Topics to discuss

1. Petroleum dependency – Timor-Leste is cursed by its (lack of diverse) resources.

2. The state budget and national economy are not sustainable.

3. If wishes were horses ... dreams should (mostly) be based on reality.

4. Justice and land rights (no time today, but in handout).
History in one slide

- People have lived in Timor-Leste for at least 5,000 years.
- Portuguese colonized nearly 500 years ago.
  - They brought Catholicism but little development or education.
  - Onshore oil exploration started in 1890s.
- Australia, then Japan, invaded in 1941-45.
  - 40,000-60,000 Timorese killed in WWII, which didn’t involve them.
- Portugal’s military dictatorship resumed control in 1945.
  - Offshore oil exploration began in the 1960s.
- Portugal began decolonizing in 1974.
  - After Carnation Revolution brought down Portuguese dictatorship
  - TL declared independence 28 November 1975 … but 10 days later
- Indonesia invaded on 7 December 1975.
  - Indonesia killed 100,000-200,000 Timorese in 24-year occupation.
- Referendum in 1999, then 2½ years of UN rule.
- Finally restored independence on 20 May 2002.

1. Petroleum Dependency

Timor-Leste is one of the most petroleum-export dependent countries in the world. This determines our State, our economy and our future.
La'o Hamutuk for ANU Seminar

27 November 2013

Basic Statistics

• More than half of Timor-Leste’s people live in poverty, and the number is growing.

• 80% of the people live in rural areas, largely by subsistence farming.

• About 1,500 Timorese children under 5 years old die from preventable conditions every year ... about 20 times the number of people who die from physical violence.

• More children die from diarrhea than malaria, and our malaria rate is among the highest in the world. Sanitation and malnutrition are endemic.

By 2020, 250,000 more babies will have been born, and the only producing oil and gas fields will be used up.

How will they survive?
**Petroleum Dependency**

- Projected state revenues in 2014: $2,380 million
  - $2,213 million (93%) will be from oil (incl. $770m investment return)
  - $166 million (7%) will be from non-petroleum sources

- 2014 State Budget: $1,500 million
  - $903 million (60%) will be taken from the Petroleum Fund in 2014.
  - $430 million (29%) more is from the Petroleum Fund in the past and future.

- Non-oil GDP in 2011: $1,046 million
  - Petroleum GDP in 2011: $3,463 million (81%)

- State activities, paid for with oil money, are about half of our "non-oil" economy, because some of this money circulates in the local economy.

- Balance of trade (2012): $664m imports, $31m exports.

- Petroleum "income" goes to the State, not the people.

**South Sudan (and Equatorial Guinea?) are the only countries which depend more on oil and gas exports than Timor-Leste.**

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**Australia is more "oil-rich" than Timor-Leste**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Timor-Leste</th>
<th>Australia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Known oil and gas reserves per citizen</td>
<td>797 barrels</td>
<td>1,178 barrels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How long they will last at 2012 production rates</td>
<td>14 years</td>
<td>58 years</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Timor-Leste has already received 60% of the revenues from Bayu-Undan and Kitan, and they could end in seven years.

Oil is running out quickly!

| Table 2.5.3.2.2: Petroleum Wealth and the Estimated Sustainable Income (ESI), $ millions |
|---------------------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
|                                 | 2013 BBI | 2014 Budget | 2015     | 2016     | 2017     | 2018     |
| Estimated Sustainable           | 787.0    | 632.3     | 638.7    | 628.4    | 616.0    | 612.8    |
| Income (PWx3%)                  |          |           |          |          |          |          |
| Total Petroleum Wealth (PW)     | 26,231.7 | 21,076.3  | 21,291.0 | 20,947.4 | 20,534.9 | 20,425.9 |
| Opening PF Balance              | 10,776.7 | 14,058.5  | 15,369.0 | 16,431.1 | 17,548.5 | 18,723.9 |
| Net Present Value of Future     |          |           |          |          |          |          |
| Revenues                        | 15,455.0 | 7,017.8   | 5,922.0  | 4,516.3  | 2,986.4  | 1,702.0  |

Source: Petroleum Fund Administration Unit

This table, from the 2014 budget proposal, shows how quickly our future revenues will decline, as the ESI falls every year.
Australian companies began exploring Sunrise in the early 1970s, after Australia and Indonesia divided our maritime resources without involving Portugal. In 1989, they closed the “Timor Gap” to share illegally occupied resources in the Joint Development Area.

