Viewing cable 06JAKARTA2532, SENATOR FEINGOLD’S FEBRUARY 23 MEETING WITH

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| Subject: | FOREIGN MINISTER WIRAJUDA                                    | JAKARTA 0002532 001.2 OF 003                                             |

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**1. (C) Introduction and Summary.** In a February 23 meeting with Senator Russell Feingold, Indonesian Foreign Minister Wirajuda expressed optimism that Indonesia's historic experience with Islamic fundamentalism would eventually lead to success in stemming the current threat posed by Muslim extremists and terrorist groups such as Jemaah Islamiyah. He explained Indonesia's approach to seeking accountability for crimes against humanity in East Timor, saying that the bilateral Truth and Friendship Commission offers the best prospects. With regard to Papua, Wirajuda stressed that the Special Autonomy Law is the basis for the GOI's approach to resolving the conflict, but he defended the GOI's policy of excluding foreign journalists from the province. Wirajuda explained that the GOI had decided to abstain in the IAEA Board of Governors vote on referring Iran to the UN Security Council because it had believed that there was still time to reach a negotiated resolution. Wirajuda conceded that the U.S. invasion of Iraq and detention center at Guantanamo had damaged America's image in the eyes of many Indonesians. End Summary.

Counter-Terrorism and Muslim Extremism

**2. (C) Senator Russell Feingold, accompanied by Ambassador and professional staff members Grey Frandsen and Evan Gottesman, met with Indonesian Foreign Minister Has san Wirajuda on February 23. Senator Feingold greeted Foreign Minister Wirajuda, recalling their last meeting at a Washington luncheon hosted by Senate Majority Leader Frist. He stressed the importance of the United States' relationship with Indonesia, saying that he personally was engaged on bilateral issues including military-to-military relations; the 2002 murders of two Amcits near Timika, Papua; and human rights. He asked Wirajuda to offer an assessment of the current terrorist threat in Indonesia. Wirajuda said that the terrorists' goal was creation of an Islamic state. He then offered a historic perspective, noting that Indonesia had dealt with this issue since independence in 1945. He explained that Indonesia's founding fathers had rejected the option of making Indonesia an Islamic republic, and opted instead for a pluralistic society. Again in the 50's and 60's, the GOI had fought armed insurgencies seeking to impose sharia law in South Sulawesi, Sumatra, and West Java. Currently in Indonesia, he said, there were groups that used the democratic process to press for sharia law, while others have turned to violence. However, because of its historic experience with earlier groups advocating these goals, Indonesia has not been as shocked as some of its neighbors by...
the emergence of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI).

3. (C) Senator Feingold inquired whether Wirajuda believed that JI was growing stronger or weaker. Wirajuda said that particularly following the killing of the bomber Azahari, it appeared that JI was growing weaker. He said that Indonesia's historic experience shows that the vast majority of Indonesians reject violent approaches. The GOI's strategy for combating extremists involves "empowering the moderates" by promoting domestic and international inter-faith dialogues.

4. (C) Senator Feingold commented that he was encouraged by this approach, pointing out that many Americans were not aware of Indonesia's tradition of religious moderation. Wirajuda agreed, saying that Indonesian Islam is different from forms of Islam that occur in an Arab cultural context. Islamic extremists in Indonesia, he said, had adopted or were influenced by Arab cultural traits.

East Timor
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5. (C) Senator Feingold said that another of his concerns was crimes against humanity committed during Indonesia's occupation of East Timor. He said that he welcomed the creation of the Commission on Truth and Friendship, but stressed that there must be accountability for past crimes.

6. (C) Wirajuda acknowledged that previous efforts, such as East Timor's Serious Crimes Unit and Indonesian prosecutions, had proven unsatisfactory. After initial debate, he said, GOI and the Government of East Timor had agreed to set up the Truth and Friendship Commission as an initiative to establish accountability. Wirajuda said, however, that the Commission's Terms of Reference stipulated that it would provide an amnesty and would not lead to further prosecutions. He stressed that the Commission was primarily a means to promoting greater reconciliation. Wirajuda noted also that the governments of Indonesia and East Timor were making good progress on other residual issues such as border demarcation.

