Rights and Sustainability in Timor-Leste's Development

Briefing for media and others La'o Hamutuk 9 March 2012



Contents

This presentation is adapted from one that La'o Hamutuk gave to journalists on 9 March 2012. It discusses several topics that La'o Hamutuk follows which are critical to the future of Timor-Leste. We have inserted more slides to provide additional information.

- 1. TL is the second-most petroleum-export dependent country on earth. This determines our State, economy and future.
- 2. TL has almost no industry and an embryonic private sector. The State Budget increases faster than all but Zimbabwe.
- 3. Current plans for future development will not provide a sustainable improvement in our people's lives. These unrealistic dreams rely on Greater Sunrise gas, which is limited and might never come to our shores or treasury.
- 4. Impunity for past crimes threatens future rule of law.
- 5. Land is the base of our culture and lives; recent developments may increase injustice and conflict.

1. Petroleum Dependency

TL is the second-most petroleumexport dependent country on earth. This determines our State, economy and future.

Basic Statistics

- 41-50% of the people live below the poverty line.
- 80% of the people live in rural areas, largely by subsistence farming.
- More children die of diarrhea than malaria.
- About 2,000 children under age 5 die from preventable conditions every year ... about 50 times the number of Timorese who die from violence (39 in 2010).
- During the last few weeks, at least 10 people died from Dengue Fever and nobody died from election-related violence.
- In 2010, TL exported \$16 million (coffee).
- In 2010, TL imported \$288 million (everything).

Basic Statistics

By 2024, 360,000 babies will have been born, and the only producing oil and gas field will be used up.

How will they survive?

Petroleum Dependency

• State expenditures in 2012: \$1,495 million (89%) will come from the Petroleum Fund.

\$1,674 million

Non-oil GDP in 2012:

\$1,252 million

GNI in 2012:

\$4,073 million

\$2,821 million is from exporting nonrenewable oil and gas. This is 69% of our entire economy and 95% of state revenues. It is declining every year and will probably end by 2024.


- State activities paid with oil money are about half of Timor-Leste's "non-oil" economy as they are recycled through the local economy.
- Petroleum income doesn't provide jobs or money for people it all goes to the State.
- Although the Petroleum Fund can improve equity between generations, it does not guarantee good governance or prevent corruption, and will not last long if current policies continue.

South Sudan is the only country which is more oilexport-dependent than Timor-Leste.


TL's oil wealth alone cannot meet our needs.

Timor-Leste's Annual Petroleum Revenues (discounted 3.7% / year)

If Sunrise construction starts in 2016.





Oil income will continue to decline.



This Ministry of Finance graph shows that TL has already passed its peak of revenues from Bayu-Undan and Kitan.

If current trends continue, TL will be unable to finance its budget in 9 years.





Signs of the "resource curse" (1)

- Seeing money as the solution to every problem
 It's easier to buy a scholarship than to build a university.
- Spending without thinking
 State expenditures are growing 28% every year.
- Lack of realistic long-term planning
 The Strategic Development Plan is but a dream.
- Import dependency
 TL has a billion-dollar non-oil trade deficit.
- Inflation (17%) from little local productive capacity Our economy cannot absorb the cash in circulation.


Signs of the "resource curse" (2)

- Ignoring non-oil development and revenues
- Acting as if oil will last forever
 Bayu-Undan and Kitan will be dry by 2024.
- Borrowing today, to repay tomorrow
 TL will borrow more than \$460 million in the next five years, often for projects with little likelihood of return.
- Wealth goes mainly to the urban elite.
 Most people won't benefit from highways, airports and oil facilities, but will feel the burden of loan repayments.
- Petroleum sector "captures" decision-making.
 Few creative ideas to develop agriculture, education, tourism, small industries ...

Most people live in rural areas by subsistence agriculture.