The 2006 CMATS treaty bans maritime boundaries discussion for 50 years. It divides Sunrise upstream revenues 50-50.

Australia put its greed for oil before respect for its sovereign neighbors or international law.

Based on UNCLOS, TL owns everything north of the median line.
Conspiring to steal Timor’s wealth

1989:
Foreign ministers
Gareth Evans and Ali Alatas toast the signing of the Timor Gap Treaty while flying over the Timor Sea.

Australia is still stealing 40%.

This graph includes known fields which would belong 100% to Timor-Leste under the international law median line principle: Bayu-Undan, Elang-Kakatua, Greater Sunrise, Kitan, Laminaria-Corallina and Buffalo.
The occupation continues

Timor-Leste’s Petroleum Revenue Streams
Totals for 2012. All figures in millions of U.S. dollars. Numbers in italics are estimates.

- **Purchasers of condensate & LPG**
  - Bayu-Undan joint venture: ConocoPhillips (33%), Santos (37%), ENPEX (17%), ENI (3%), Tokyo Electric and Gas (9%)
  - Tax to Australia: $67
  - PDO, B-U liquid taxes for 2012: $875
  - Company operating costs & profit: $603

- **Purchasers of LNG**
  - Bayu-Undan gas liquefied in Darwin
  - $340 B-U overdue taxes for past years
  - $1,971 B-U/FTP (royalty)

- **Purchasers of oil**
  - Kitan joint venture: M1 (40%), INPEX (25%), Talisman (25%)
  - Kitan taxes: $397
  - Tax to Australia: $32
  - National Petroleum Authority (Australia-TL joint agency): TL share 80% = $1,957

**Timor-Leste Petroleum Fund**
End-of-2012 balance $11,775 million

- Autonomous agencies: $19
- Domestic revenues: $118
- $665 ESI transferred
- $830 more than ESI transferred

**Timor-Leste State Budget**
$1,135 million spent during 2012

- Donor-funded projects: $554
- $681 recurrent
- $503 capital
- $671 carried over to 2013

State operations & services:
- Education, health, infrastructure, public works, police, agriculture, veterans, administration, social assistance, F-DTL, courts, administration, etc.
If current trends continue, TL will be unable to finance its budget in 13 years.

- Surplus plan approved in 2016 with surplus TL. Surplus has 5.11% and TL gets 50% of it. Natural gas is worth 25% as much as oil.
- Petroleum Fund investments gained 3.8% per annum. During 2012 the fund earned 3.8% per annum.
- Domestic revenues increase 0.9%/yr now and 4.0%/yr after 2010. During 2009-2012, there was a sense (without ESTL or taxes from the state) increased 7.4%/yr. Estl increase 15% of free cost from users. It currently remains 12%.
- Expenditures 2011-12 per GDP 2014, then calculated from 1M model. Spending goes up 4.0%/yr now and 8.0%/yr after 2009. In 2009-2011, recurrent spending (less ESTL fund) went up 1.4%/yr. Annual maintenance costs 8% of installed capital.
- Includes $45m for the Tsar Maze project, $45m for Oil plant and $10m for airports and Tihor park. Includes $50m in contracted and budgeted loans.

Austerity starts in 2026, cutting 63% from planned outlays in 2027-2030.

Petroleum Fund balance
Petrol rev. + PF return
Spending (excl debt serv.)
Domestic revenues
Outstanding debt

Signs of the “resource curse” (1)

- Acting as if the oil money will last forever
  Bayu-Undan and Kitan will be dry by 2020.
- Borrowing today, to repay tomorrow
  TL will borrow $502 million in the next six years, often for projects with little chance of return.
- Lack of realistic long-term planning
  The Strategic Development Plan 2011-2030 is but a dream.
- Seeing money as the solution to every problem
  It’s easier to buy a scholarship than to build a university.
- Spending without thinking
  Recurrent expenditures go up more than 20%/year; projects often produce little result or return.
Signs of the “resource curse” (2)

• **Import dependency**
  In 2011, TL’s non-oil balance of payments deficit was $1.5 billion.

