and identify additional prospects for drilling in 2003 and beyond. Under a farming agreement signed with Energy Africa in January 2002, the bulk of the 3D survey in Block 2 is to be funded by Energy Africa which will earn 20% interest in that area. Hardman will retain a 28.8% interest in Block 2.

The 2002 work programme will add considerably to the understanding of the Mauritanian deep water basin and is aimed at upgrading the prospectivity of this new oil province. In particular, additional drilling of the Chinguetti Field will allow an accurate estimation of the recoverable oil volumes in the structure and the economic viability of the project.

In January 2002, Woodside advised that the Scope For Recovery reserves based on the results of only the Chinguetti-1 well were 65 million barrels (recoverable). It should be emphasised that this estimate is based on a risked reserve estimate, whereby parts of the field which have not yet been evaluated by drilling have had a risk factor applied, thereby reducing the volume estimates.

Studies of the Chinguetti Field by Hardman have indicated that the Most Likely (P50) technically recoverable volume for the primary reservoir target only (A Sand) is in excess of 100 million barrels. There may also be further potential in deeper Tertiary sands below the A Sand, which was not encountered in the Chinguetti-1 well, and also in the B Sands which contained a 7 metre gas column in Chinguetti-1.

K Davies. COMPANY SECRETARY AND CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER

Mauritania: On a bumpy road towards democracy

4 July 2003, from IRIN website

SUMMARY & COMMENT: A look at the Mauritania "system", a combination of multipartism and dictatorship. An attempted coup took place on June 8, 2003. Note that this report does not necessarily reflect the views of the United Nations.

Last month's bloody coup attempt highlighted the fact that beneath a veneer of multi-party democracy, Mauritania remains very much a traditional society where control of the army and membership of clan and family are the real keys to power.

The pro-western government of President Maaouiya Ould Sid Ahmed Taya, an army colonel who seized power in a coup 19 years ago, survived a two-day battle with rebel soldiers to the relief of neighbouring governments and Mauritania's Western donors.

Many Mauritanians condemned the coup, but they regarded it as being motivated more by family vendettas among the ruling elite than about "bread and butter" issues affecting the country's largely poor population.

One French-trained economist said that while Ould Taya was not a popular figure, Hanenna's coup attempt had attracted little popular support. "Between the bad and what could have been worse, Mauritanians want neither," he told IRIN.

On the night of 8 June, rebel military units, led by a former army colonel, Saleh Ould Hannena, rolled a column of tanks into the capital Nouakchott and began shelling the presidential palace.

State radio and television went off the air and for 36 hours the capital of this desert nation of only 2.5 million people echoed to the sound of gunfire.

However, military units loyal to Ould Taya eventually crushed the uprising and Ould Taya reappeared on TV screens to confirm that he was back in control.

The rebels never said why they wanted to overthrow Ould Taya or what they stood for and the government has not publicly identified the coup plotters. One official dismissed the bloody battle which left 29 people dead and dozens wounded, as "just a bump on the road."

But Mauritania's neighbours and western donors took it seriously enough. Within days, French foreign minister Dominique de Villepin jetted in for a lightning visit, followed shortly after by Morocco's King Mohamed VI. Sighs of relief and messages of support, meanwhile came from the United States, Senegal and Algeria.

Although Ould Taya was quick to announce that presidential elections would go ahead as planned on 7 November, security in Nouakchott has been beefed up since the coup attempt. Heavily armed soldiers have mounted guard outside the presidential palace, radio and TV studios and other government buildings. And at night military check points have been thrown up across the city of one million people to search cars and check the identity of their occupants.

Initially there was widespread speculation that the coup attempt was partly a reaction to a month-long crackdown on Islamic radicals by Ould Taya.

Diplomats feared that had he been overthrown, Mauritania might have severed its unpopular diplomatic relations with Israel, loosened its ties with the United States and become more closely identified with the Arab world.

But many Mauritanians suspect that the coup attempt was more about family and clan rivalries, than fundamental issues of government policy.

Ould Hannena has gone into hiding, but many of his relatives in government have been sacked or arrested.

Victims of the purge included the head of the Supreme Court, the mayor of the northern port city of Nouadhibou, the deputy director of the government news agency, the minister in charge of women's affairs, the national secretary of the ruling Republican Social Democrat Party (PRDS) and several military officers.