7. (C) Senator Feingold responded that while he continued to urge that those responsible for crimes against humanity in East Timor be prosecuted, he welcomed other efforts to promote closure. He commented that this matter continues to require serious attention.

Papua
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8. (C) Turning to Papua, Senator Feingold said that he was increasingly concerned about conditions in that region, including underdevelopment, heavy-handed tactics by the Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI), and an influx of non-Papuan settlers. He stressed that the United States fully supports Indonesia's territorial integrity, and asked what strategy the GOI has taken to address the Papuan problem.

9. (C) Wirajuda explained that the armed insurgency in Papua was insignificant, and certainly not comparable to the Aceh conflict. He explained that the GOI was trying to fully implement Papua's Special Autonomy Law, which provides for increased revenue sharing with Papua's provincial and district governments, but corruption and poor capacity were serious problems for those levels of administration. With regard to the division of Papua into two provinces, which has been challenged by both Papuan and foreign critics of the GOI, Wirajuda pointed out that Papua New Guinea - the eastern half of the island - is divided into 20 provinces.

10. (C) Senator Feingold stressed that he was concerned by reports of human rights violations in Papua, and asked about the GOI's policy of forbidding foreign journalists access. Wirajuda responded that the GOI "must be selective" because the activities of journalists could "distract" efforts to settle the problem. Indonesia's visa policy was generally liberal, he said, but the GOI was nonetheless wary of journalists who might "fan the flames" of conflict. The Ambassador urged the GOI to reconsider its position, pointing out that in Aceh, permitting access to journalists has resulted in improved media coverage. Keeping Papua closed, he said, hurts Indonesia.

11. (C) Senator Feingold thanked Wirajuda for the GOI's progress on case of the murders of two American citizens in a 2002 shooting in Timika, Papua. He asked how Wirajuda envisioned next steps in the case. Wirajuda responded that the GOI remained committed to seeing the case through to a trial and convictions, but was concerned about the affair potentially being exploited by Papuan separatists. He said that everyone within the GOI had agreed with the decision to move the venue of the trial from Jayapura to Jakarta, where it would create less agitation among separatists. Senator Feingold assured Wirajuda that he would remain engaged on the
Senator Feingold invited Wirajuda to explain Indonesia's decision to abstain during the recent IAEA Board of Governors vote on whether to refer the Iranian nuclear program to the U.N. Security Council. Wirajuda reiterated Indonesia's commitment to non-proliferation, but also to the inalienable right for NPT signatories to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. He said that in talks with Iran, Indonesia had encouraged it to pursue Russia's offer to develop a joint program, to continue dialogue with the EU-3, and to permit IAEA inspectors to continue to monitor Iran's activities. The problem, Wirajuda said, was a "lack of trust." In the end, Wirajuda said, Indonesia had abstained on the vote because it believed that there was time to reach a negotiated settlement before the March 6 meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors.

Indonesian Perceptions of U.S. Policies
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Senator Feingold asked the Foreign Minister whether U.S. policies in Iraq had negatively impacted Indonesian perceptions of the U.S. Wirajuda said that this had been the case "at first," and that some Indonesians were concerned that there was an escalating confrontation between the Christian and Muslim worlds. Senator Feingold asked whether this had also been a factor in Indonesia's thinking on the Iranian nuclear program. Wirajuda conceded that this was a factor in terms of domestic perceptions of the issue, but repeated that the GOI's decision to abstain had been mainly driven by the desire to give diplomacy more time to work. The Minister said that he privately believed that the U.S. detention facility at Guantanamo Bay was hurting the United States' image. He had personally agreed with the Malaysian Foreign Minister's call to shut down Guantanamo, although he had chosen not to express this publicly.

CODEL Feingold has cleared this message.

PASCOE