• **Inflation from little local productive capacity**
  Our productive economy cannot absorb the cash in circulation

• **Ignoring non-oil development and revenues**

• **Benefits go mostly to the urban elite.**
  Most people won’t use highways, airports and oil facilities ... but will share the costs of paying for them.

• **Petroleum “captures” decision-making.**
  Agriculture, tourism, small industries, etc. don’t get a “fair go.”

2. Unsustainable budget and economy

*Timor-Leste has almost no industry and a tiny private sector.*

*Our State Budget has grown faster than nearly every country in the world.*
State Budgets 2002-2014

State Revenues and Expenditures (including auton. agencies)

- The narrow bars show revenues from various sources.
- The yellow and red striped area is loans which must be repaid in the future.
- The blue part shows unspent money carried over from the previous year to be spent this year.
- The green part is new oil revenue from taxes, fees and autonomous agencies.
- Most financing is from the Petroleum Fund (pink and purple), with the darker purple showing the Estimated Sustainable Income (ESI).

Graph by La'o Hamutuk based on RDTL Ministry of Finance data and projections. 26 October 2013

The 2014 Budget will neglect farmers, students, and health care.

Allocation of the proposed 2014 State Budget (US $1,500 million)

Graph by La'o Hamutuk based on proposed 2014 RDTL General State Budget. October 2013
La'o Hamutuk for ANU Seminar

27 November 2013

Income in the 2014 state budget

Total revenue: $1,500 million, of which 88% is from past, present and future oil and gas income.

Donor support is less important now.

Percentage of Donor Support in Combined Sources Budget

Graph by La'o Hamutuk based on the proposed 2014 State Budget, October 2013
Budget Execution 2011-2013

Budget Execution in cash by month (through 28 Oct. 2013)

Infrastructure Fund in 2013

Ezekusaun Fundu Infraestructura hafoin trimestra tolu iha tinan 2013
Alokasaun total tokon $604

Graph by La'o Hamutuk from RDTL Budget Transparency Portal, 28 October 2013
Real Threats to Real Security

• Human security is health care, food, education, employment, housing, etc.
• 20 times as many Timorese children under five die from avoidable conditions as people are killed by violence.
• These children will not be helped by police, soldiers or judges, but many donors prioritize the “security sector,” seeing everything through a conflict lens.
• We must diversify our economy and strengthen our people and workers to prepare for the day our oil runs out and we can no longer pay for imports.

Timor-Leste’s Balance of Trade

The graph shows legal goods trade only. About 89% of donor spending and more than 70% of state spending leaves the country.
We have a $1.5 billion trade deficit, covered by oil revenues...for now.

Timor-Leste’s Balance of Payments (goods & services)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Oil revenues</th>
<th>Non-oil Exports</th>
<th>Imports</th>
<th>Non-oil balance</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2010</td>
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<td>2011</td>
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<tr>
<td>2012</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Graph by La’o Hamutuk based on Central Bank Balance of Payments data, July 2013

Timor-Leste changes every year.

• **Population**
  is increasing 2.4% per year, doubling in less than 29 years (the post-war “baby boom” will become parents).

• **Inflation**
  Consumer prices increased more than 11% during 2012.

**People’s needs and desires will increase as the nation develops.**
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Timor-Leste is struggling to find jobs for 15,000 people who will enter the work force in 2013.

By 2024, it will almost 30,000 each year, and the oil will be gone. Today’s youth will have children of their own.

Many children will become youth.

Year-on-year inflation

Inflation since 2009 comes from the government spending more than the economy can absorb.
Agriculture will get 2.3% of state expenditures in 2014, although it is the livelihood of 75% of the population.

What do 600,000 working-age Timorese do for work?