UNDP HDI mainly shows oil revenues



UNDP changes its methodology nearly every year. The green lines are the methodology used in the 2011 Human Development Report, which show a slight increase in HDI during the last two years, but still lower than before the 2006 crisis. The red lines show the methodology used last year, while the blue lines are the 2009 methodology, which didn't use oil income to measure human development.

Rank scale is the fraction of countries ranking below Timor-Leste; in 2011 we ranked 147 out of 187, for a rank scale of 0.21.

The dotted lines show Gross National Income (Purchasing Power Parity) per capita, according to 2010 and 2011 methodologies. Timor-Leste's HDI is based on unchanging 2001 education data, and lifespan only increased slightly, so nearly all of the change in HDI results from changing oil revenues.


Graph by La'o Hamutuk based on information in and projections from UNDP Human Development Report. Nov. 2011

2. Unsustainable budget & economy

Timor-Leste has almost no industry and an embryonic private sector.

The State Budget increases faster than everyone except Zimbabwe.

State Budgets 2002-2012



The State Budget is growing at 28%, much faster than the economy and faster than every country except Zimbabwe.


The 2012 Budget is for infrastructure.

Allocation of the 2012 State Budget (\$1,674 million US Dollars)




Income in the 2012 state budget


Total revenue: \$1,674 million



Donor support is less important now.




We spend less on human resources.



Countries on track to meet the MDGs spend 28% of their budgets on health and education.

Timor-Leste will spend 10.4% in 2012.

What do 600,000 working-age Timorese do for work?




Real Threats to Real Security

- Human security is health care, food, education, employment, housing, etc.
- 50 times as many Timorese children under five die every year from avoidable conditions as people are killed by violence.
- These children will not be helped by police, soldiers or judges, but the UN and donors prioritize the "security sector" and see everything through a conflict lens.
- We must diversify our economy and strengthen our people and workers to prepare for the day our oil runs out and we can no longer pay for imports.





Timor-Leste's Balance of Trade



The graph shows legal goods trade only.

Coffee was 96% of all non-oil exports in 2010.

89% of donor spending and 70% of state spending goes overseas.

Timor-Leste trade in 2010

(million USD)

Category	Imports	Exports	Balance
Goods	\$289 (DNE reports)	\$17 (96% coffee)	-\$272
Other goods (extra-legal)	\$200 (LH est.)	\$0.3 (LH est.)	-\$200
Services	\$505 (2009, from BPA)	\$3 (LH est. remittances)	-\$502
Total excluding oil and gas	\$994	\$20	-\$974
Petroleum receipts (to state)		\$2,016 (incl. \$294 Petrol. Fund interest)	\$2,016
Total	\$994	\$2,036	\$1,042

Timor-Leste changes every year.

Population

is increasing 2.4% per year, doubling in less than 29 years (the post-war "baby boom" will become parents).

Inflation


According to the National Statistics Department, consumer prices in Dili increased 17.4% from December 2010 to December 2011.

People's needs and desires will increase as the country develops.

Many children will become youth.

Timor-Leste Population by Age

(From 2010 census)



Timor-Leste is struggling to find jobs for 15,000 people who will enter the work force this year.

In 2024, it will be around 30,000 each year, and the oil will be used up. Today's youth will have children of their own.

CONSUMER PRICE INDEX

DILI REGION, DECEMBER 2011

DECEMBER 2011 KEY FIGURES

	% change from previous month (monthly rate)	% change Dec 2010 to Dec 2011 (rolling year rate)
All groups	3.8%	17.4%
All groups excluding Housing	3.9%	18.16
1. Food	4.7%	19.8%
2. Alcohol and tobacco	4.6%	18.9%
3. Clothing and footwear	4.1%	19.7%
4. Housing	2.9%	11.7%
Household furnishings, sup- plies and services	0.5%	10.4%
6. Health	0.0%	8.1%
7. Recreation and education	1.1%	1.8%
8. Transport and communication	-0.3%	17.3%


DECEMBER 2011 KEY POINTS

THE ALL GROUPS CPI


- On a monthly basis the CPI for Dili rose (3.8%) December 2011 from November 2011.
- On an annual basis the CPI for Dili increased (17.4%) Dec2011 compared to Dec 2010.

