
Briefing on the CMATS Treaty

By Juvinal Dias and Charles Scheiner

La'o Hamutuk


Timor-Leste Institute for Development Monitoring and Analysis


21 February 2013





Basic concepts

- Treaty, Contract, Agreement
- Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)
- International law
- Median Line, continental shelf
- International Conventions: UNCLOS, Vienna
- Field Development Plan
- Regulators National Petroleum Authority (ANP) and Australia











History, continued

- 1999 Timor-Leste free from Indonesia
- 2002 Timor-Leste restores its independence
- 2002 TL and Australia sign Timor Sea Treaty (90:10)
- 2003 Australia finally ratifies the Timor Sea Treaty, after TL signs the IUA (Sunrise International Unitization Agreement)
- This allows Bayu-Undan development to proceed.
- 2006 TL and Australia sign CMATS Treaty
- 2007 TL and Australia ratify CMATS, and also ratify IUA
- 2008 Eni discovers Kitan, the only field since 1997
- 2010 Woodside decides to prefer Floating LNG

CMATS

Certain Maritime Arrangements in the Timor Sea



- Signed in Sydney 12 January 2006.
- TL ratified on 20 February 2007.
- Australia ratified on 22
 February 2007, without approval from Australia's Parliament.

- Neither Australia nor Timor-Leste shall assert, pursue or further by any means in relation to the other Party its claims to sovereign rights and jurisdiction and maritime boundaries for
- The period of this Article does not prevent a Party from continuing activities (including the regulation and authorisation of existing and new activities) in areas in which its domestic of existing and new activities; in areas in which its consistence legislation on 19 May 2002 authorised the granting of permission for conducting activities in relation to petroleum or other resources of the seabed and subsoil.
- Notwithstanding any other bilateral or multilateral agreement binding on the Parties, or any declaration made by either Party pursuant to any such agreement, neither Party shall commence or pursue any proceedings against the other Party before any court, tribunal or other dispute settlement mechanism that
- court, tribunal or other dispute settlement mechanism that would raise or result in, either directly or indirectly, issues or findings of relevance to maritime boundaries or delimitation in the Timor Sea. Any court, tribunal or other dispute settlement body hearing proceedings involving the Parties shall not consider, make comment on, nor make findings that would raise or result in, either directly or indirectly, issues or findings of **relevance to maritime boundaries or delimitation in the Timor Sea**. Any such comment or finding shall be of and effect, and shall not be relied upon, or cited,
- by the Parties at any time.

 Neither Party shall raise or pursue in any international organisation matters that are, directly or indirectly, relevant to aritime boundaries or delimitation in the Timor Sea.
- The Parties shall not be under an obligation to negotiate permanent maritime boundaries for the period of this Treaty.
- Article 5: Division of Revenues from the Unit Area The Parties shall share equally revenue derived directly from the production of that petroleum lying within the Unit Area in so far as the revenue relates to the upstream exploitation of that petroleum. Australia shall make a [monthly] payment to Timor-Leste equivalent
- to half the Australian revenue component and the Timor-Leste revenue component, less the Timor-Leste revenue.

visions (1)

- Doesn't decide (Art. 2) and blocks discussions about maritime boundaries for fifty years (Art. 4).
- **Extends Timor Sea Treaty from** 2033 to 2057 or longer (Art. 3).
- **Enables exploitation of fields** outside the JPDA (Sunrise, Laminaria-Corallina) (Art. 4.2).
- Shares "upstream" oil revenues from Greater Sunrise 50/50 (Art. 5).

CMATS Provisions (2)

Article 12: Period of this Treaty

- 1. Subject to paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of this Article, this Treaty shall remain in force until the date $\bf 50$ years after its entry into force, or until the date five years after the exploitation of the Unit Area ceases,
 - (a) a development plan for the Unit Area has not been approved in accordance with paragraph 1 of Article 12 of the Sunrise IUA within six years after the date of entry into force of this Treaty; or (b) production of petroleum from the Unit Area has not commenced within ten years after the date of entry into force of this Treaty;
- either Party may notify the other Party in writing that it wishes to terminate this Treaty, in which case the Treaty shall cease to be in force three calendar months after such notice is given.
- 3. Should ${\bf petroleum\ production\ take\ place\ }$ in the Unit Area subsequent to the termination of this Treaty pursuant to paragraph 2 of this Article, all the terms of this **Treaty shall come back into force** and
- operate from the date of commencement of production.