- Farmers, fishers, other informal or unemployed: 71%
- Self-employed (taxi, market, kios): 8%
- Local & Int’l NGOs: 0.3%
- $3/day labor for gov’t: 6%
- Public employees: 7%
- UN, embassies, int’l agencies: 0.7%
- Private businesses: 9%
- Petroleum sector: 0.1%
We have a few rich, but many poor.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income (including non-cash)</th>
<th>Expenditure (including non-cash)</th>
<th>Share of expended petroleum wealth</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$1,000</td>
<td>$900</td>
<td>$800</td>
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<tr>
<td>$800</td>
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<tr>
<td>$200</td>
<td>$100</td>
<td>$0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The richest 10% receive 14 times as much as the poorest 10%.
The black line shows the amount withdrawn from the Petroleum Fund in 2011, if it were shared equally by every Timor-Leste citizen.

Segment of Timor-Leste’s population, by income

Graphic by La'o Hamutuk based on DGS 2011 Household Income and Expenditure Survey, June 2013

Dili is very different from the districts.

From Timor-Leste Demographic and Health Survey 2009-2010

Table 2.11: Wealth quintiles
Percent distribution of the de jure population by wealth quintiles, according to residence and region, Timor-Leste 2009-10

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Residence/region</th>
<th>Wealth quintile</th>
<th>Lowest</th>
<th>Second</th>
<th>Middle</th>
<th>Fourth</th>
<th>Highest</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Number of population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Residence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td></td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>57.9</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>17,052</td>
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<td>Rural</td>
<td></td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>53,134</td>
</tr>
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<td>District</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aileu</td>
<td></td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>2,785</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ainaro</td>
<td></td>
<td>30.9</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>3,830</td>
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<td>Baucau</td>
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<td>28.9</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>15.5</td>
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<td>3,590</td>
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<td>Bobonaro</td>
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<td>15.2</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>26.1</td>
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<td>11.1</td>
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<td>Codrlina</td>
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<td>20.1</td>
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<td>6.4</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>6.3</td>
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<td>Ermera</td>
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<td>9.8</td>
<td>30.2</td>
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<td>25.3</td>
<td>25.1</td>
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<td>38.3</td>
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<td>18.3</td>
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<td>17.1</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>100.0</td>
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<td>35.3</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>4,730</td>
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<td>19.9</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>66,905</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

More than 70% of Dili’s population are among the wealthiest 20% of Timorese, while only 2% are below the poverty line.

More than half of families outside Dili live in poverty.
More than \( \frac{3}{4} \) of GDP is from oil.

The non-oil, non-state GDP is stagnant.
Our businesses don’t invest in themselves.

How businesses spent the money they received in 2011

3. Unrealistic dreams

Current plans for development will not sustainably improve people’s lives.

They rely on Greater Sunrise gas, which is limited and may never come to TL’s land or treasury.
The Strategic Development Plan

- Issued July 2011, promises to make TL an Upper Middle Income Country by 2030.
- A vision and dream, not a realistic plan.
- Focuses on physical infrastructure, not sustainable development.
- Will require loans and spending beyond TL’s means.

Tasi Mane petroleum infrastructure project

- In 2010, TL began the South Coast Petroleum Corridor.
- During 2011-2013, TL spent $35 million
- Total project costs could exceed $2 billion (much more if Timor-Leste pays for the refinery, pipeline or LNG plant).
- The new budget allocates $46m in 2014 and $320m in 2015-2018, but leaves a lot out.
Tasi Mane project will include:

- **Suai**: Supply base area, Industrial estates, Nova Suai, Suai Airport, Crocodile farm
- **Betano**: Refinery and Petrochemical complex, Petroleum city (Nova Betano)
- **Beaçu**: LNG Plant complex, Nova Beaçu, Nova Viqueque, Viqueque airport.
- **Highway** from Suai to Beaçu??

Tasi Mane includes Suai supply base, Betano refinery, Beaçu LNG Plant and maybe the highway.
The Greater Sunrise stalemate

• The project is stalled because Timor-Leste and the companies do not agree on how it should be developed.

• Woodside and its partners Shell, ConocoPhillips and Osaka Gas believe a floating LNG plant in the sea is the most profitable.

• Timor-Leste wants a pipeline from Sunrise to Beaçu, to get more tax revenues and anchor the Tasi Mane project.

• Under contracts and treaties, the companies can choose the path, but both governments need to approve it.