Inflation since 2009 comes from the government spending more than the economy can absorb.

Figure 28 Timor-Leste inflation rate, Monthly Rolling Year Rates



Local factors drive recent inflation.



Dili is very different from the districts.

From Timor-Leste Demographic and Health Survey 2009-2010


Table 2.11 Wealth quintiles

Percent distribution of the de jure population by wealth quintiles, according to residence and region, Timor-Leste 2009-10


Residence/	tra .	20		Number of			
region	Lowest	Second	Middle	Fourth	Highest	Total	population
Residence							
Urban	4.5	6.1	9.3	22.2	57.8	100.0	15,852
Rural	24.6	24.2	23.3	19.2	8.7	100.0	51,134
District							
Aileu	20.6	27.9	25.1	18.2	8.2	100.0	2,785
Ainaro	30.9	32.2	19.7	12.1	5.2	100.0	3,830
Baucau	26.9	28.9	19.3	13.4	11.5	100.0	7,590
Bobonaro	15.2	19.7	26.1	27.8	11.1	100.0	6,323
Covalima	17.2	17.7	23.1	25.1	16.8	100.0	3,993
Dili	0.4	2.1	6.5	20.1	71.0	100.0	10,905
Ermera	9.8	30.2	31.9	21.5	6.6	100.0	8,132
Lautem	28.0	16.7	20.4	24.5	10.4	100.0	4,547
Liquiçá	15.7	18.8	25.3	25.1	15.2	100.0	4,082
Manatuto	22.2	10.9	22.5	27.7	16.8	100.0	3,088
Manufahi	28.3	25.1	18.1	16.6	12.0	100.0	2,699
Oecussi	46.6	17.1	14.4	14.2	7.6	100.0	4,281
Viqueque	35.3	25.5	17.4	13.0	8.7	100.0	4,730
Total	19.9	19.9	20.0	19.9	20.3	100.0	66,985

More than 70% of Dili's population are among the wealthiest 20% of Timorese, while only 2.5% are below the poverty line. About 50% of Timorese families outside Dili live in poverty.


IMF: TL spends much more than other resource-dependent states.



Budget projections are unreliable.



How real is perceived corruption?




3. Unrealistic dreams

Current plans for future development will not sustainably improve our people's lives.

They rely on Greater Sunrise gas, which is limited and might never come to our shores or treasury.

The Strategic Development Plan

- Issued July 2011, promises to make TL an Upper Middle Income Country by 2030.
- A vision and dream, not a realistic plan.
- Focuses on physical infrastructure, not sustainable development.
- Will require loans and spending beyond TL's means.



Tasi Mane petroleum infrastructure project

- In 2010, TL began working on the South Coast Petroleum Corridor.
- During 2011, TL spent \$19 million, and total project costs will be more than \$2 billion (much more if Timor-Leste pays to build the refinery, gas pipeline or LNG plant).
- The 2012
 budget
 allocates
 \$164 million
 (including the
 Supply Base
 and
 highway).









Tasi mane project will include:


- Suai: Supply base area, Industrial estates, Nova Suai, Suai Airport, Crocodile farm
- Betano: Refinery and Petrochemical complex, Petroleum city (Nova Betano)
- Beaçu: LNG Plant complex, Nova Beaçu, Nova Viqueque, Viqueque airport.
 - **Highway** from Suai to Beaçu

Tasi Mane includes Suai supply base, Betano refinery, Beaçu LNG Plant and highway.









Problems with the Tasi Mane project

- It makes TL more dependent on the oil and gas sector.
- It neglects sustainable sectors (agriculture, tourism, small industries and others).
- Nearly all the money spent will go to foreign companies, providing hardly any local jobs or contracts.
- It will create social conflict, take up valuable land, displace people, worsen health and degrade and endanger the environment.
- We wonder if it will provide a reasonable return on investment.