The joke around town is that most of these people stood accused of "kinship" with Ould Hanenna, rather than any active role in the rebellion.

Ould Hanenna himself was drummed out of the army in 2001 and was subsequently seen driving a taxi and selling cars. No official reason was given for his discharge, but he was widely believed to have been linked with a group of officers that wrote a letter to the president seeking better pay and conditions.

Little is known about Ould Hanenna's political beliefs, although he is suspected of sympathy towards the deposed Baathist regime of Sadaam Hussein in Iraq. Like the man he tried to depose, he is a member of the fair skinned Bidan elite.

He hails from the Ayoun region, near the eastern border with Mali and received military training in the Middle East, where Mauritania formerly sent cadets to military academies in Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Iraq. The fugitive coup leader is also believed to have opposed Ould Taya's controversial decision to establish full diplomatic relations with Israel in 1999.

Mauritania provides a delicate bridge between the Arab states of the Mahgreb and the black nations of Sub-Saharan Africa and ethnic tensions smoulder just belong the surface. There are therefore many vested interests in maintaining the stability in this former French colony, now an Islamic Republic that uses Arabic as its official language.

Increasingly it has looked to the Arab world rather than Sub-Saharan Africa for inspiration. Mauritania first withdrew from the CFA franc zone to establish its own currency in the 1970's and then left the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in 2000.

Two thirds of the population are Moors, who are culturally closer to Mauritania's northern neighbour Morocco than Senegal to the south. During the early years of independence Morocco claimed Mauritania as a southern province. It only recognised the government in Nouakchott in 1969.

But a third of Mauritania's populations are Black Africans who live near the southern border with Senegal. They belong to the same Wolof and Fulani ethnic groups that live in greater numbers on the south bank of the Senegal River, which forms the border between the two countries.

The Moorish community is sharply divided between the "Bidan" or white Moors, who dominate government, and the "Harratin" or black Moors, who were formerly slaves and today still generally occupy a lower rank on the social scale.

Slavery was only abolished by law in 1980 and ethnic tensions erupted into communal fighting in 1989 that led to many southern blacks being forcibly deported to Senegal and Mali.

Ould Taya has, on the surface at least, begun to modernise the country.

He legalised opposition parties in 1991 and drafted a new constitution that turned Mauritania into a multi-party democracy. Over the past decade he has also liberalised the economy, which is dependent on exports of iron ore and revenues from licencing foreign fishing boats, and has presided over a modest improvement in living standards.

According to the African Development Bank, the economy grew by four percent a year between 1990 and 2000. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) estimates that the number of Mauritanians living below the poverty line fell from 56 percent of the population to 46 percent over the same period.

Now there are hopes that offshore oil will start flowing in 2005 and help to spread the wealth currently enjoyed by a small urban elite more widely. Woodside Petroleum of Australia struck a promising oil reservoir with its Chinguetti exploration well in May 2001, since then other companies have been gearing up to drill more.

But behind the facade of modernity and progress, drought and famine still plague subsistence farmers in the southeast of the country. Opposition leaders question the economic success story told by official statistics. They accuse Ould Taya of running a corrupt government packed with members of his own family and clan that has failed to tackle the country's real problems effectively. "Tribu" the French word for tribe, crops up continuously in political discussions.

"The fundamental problem is to know if the State is fulfilling its primary roles? Is it promoting economic justice and social equality? Democracy and human rights?" said Hamidou Baba Kane, an economist and parliamentarian of the opposition Rally of Democratic Forces (RFD).

He expressed fears that the hope for oil boom would only widen the gap between rich and poor. While a minority of western-educated men wears smart suits and drive around Nouakchott in expensive cars, most of the city's middle class are growing slowly poorer and beggars line the streets. And among the drought-hit millet and sorghum fields of the south, many subsistence farmers and their families are quietly starving.

Although Ould Taya boasts that he introduced multi-party democracy to Mauritania, he has continued to ban political parties that he accuses of "threatening state authority" and detain their leaders. Critical newspapers have been shut down for similar reasons.

Political analysts say that as a result the opposition remains muzzled, weak and divided.

"The job of the opposition becomes very difficult under a tyrannical regime," Kane, the RFD leader, said.

Cheick Saad Bouh Kamara, a law professor at Nouakchott university, told IRIN that after 19 years of strong-arm government by Ould Taya, Mauritanians were yearning for change, but did not want to plunge the country into armed conflict to achieve it.