• TL can withdraw from CMATS any time before a development plan is approved.
Problems with the Tasi Mane project

- It makes TL more dependent on the oil and gas sector.
- Dubious concepts and planning; it is unlikely to provide a reasonable return on investment.
- It neglects sustainable development (agriculture, tourism, small industries etc.), exemplifying the obsession with oil.
- Nearly all the money spent will go to foreign companies, providing hardly any local jobs or subcontracts.
- It will create social conflict, take up land, displace people, worsen health and degrade and endanger the environment.
- Cost projections leave out most expenditures, including nearly all of the highway, LNG plant and refinery.
- What if Sunrise gas doesn’t come to Timor-Leste?

The Government has made many unrealistic promises to local communities about profit-sharing, jobs and other benefits.
Is the highway really cancelled?

On 11 November, the President of TimorGAP told Parliament:

• Therefore, realistically the Construction of the Highway Project will begin in May 2014.

• In May 2014, there will be an advance payment of 20% of the project cost ($250 million) of $50 million.

• From May-December 2014, physical progress of construction can achieve 25%, which requires allocating $12.5m more, which can be allocated in a mid-year budget adjustment.
Overbuilding ports and airports

- IFC is encouraging Timor-Leste to build a port and airport far beyond realistic traffic expectations.
- How will the country pay for a $6 billion annual trade deficit after the oil is gone?

TL is going deeper into debt.

- Laws since 2009 paved the way for foreign loans.
- Last year, Timor-Leste signed contracts to borrow $107 million from Japan and the ADB.
- This month, it signed for $90 million more from the ADB and World Bank.
- During 2014-2018, it hopes to borrow half a billion dollars. See the proposed infrastructure budget:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>$51m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>$117m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>$158m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>$140m</td>
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<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>$37m</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Most loans will pay for roads.

Projects to be financed with borrowed money, 2012–2016

Currently announced loans

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>809</td>
<td>MOP</td>
<td>Construção e expansão estradas SH-Luán (L) e Aeronáutica de Estreitos desde Cruzeiro Titar a Ressaca Litoral Quatro Vias</td>
<td>5.500,00</td>
<td>5.500,00</td>
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<td>Construção e expansão estradas Shim-Gew (L)</td>
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<td>5.500,00</td>
<td>5.500,00</td>
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Implementing the SDP will require billions of dollars in loans, probably at commercial rates. Even at concessional rates, repaying a loan will permanently reduce money in the Petroleum Fund. The yen loan makes us hostage to a strong dollar. TL’s oil and gas are small and non-renewable, and future oil prices are unpredictable. TL will have to make loan repayments before spending money on people’s needs or developing other sectors. Our children and grandchildren will inherit the debt after the oil wells have run dry.
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4. Impunity and accountability

Impunity for past crimes undermines future stability, security and rule of law.

- 1975-1999: Indonesian invasion and occupation killed about 180,000 people in a systematic and planned policy executed throughout Timor-Leste.
- 2000: Indonesian Commission on Human Rights Abuses in TL (KPP HAM) reported on 1999 crimes and recommended an international mechanism.
- 2001-2004: UN-supported Serious Crimes Unit indicted 391 people for 1999 crimes. All Indonesian and most Timorese indictees live free in Indonesia.
- 2001-2005: TL’s Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR) researched history and encouraged reconciliation among Timorese. Its extensive report made 200 recommendations, including that if other processes fail, the UN should create an international tribunal.
- 2005: UN Commission of Experts (COE) reviewed legal processes to date and recommended creating an international mechanism.
- 2005: TL and Indonesian governments created the Commission of Truth and Friendship (CTF) using diplomacy to avoid individual accountability.

Until today, not one legitimate process in Indonesia or Timor-Leste has held major criminals accountable.
Indonesia’s occupation included many massacres.

Above: 1983 massacre in Kraras, Viqueque
Right: Commemorating the 10th anniversary of the 1999 Suai Church massacre. Indicted ringleader Maternus Bere was illegally freed due to Indonesian pressure on TL’s leaders.

UN Serious Crimes Unit Special Panel

The UN-supported Serious Crimes Unit indicted 391 people for 1999 crimes, tried 87 Timorese and convicted 84.

All Indonesian indictees and most Timorese are living free in Indonesia, and recent efforts to prosecute were blocked by political interference.
The Serious Crimes Unit issued an arrest warrant for former Indonesian military chief Wiranto for Crimes Against Humanity weeks before this photo was taken in Bali.