The Government has made many unrealistic promises to local communities about jobs and other benefits.

Tasi Mane project costs

Project component	2011 expenditure	2012 allocation	2013-2016 allocation	Anticipated loans
Detailed site survey for Beacu infrastructure	\$5.0m	\$0.5m		
Design, construction and supervision of Suai supply base	\$9.0m	\$100.0m	\$220m	
Construction and supervision of roads and bridges for Suai-Beacu highway	\$1.3m	\$45.2m	\$500m	\$220m
Environmental studies	\$0.8m	\$2.1m		
Pipeline route analysis	\$2.0m	\$1.5m		
Design and supervision of Beacu infrastructure	\$0.8m	\$3.5m		
Design, construction and supervision of Suai airport		\$5.0		
Design, construction and supervision of Viqueque airport (budgeted under transport)		\$1.0		
Detailed Geotechnical and Marine study for the Betano petrochemical plant		\$5.0		

- No information on projected benefits or return.
- Omits most future expenditures.
- Exemplifies "petroleum capture" of decision-making.
- What if Sunrise gas doesn't come here?

C. Faze datoluk (3) - Portu Integradu (All Cargoes)

- Espansaun be Parede harahu laloran
- Fatin no Terminal be kontentor
- Terminal no Ponte Kais ba Pasaleiro Ro bo'ot
- Rele mos sai Fatin no Terminal ha Industria Peskas



Ezemplu Imajon Aktividades Supply Base

Benefisiu no Involvimentu oinsa deit maka Timoroan sei hetan husi Proletu Suai Supply Base (SSB)

A. Durante Faze konstruksaun

Krie Kampu Serbisu Direta (± 300 Vaga Serbisu)

moroan sira nebe sei involve iha faze ida ne'e mai hosi nivel skill/Matenek oin-oin hanesan:

- High skill: Enlinedy, Ekonomista, Akuntabilidade, sst.
- Medium skill: Tekniku Profesionais, Mandor, Mekaniku sst.
- Low skill: Motorista, sst.
- Unskill: Ajudante, Security, Cleaner, sst.

Kria Kampu Sarbisu Indireta (± 1000-1500 Vaga Serbisu)

Hosi projetu ne'e mos sei kria kampu serbisu indereta lubuk ida ba "komunidade lokal" hodi suporta ba projeitu ne'e rasik hanesan ba:

- · Kontraktor Lokal / Nasional:
- Fornesementu hahan
- Transporte;
- Laundry/Fase Ropa; sst



B. Durante Faze Operasaun

Kria Kempu Serbisu Direta (± 272-370 Vaga Serbisu)

 ±200-250 Timoroan sei serbisu direta iha operas SSB nian, no ±72-120 sei serbisu ho Operador sira nebe aluga Minishorebase.

- Serbisu ba operasaun SSB hanesan: Jestaun, operasaun. manutensaun, Seguransa ne Meu-ambiente, umanu, Finansa, Busines support, Security no sst.
- Atu hatan ba serbisu hirak ne'e persila skill hanesan;
- V High Skill → Sei loke vaga ba National no Lokal
- √ Medium Skill

 Sei loke vaga ba Lokal no National
- √ Low Skill → Sei fo prioridade ba ema lokal
- √ Unskill → Sei fo prioridade be ema loke

mpu Serbisu Indireita (± 1000 Vaga Serbisu)