Kamara, who is vice-president of the International Federation of Human Rights, said Mauritanians wanted "peace at all costs, but not at any price."

So far three opposition politicians have announced plans to challenge Ould Taya in the November presidential election, including for the first time, a woman. Aicha Mint Jiddana, a 43-year-old businesswoman, is campaigning against female circumcision and forced marriage.

But it remains to be seen whether Ould Taya's western friends will pressure him into running a freer, fairer and more transparent poll than the last presidential election in 1997 which was boycotted by most of the opposition.

MAURITANIA: Petro-dollars could be a catastrophe, government critics warn

Offshore oil will start flowing in 2006

NOUAKCHOTT, 23 Feb 2005 (IRIN) - Mauritania, a land of desert nomads, will join the growing league of African oil exporters, when its first offshore oilfield starts production next year.

But government critics, aid workers and diplomats are nervous that the impending flood of petro-dollars into this poor and sparsely populated country could spell disaster.

They fear this new source of government revenue will simply benefit the ruling elite, fueling political instability and deepening social divisions, rather than promoting general prosperity and economic development.

“Oil will be a catastrophe for Mauritania. We don’t have a middle class that will benefit from this influx of money and it won’t be allowed to develop either,” said Brahim Ould Ebety, a prominent lawyer, who has defended opposition activists accused of plotting against President Maaouiya Ould Taya.

"People are either very rich or very poor," he told IRIN.

Ebety is one of the few professionals who dares to speak out openly against the government and the authoritarian political system in this vast desert country.

“This government does not listen to people’s needs nor work for the people’s needs,” he told IRIN.

“That needs to change as does the reluctance to tackle corruption and issues of due diligence in this country,” the lawyer said, speaking in his dimly-lit office in the capital Nouakchott.

Changes need to be made soon

But time is running out if changes are to be made before the government starts receiving a regular income from offshore oil sometime next year.

"Development of the Chinguetti Field began last year and it is expected to come on stream in mid-2006," said Teju Akande, an Oil Analyst at Wood Mackenzie, an energy research and consultancy company based in Edinburgh, Scotland.

Wood Mackenzie anticipate that a second, larger offshore field called Tiof, will come on-stream approximately one year later.

“By 2009 we estimate that combined production of the two fields will peak at 165,000 barrels per day,” Akande said.

At current crude prices of around US$50 per barrel, that would be worth about $300 million a year in foreign exchange earnings - half as much again as Mauritania currently earns from exports of fish and iron ore.

“Mauritania’s oil fields are small compared with the recoverable reserves from other West African deep water projects," Akande said. "We’re not talking another Nigeria or Angola, but when full capabilities come on stream it will be comparable to producers like Cote d’Ivoire and Equatorial Guinea.”

However, with a population of just three million people and an annual gross domestic product (GDP) of around US$ 1.1 billion, oil money is sure to have a major impact - just as it has in Equatorial Guinea.

There, according to figures from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), oil has fuelled a 40-fold growth of the economy between 1995 and 2005.

In 1995, when oil production began, the economy of Equatorial Guinea was about one-tenth the size of Mauritania's.

Now, it is over six times larger.

But some revenue has already been received

Even before the first barrel of oil is pumped out of the seabed off Mauritania's Atlantic coast, the first petrodollars have already started to flow in.

In October 2004, Sterling Energy, an independent UK-based oil company, announced that it had struck a deal with Mauritania to share the revenues from the government's 12 percent stake in the Chinguetti field, which is forecast to produce 75,000 barrels per day.

In return for this privelege, Sterling paid Mauritania a cash bonus of US$15.5 million and raised a $130 million loan to help the government pay for its share of the oilfield's development costs.

However, diplomats and oil industry observers say there are no mechanisms in place to guarantee transparency in the government's  handling of oil revenues, as there are in Chad and will be shortly in Sao Tome and Principe.

Despite numerous attempts to contact the Ministry of Mines and Industry which is resonsible for petroleum development, IRIN was unable to obtain comment from the Mauritanian government.

Fears of corruption

"When it comes to this (oil) issue, it is practically impossible to find someone reliable within the government who is willing to  speak out. It is a big problem that we have here," said one UN official working in Nouakchott.

Aid workers, who asked not to be named, pointed out examples of corruption that they came across on a regular basis.