 4. The following provisions of this Treaty shall survive termination of this Treaty, and the Parties shall continue to be bound by them after

- rnimation:

 (a) Article 2;

 (b) the second sentence of paragraph 5 of Article 4;


 (c) paragraph 3 of this Article; and

 (d) this paragraph.


 The period of this Treaty referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article may be extended by agreement in writing between the Parties


- Article 11: Dispute Settlement
 Any disputes about the interpretation or application of this Treaty shall be settled by consultation or negotiation.

 Any disputes will be resolved by negotiation (Art. 11).
 - Either country can give notice to terminate this Treaty after 23 Feb. 2013 if no development plan has been approved, or if there is no production by 2017 (Art. 12.2).
 - If Sunrise begins production in the future, CMATS will come back into force (Art. 12.3), including the 50-50 split.









CMATS advantages for TL



- Increase TL's share of Greater Sunrise extraction revenues from 18.1% to 50%.
- Give security to investors that the Greater Sunrise regime is stable so the project can proceed.

CMATS disadvantages for TL



- Blocks chance for Timor-Leste to achieve its boundary rights until the oil and gas fields are dry.
- Allows Australia to keep stealing oil and gas wealth from occupied seabed territory like Laminaria-Corallina.

What if TL terminates?



Advantage:

It will be possible to negotiate maritime boundaries to reclaim TL's sovereign rights over the Timor Sea, including Greater Sunrise, the Joint Petroleum Development Area and Laminaria-Corallina fields.

Should we terminate or not?



- TL should terminate CMATS only when we know that Australia will negotiate maritime boundaries in good faith.
- If we don't give notice today, we can do it later, if Sunrise is still stalled.
- We need to evaluate the interest and power of the Australian people to change their government's policy.

But

Terminating CMATS will not end or affect the four Greater Sunrise contracts with Woodside, Shell, ConocoPhillips and Osaka Gas which were signed in 2003.

Can TL pursue legal avenues?

The Government of Australia further declares, under paragraph 1(a) of article 298 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea done at Montego Bay on the tenth day of December one thousand nine hundred and eighty-two, that it does not accept any of the procedures provided for in section 2 of Part XV (including the procedures referred to in paragraphs (a) and (b) of this declaration) with respect to disputes concerning the interpretation or application of articles 15, 74 and 83 relating to sea boundary delimitations as well as those involving historic bays or titles.

Summary of the purpose of the proposed treaty action and why it is in the national interest

8. The purpose of the treaty action is to place some limitations on Australia's acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The changes are in line with the Government's view that that countries like Australia that have a broad and long term acceptance of the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice are not exposed to the possibility of litigation by countries that only accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court for a short time or for a specific purpose. It is also the Government's view that maritime boundary disputes are best resolved through negotiation and not litigation.

Australia's declaration in March 2002

What are the obstacles to future negotiations?



- Australia has long demonstrated its desire to expand its access to oil and gas fields in the Timor Sea.
- Australia infringes on the maritime territory of their other neighbors through bilateral negotiations.



 Australia's culture, society and politics are greedy, and they don't want to lose billions of dollars in oil revenues.

What makes TL strong?



- **UNCLOS 1982**
- Timor-Leste's people and society, and international solidarity
- \$12 billion in our Petroleum Fund (compared with zero in 2002-2005)



- **Unfortunately:**
 - Australia already withdraw from compulsory processes to resolve maritme boundary disputes under UNCLOS and ICJ.
 - National and international movements on the Timor Sea are dormant or dead.
 - We are spending a lot from our PF.

What is best for TL to do?



- Demand a maritime boundary based on international legal principles.
- Encourage national and international movements for Timor Sea justice.
- Invest in non-oil economic sectors.
- Control state expenditures to avoid emptying the Petroleum Fund.
- Petroleum revenues: receive, use, save and invest.

For more information

Visit www.laohamutuk.org or

http://laohamutuk.blogspot.com/

Thank you.