- Iha faze operasaun SSB sel kontinua kria serbisu indereta ba "komunidade lokal" hanesan iha faze konstrusaun.
- Wainhira SSB iha faze operasaun sei industria foun sira seluk hanesan: Fabrikas, Industria Agrikula, Indusba peskas no sira seluk

leten bele kria tan kamou serbisu ne'e be ho estimasaun ± 10,000 vaga serbisu

Kria Oportunidade Negoslu

- Industria ba Konstrusaun (Fabrika Batako, Karpintaria, sst)
- Hospitalidade (Hotel, losmen, salon, travel agensia, sst) Fatin ba han no Hemu (Restaurante, Bar, kantina, sst)
- Komersi (Supermerkadu, lojas, stasaun ba mina).
- Offeresionamentu (Produtu local)
- · Investimentu hosi Rai Liur (Banku, Telekomunikasaun, sst)

Desenvolve Rekursu Umanu

Sel prepara Timoroan atu tuir trainamentu iha nivel hotu-hotu nebe sei halao iha Nasaun seluk nomos iha Timor laran minin tinan ida molak faze operasaun hahu.

Contacts

Ekipa Konjunta

Interministerial: SERN/MJ/ MAGET/MAP/SEMA/SES NTL/ Autoridade Lokal Distritu Covalime

C/O Pipeline Task Force Farot Office Farel Street Dill.-Timor-keste T- (-670) 333 1231 F: ptf sem@gmail.com

GOVERNU REPÚBLICA DEMOCRÁTICA DE TIMOR LESTE Sekretaria Estadu Rekursu Naturais



PROJETU TASI MANE CALSUPPLY BASE & NOVA SUAL



Informasaun:

- 1. Introdusaun
- 2. Saida maka supply base no Nova Suai
- 3. Supply Base no Nova Sual ne'e lokaliza iha ne'be?
- 4. Atividades sira ba Suai Supply Base (SSB) nlan: Halao ona, lao hela no atu halao
- Attvidades Konstruksaun Projetu Suai Supply Base fahe ba faze 3 (tolu)
- Benefisiu no Involvementu olnsa delt maka Timoroan sei hetan husi Projetu Suai Supply Base (SSB).



Dezenu Konseptual Projetu Tasi Mane



Ezemplu Imajen Supply Bas

1. Introdusaun

Governu Timor-Leste iha ona Planu Estrateiia Dezemvolvimentu Nasional (PEDN), Iha Planu ne'e sei implementa projetu lubuk ida iha Kosta Sul hanaran PROJETU TASI MANE ne'be sei kompostu hosi:

- 1. Suai Supply Base no Nova Suai inklui Aeroportu no fatin ba lafaek sei konsentra iha Distritu Sual.
- 2. Betano Refineria/Petrokimiku no Nova Betano sei konsentra iha Betano Distritu Manufahi.
- 3. Planta LNG Beaço, Nova Viqueque no Nova Beaço, sei konsentra iha Distritu Viguegue.
- 4. Auto-Estrada (Highway) sei liga husi Suai to Beaco

2. Saida maka Supply Base no Nova Sual

- Supply Base, katak bazedeapolu lojistiku ka Portu espesifiku ne'ebé atu uza hodi fó-suporta ba atividade sira esplorasaun no produsaun Minarai no Gás iha tasi-laran no rai-maran. Atividade sira iha tasi-laran ne'e gasta osan boot ho nia risku mós boot ho nune'e tenki persiza bazedeapoiu ida ne'ebé espesifiku liu hodi hatán nesesidade indústria minarai no gás nian.
- Nova Suai, katak sidade foun ne'ebé sei atu hari, hodi uza fó-suporta ba atividade Suai Supply Base.