“There are sacks and sacks of food aid on sale in the main market. And all of those houses in E-north,(a smart neighbourhood where large colonnaded houses are being built) - they’ve all been built with stolen development money,” one said.

“The corruption in Mauritania really is unbelievable,” said another. “I’m supposed to be giving out free condoms, but I have to accept the fact that half of what I bring into the country ends up being sold out of pharmacies,” said another humanitarian worker.

“Things are bad, but I can imagine it will only get worse when they get their hands on the oil money,” he said.

“Politics is marked by corruption,” veteran opposition leader and former central bank chairman Ahmed Ould Daddah told IRIN. “It is politics for the group in power not for Mauritanian.”

“If that does not change, if the government does not open up to dialogue with the political opposition, if they do not allow criticism and discussion and develop a system of justice in which we can have confidence, then oil will be a disaster - it will be a curse for Mauritania,” said Ould Daddah.

Calls for dialogue

Ould Daddah, half brother of Mauritania’s first president Moktar Ould Daddah, was recently imprisoned on charges of funding an attempted coup d’etat against Ould Taya, a former army colonel who has ruled Mauritania with an iron hand for 21 years.

Last year, the government put on trial a total of 195 defendants accused of plotting three successive attempts to topple Ould Taya. The trial took place at a remote police barracks in the desert, some 50 km east of the capital, Nouakchott.

Most of the defendants were soldiers accused of taking part in a bloody uprising in June 2003 which was eventually put down by forces loyal to Ould Taya. Others, including a number of civilian opposition leaders were accused of mounting two further attempts to topple the president in August and September 2004 which were nipped in the bud.

The prosecution demanded a five years in jail for Ould Daddah, who was eventually let off with a suspended sentence and released in early February.

Speaking from his headquarters of his Assembly of Democratic Forces (RFD) party in central Nouakchott, that is still draped with the banner calling from his release from prison, Ould Daddah stressed that dialogue was essential for Mauritania’s future peace and security.

The opposition parties, which range in hue from pro-western liberals to Islamic fundamentalists, are petitioning for a national dialogue with Ould Taya and a new era of open-door government, but with little conviction that they will get it.

“I have met President Ould Taya on two occasions, but only to shake his hand. In all his 21 years in power, I have never had a discussion with him,” said Ould Daddah, who looked thin after spending several months in prison.

Ould Taya rarely makes public appearances, and according to lawyers and journalists, selected foreign reporters have been  paid handsomely to visit Mauritania in order to write favourable articles about the president and his country.

Indeed, one local journalist told IRIN that these are the only kind of interviews the president is comfortable with.

“Ould Taya has a problem in expressing himself - he is not used to speaking with journalists. If he has a decision he hands it to his spokesman to make the announcement,” the journalist said.

Widespread pessimism

Few have any illusion that anyone but Ould Taya takes all the important government decisions.

“The government is not a team - it does not work together to obtain results," Ebety, the outspoken lawyer, said. "They are simply enforcing the orders of the President,” he added.

“The head of state is totally cut off from reality - that is a big problem - he is surrounded by his supporters and allies,” Ebety said.

Ould Taya came to power in a military coup in 1984. Elections in 1992, 1997 and 2003 were marred by allegations of voter intimidation and electoral fraud.

“There is no possibility for a change of government through the electoral system in Mauritania as things stand now,” said Ould Daddah.

The veteran opposition leader said he condemned violence unreservedly, but he warned that without dialogue and efforts to truly democratise the Mauritanian political system, tensions would only mount.

“The opposition does not want violence, but it’s like physics, if you block all the escape routes the pressure will build until it explodes,” he said.

Copyright © IRIN 2005
The material contained on www.IRINnews.org comes to you via IRIN, a UN humanitarian news and information service, but may not necessarily reflect the views of the United Nations or its agencies. All IRIN material may be reposted or reprinted free-of-charge; refer to the IRIN copyright page for conditions of use.  IRIN is a project of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.

See "Mauritania's Poor Skeptical on Oil Riches", Washington Post, August 2005

Western Sahara

Western Sahara hold possibly the world's richest fishing grounds. Contained within its borders are significant untapped phosphate and oil reserves.