Wiranto later ran twice for President of Indonesia.
Ongoing impunity creates insecurity.

- Today, all the main perpetrators of crimes against humanity during the Indonesian occupation are free in Indonesia, including everyone responsible for the 99% of occupation-related killings committed between 1975 and 1998.
- They are all protected by the Indonesian government, and many hold high Indonesian political and military positions.
- This ongoing impunity greatly threatens peace, security, democracy, rule of law and moral values in both Timor-Leste and Indonesia.

UN Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty

“Ending impunity is an essential prerequisite to ensuring stability, peace and sustainability. The Special Rapporteur encourages the State to take measures to ensure that post-conflict justice and reconciliation is prioritized and that a legal framework is put in place to ensure that those responsible for serious crimes during the conflict are called to account for their deeds, and the victims of those crimes are able to access reparations. She also reminds the Government of Indonesia, the United Nations and the international community of the role they must play in ensuring that the perpetrators of crimes during the Indonesian occupation are brought to justice.”

June 2012 report to Human Rights Council
What happens next?

• Today, neither Indonesia, Timor-Leste nor the international community has the political will to bring these criminals to justice.

• The Commission of Experts report has never been discussed in the Security Council.

• UNMIT left Timor-Leste at the end of 2012, having failed to achieve justice.

• UN policy and global consensus says that there can never be impunity for crimes against humanity. **Chega!**

A luta continua. We continue to demand that people who violate the law be held accountable for their crimes.

5. Access to land

**Land is the base of our socio-cultural lives.**

**Recent developments could increase injustice and conflict.**
Traditional land system before Portuguese colonization and Indonesian occupation

Land functions
- Determines our origin and identity
- Place occupied by our ancestors spirits
- Socio-cultural functions linked to tradition and cosmos
- Collective economic function

Access to land
- Inheritance
- Traditional system allowing right to collective use
- Property right allowed after occupying land for a long time

Land management
- Traditional collective management system at the family and village levels (Tara Bandu).

Consequences of colonization and occupation

Introduction of a new coercive system
- Forced displacement
- Transmigration
- Taxes
- Certificates
- Corruption and stealing

Changes in land functions

Land as a strategic tool to
- Reinforce power and domination
- Support Portuguese and Indonesian economy
- Increase people’s dependency and vulnerability

Land as a commodity without soul

Privatization: communities lose rights to individuals.
Desertification: monocrop agriculture depletes soil.
Land registration in Portuguese and Indonesian times

- 200,000 parcels already registered.
- 2,843 land titles issued by Portuguese.
- 34,965 land titles issued by Indonesians including 30% through corruption.

This system transferred land ownership from Timorese families and communities to more than 100,000 non-Timorese private owners.

Land law elaboration

In 2009, the Ministry of Justice, with the support of USAID, implemented the cadastre and registration system and created the Special Regime for Determination of Ownership of Immovable Property, Expropriation Law and Real Estate Finance Fund Law.

These laws were elaborated with very limited community participation.
Land law concept

Establishment of a formal, basic land tenure system to address:
- needs of the modern urban sector
- formal land transactions
- registration.

It must also respect traditional land and customs.

Who will benefit from these land laws?

- The State.
  Land "owned" by Portuguese and Indonesian administrations automatically becomes Timor-Leste state property without considering how the occupiers got it.

- People who got certificates during Portuguese and Indonesian times.

- Rich and powerful people.
  People with a lot of land and money can pay taxes and exert disproportionate influence.
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27 November 2013

Likely consequences of the implementation of the Land Laws

Social, cultural and economic impacts:

• Land will become a commodity with no spiritual value.
• Degradation of our cultural system which is based on collective values.
• Land concentration in the hands of rich and powerful people.
• Increasing cases of eviction.
• Poor people will lose their land.
• Less land available for agriculture and production.
• Emergence of slums, landlessness and homelessness.

Use www.laohamutuk.org
Thank you.

You will find more and updated information at

- La’o Hamutuk’s website
  http://www.laohamutuk.org

- La’o Hamutuk’s blog
  http://laohamutuk.blogspot.com/

- Reference DVD-ROM available from our office.

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