Area of service Sual Supply Base



Transport husi Supply Base ba



Facilidade Produsaun mina Bayu -Undan iha Tasi Timor

3. Suai Supply Base no Nova Suai lokaliza iha ne'be?

Tuir Planu Estrateija Dezemvolvimentu Nasional deside tiha ona katak Projetu Supply Base no Nova Suai sei konsentra iha Distritu

Governu Timor-Leste liuhosi Sekretaria Estadu Rekursus Naturals. (SERN) dezigna tiha ona fatin ba projetu Supply Base iha Suku Kamanasa ho nia totál área Ektár 1056 no Nova Suai iha suku Labaral ho nia totál área Ektár 208. Mapa área dezignada maka tuirmai ne'e:



4. Aktividades ba Suai Supply Base no Nova Suai

- Atividade sira ne'ebé halao tiha ona:
- 2009-2010 halo Estudu Konseptuál
- 2010-2011 halo Estudu Detailladu (Viabilldade Tékniku no Komérsiu) & FEED ba Suai Supply Base, no Spatial Design ba Nova Suai kompletu ho nia rezultadu pozitivu
- Agostu 2011 Ekipa Tékniku SERN no Konsultór halo aprezentasaun Rezultadu Finál Estudu Viabilidade Tékniku no Komérsiu & FEED ba Konsellu-Ministru
- Agostu 2011 Konsellu-Ministru aprova ona Projetu Suai Supply Base atu bele hala'o.
- Forma Ekipa Konjunta Interministeriál inklui Autoridade Lokál hodi halo sosialízasaun ba prosesu liberta ral no proriadade sira iha área ne'ebé tama iha Projetu Suai Supply Base no Nova Suai.

B. Atividades nebe halo hela

- Ekipa Konjunta Interministerial halao programa Sosializasaun, Konsultasaun no identifikasaun rai no propriadades iha area nebe tama ba Projetu Suai Supply Base no Nova Sugir
- Identifika hela Konsultor nebe sei halo serbisu hamutuk ho Governu durante perparasaun. Konstruksaun to'o Operasaun;


Ekipa Konjunta Interministerial sei halo diskusaun ho komunidades nebe hela besik tha area designadu ba projettu hodi hetan ideia nebe diak liu tan oinsa projeito Suai Supply Base no Nova Suai bele lao ho diak.


C. Atividades nebe atu halo

- Rezultadu husi sosializasaun, konsultasaun, identifikasaun ba Rai no Propriadades, no diskusaun ho komunidades sel hato'o ba Konsellu Ministru
- Tenderizasaun ba kompania sira nebe atu halo konstrusaun ba projetu Suai Supply Base;
- Peskiza detailladu ba area fatuk (Quarry) nebe identifikadu:
- Detaillu design & FEED (Front End Engineering Design) ba Nova Suai

etu Sual Supply Base

- Sei konstrui iha fazeadamente 3
- Faze dahuluk sei konstrui durante Fulan 18-24







- Edifisiu (office block)
- Armaien (Warehouse)
- Tanki liquidu (storage tank)
- Espasu Livre (Open Yard)
- Minishorebase



Ezemplu Imajen Ponte-Kais (Jetty)


- Ma Espansaun ba Parede harabun lajoran
- Espansaun ba Ponte-Kais (Jetty)
- Exporta no importa industria Minarais
- Fasilidade tranka Ro bo'ot ho kapasidade 30,000 DWT

B. Faze daruak (2) - baze suporta Rekursu Minarais & Ener-

TL is about to become a borrower.

- Laws passed since 2009 have paved the way for Timor-Leste to take out foreign loans.
- The 2012 Budget starts borrowing with \$160 million, including \$43.1 million to be spent this year.
- During the next four years, the Government plans to borrow nearly half a billion dollars.

Most loans will pay for roads.



Lenders are

- World Bank
- JICA (Japanese government)
- Asian Development Bank
- China Export-Import Bank