The area is also home to one of the world's longest-running conflicts. Morocco which marched into the territory in 1975 under invitation from Spain, the departing colonial power -- and the native Sahawari people and their national liberation movement, the Polisario Front

Before the ceasefire, the war cost thousands of lives and disappearances and prompted Morocco's King Hassan to construct the huge fortified wall around two-thirds of the desert.

The Sahawari are nomadic tribes, formed from a mixture of Arabic, Berber, and black African cultures, their ancestors were Yemeni Arabs who originally traveled across north Africa in the 13th century. Sahawaris now live in refugee camps inside southwestern Algeria, or under harsh repression in Moroccan-controlled territory.

About 165,000 Sahawaris live in the Algerian camps (plus another 65,000 in the Moroccan "Occupied Territories"), which are run on a semi-autonomous basis by the Polisario -- or, as they call themselves, the Sahawari Arab Democratic Republic. Set up during frequent bombing by Moroccan jets (which also attacked the refugee columns fleeing the Western Sahara), the camps are still here, 24 years later.

In October 2002, of two large contracts were signed between international oil companies and the Moroccan government to explore promising oil fields off the coast of Western Sahara.

The companies are TotalElfFina and Kerr McGee. Under the contracts, TotalFinaElf may explore 115, 000 kilometre square area off the coast of Dakhla Western Sahara for a 12 month period. Kerr McGee signed a deal to explore 110, 000 kilometre square area of deep water off the northern coast of Western Sahara.

President of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, Mohamed Abdelaziz, said that contracts signed by oil companies Kerr McGee and TotalFinaElf to explore the oil resources offshore Western Sahara were a "provocation." The President appealed to the United Nations to annul the contracts with Morocco because they violate international law.

President Abdelaziz claim this on behalf of the UN refusal to recognise the Moroccan occupation of Western Sahara and the territory's status as a colony. They refer to a 1991 UN resolution, stating that "the exploitation and plundering of colonial and non-self-governing territories by foreign economic interests, in violation of the relevant resolutions of the United Nations is a grave threat to the integrity and prosperity of those Territories."

According to the US Geological Survey of World Energy, year 2000, estimated oil and gas resources off the Saharan coast are substantial and the probability (including both geologic and accessibility probabilities) of finding lucrative oil and gas fields is very high. While it is assessed that Western Sahara has relative large and probable offshore oil resources, numbers for Morocco proper are low and insecure.

The Paris-based oil multi TotalFinaElf announced that it "has signed a reconnaissance contract with the Moroccan state oil company, Office National de Recherches et d'Exploitations Pétrolières (ONAREP), for the Dakhla Offshore zone. Located offshore the town of Dakhla, the zone covers an area of 115,000 km2." Dakhla was the capital of the Spanish Western Sahara colony before 1975.

According to a TotalFinaElf release, "the contract covers an initial period of 12 months, during which regional geological and geophysical studies will be undertaken in order to assess the petroleum potential of the zone. These studies will complement the knowledge base that TotalFinaElf has been building-up over several years along the length of the Atlantic coast of Africa.

The American oil company Kerr-McGee is far more restrictive on its information. The company's website only informs that Kerr-McGee is involved in "focusing on international deepwater opportunities offshore ... Morocco, ... where it has lease positions". In November 2001, the US company has acquired 33.33 percent interest in the 3 million-acre Cap Draa Haute Mer exploration license offshore Morocco.

Earlier operations abandoned

Previous attempts to explore Western Sahara oil resources have all been abandoned due to the political risks. Gulf Oil, WB Grace, Texaco and Standard Oil were considering a joint venture with the Spanish authorities in the 1960s.

In the second half of the 1960's the US companies Pan American Hispano Oil, Caltex, Gulf Oil and Phillips undertook an exploration of 2443.192 hectares of Western Saharan desert which led to the discovery of a small layer of 100 km at Faim el Oued. In total 27 strata of oil were discovered in 1964.

In 1978, offshore blocks were awarded to Philips and BP but were quickly abandoned because of the war. In the basin between El Ayoun, Western Saharan capital and Tarfaya (Morocco) bituminous shale was discovered with reserves of 100 million barrels of crude but this can only profitably be extracted if oil prices rise to US$ 40 a barrel. Shell signed a contract to build a treatment works in 1981 but the work was never completed.

Sources: UK Sahara Campaign, AARASD, afrol archives. 2002
Nick Ryan. North Africa's Forgotten War: Western Sahara. 1999

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