Brown: estimates from La'o Hamutuk

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Project	Financed by	Loan	Grace Period (yrs)	Term (yrs)	Interest rate	Total Repaid
Dili-Liquiçá-Gleno roads	ADB ADF concessional	\$9.1m	8	32	1.0% / 1.5%	\$12m
Dili-Liquiçá-Gleno roads	ADB OCR commercial	\$30.9m	5	25	LIBOR + 0.19%	46m
Dili-Ainaro, Same, Ermera roads	WB IDA concessional	\$20m	10	25	2.50%	\$28m
Dili-Ainaro, Same, Ermera roads	WB IBRD commercial	\$20m	5	30	LIBOR + 0.46%	\$32m
Dili-Baucau road	JICA concessional	\$68.7m	10	30	0.70%	\$77m
Dili drainage	China Ex-Im bank	40m	10	25	3.00%	60m
Manatuto-Natarbora road	ADB OCR commercial (?)	\$75m	5	25	LIBOR + 0.19%	\$110m
Tasi Mane highway	unknown commercial	\$220m	10	20	4.00%	\$352m

Borrowing in the 2012 State Budget

Table 6.1. Financing	needs for me	ajor infrastructure	projects, 2	2012 - 2016 (\$	millions)
----------------------	--------------	---------------------	-------------	-----------------	-----------

Roads	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	Total
Dili-Liquica, Tibar-Ermera	5.26	10.70	10.70			26.66
Manatuto-Natarbora	2.84	2.88	2.28	5.34	30.00	43.34
Dili-Manatuto-Baucau	0.27	1.35	10.85	18.99	19.77	68.70**
Maubisse-Ainaro/Same	5.00	10.00	20.00	5.00		40.00
South Coast Highway		30.00	40.00	50.00	100.00	220.00
Dili sanitation/drainage		20.00				20.00***

^{**} The total amount to be provided in Loan is 68.7 million. This total is made based on the information provided by JICA. Government will be finding 25% to complete 95 million of the total project cost.


Table 6.2 Loans and Co-financing from the Government, 2012 - 2016 (\$ millions)

	53.03	104.25	105.42	133.65	161.00	557.35		
Government Co-Financing	9.93	24.05	24.32	30.85	54.00	143 .15		
Loans	43.10	80.2	81.1	102.8	107.0	414.2		
	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016			


Source: Major Projects Secretariat, Ministry of Finance, 2011

^{***} The Exim Bank still need to do design in 2012 therefore there will be no expenses in 2012.


Loans will have to be paid back.



Commercial loans will become more expensive in the future.




Important to consider



- Implementing the SDP will require billions of dollars more in loans, probably at commercial rates.
- Even at concessional rates, repaying a loan will permanently reduce money available from the Petroleum Fund.
- TL's oil and gas are small and nonrenewable, and future oil prices are unpredictable.
- TL will have to make loan repayments before spending money on people's needs or developing other sectors.
- Our children and grandchildren will inherit our debt.


Sunrise and maritime boundary dispute

- Australian companies began exploring Sunrise in the early 1970s, after Australia and Indonesia divided our maritime resources without involving Portugal. In 1989, they closed the "Timor Gap" to share illegally occupied resources in the Joint Development Area.
- The 2006 CMATS treaty bans maritime boundaries discussion for 50 years.
 It divides Sunrise upstream revenues 50-50.
- Australia put its greed for oil before respect for its sovereign neighbors or international law.
- Based on UNCLOS, TL owns everything north of the median line.



The Greater Sunrise stalemate

- The project is stalled because Timor-Leste and the companies do not agree on how it should be developed.
- Woodside and its partners Shell, ConocoPhillips and Osaka Gas believe a floating LNG plant in the sea is the most profitable.
- Timor-Leste wants a pipeline from Sunrise to Beaçu, to get more tax revenues and anchor the Tasi Mane project.
- Under contracts and treaties, the companies can choose the path, but both governments need to approve it.
- TL can cancel CMATS next year if the parties haven't agreed yet.



Beginning the theft of Maubere's wealth


Foreign
ministers
Gareth Evans
and Ali Alatas
toast the
signing of the
Timor Gap
Treaty in 1989
while flying
over the Timor
Sea.




Can Timor-Leste achieve the highest economic growth in the world?

Long-term average annual real GDP growth

(1980 or available data - 2016)





4. Impunity and accountability

Impunity for past crimes threatens stability, security and rule of law.

Impunity and accountability for crimes against humanity

- 1975-1999: Indonesian invasion and occupation killed about 180,000 people in a systematic and planned policy executed throughout Timor-Leste.
- 2000: Indonesian Commission on Human Rights Abuses in TL (KPP HAM) reported on 1999 crimes and recommended an international mechanism.
- 2001-2004: UN-supported Serious Crimes Unit indicted 391 people for 1999 crimes. All Indonesian and most Timorese indictees live free in Indonesia.
- 2001-2005: TL's Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR)
 researched history and encouraged reconciliation among Timorese. Its
 extensive report made 200 recommendations, including that if other processes
 fail, the UN should create an international tribunal.
- 2005: UN Commission of Experts (COE) reviewed legal processes to date and recommended creating an international mechanism.
- 2005: TL and Indonesian governments created the Commission of Truth and Friendship (CTF) using diplomacy to avoid individual accountability.

Until today, no legitimate processes in Indonesia or Timor-Leste have held major criminals accountable.

Indonesia's occupation included many massacres.



Above: 1983 massacre in Kraras, Viqueque

Right: Commemorating the 10th anniversary of the 1999 Suai Church massacre. Indicted ringleader Maternus Bere was illegally freed due to Indonesian pressure on TL's leaders.





UN Serious Crimes Unit Special Panel

The UN-supported Serious Crimes Unit indicted 391 people for 1999 crimes, tried 87 Timorese and convicted 84.

All Indonesian indictees and most Timorese are living free in Indonesia, and recent efforts to prosecute were blocked by political interference.



2004: President Xanana Gusmão and indicted ex-General Wiranto

The Serious Crimes
Unit issued a warrant
to arrest former
Indonesian military
head Wiranto for
Crimes Against
Humanity a few
weeks before this
photo was taken in
Bali. Wiranto later
ran for President of
Indonesia twice.





Ongoing impunity creates insecurity.

- Today, all the main perpetrators of crimes against humanity during the Indonesian occupation are free in Indonesia, including everyone responsible for the 99% of occupation-related killings committed between 1975 and 1998.
- They are all protected by the Indonesian government, and many hold high Indonesian political and military positions.
- This ongoing impunity greatly threatens peace, security, democracy, rule of law and moral values in both Timor-Leste and Indonesia.

What happens next?

- Today, neither Indonesia, Timor-Leste nor the international community has the political will to bring these criminals to justice.
- The Commission of Experts report has never been discussed in the Security Council.
- UNMIT will leave Timor-Leste at the end of 2012, having failed to achieve justice, and future UN processes here will have less power and are not yet defined.
- UN policy and global consensus says that there can never be impunity for crimes against humanity. Chega!

A luta kontinua. We continue to demand that people who violate the law be held accountable for their crimes.

5. Access to land

Land is the base of our culture and lives.

Recent developments may increase injustice and conflict.

Traditional land system before Portuguese colonization and Indonesian occupation

Land functions

- Place of birth that determines our origin and identity
- Place occupied by our ancestors spirits
- Socio-cultural functions linked to tradition and cosmos
- Collective economic function

Access to land

- Inheritance
- Traditional system allowing right to collective use
- Property right allowed after occupying land for a long time



Land management

 Traditional collective management system at the family and village levels (Tara Bandu).

Consequences of colonization and occupation

Introduction of a new coercive system

- Forced displacement
- Transmigration
- Taxes
- Certificates
- Corruption and stealing

Changes in land functions

Land as a strategic tool to:

- Reinforce power and domination
- Support Portuguese and Indonesian economy
- Increase people's dependency and vulnerability

Land as a commodity without soul

Privatisation: communities lose rights to individuals.

Desertification: monocrop agriculture depletes soil.

Land registration in Portuguese and Indonesian times

- 200,000 parcels already registered.
- 2,843 land titles issued by Portuguese.
- 34,965 land titles issued by Indonesians including 10% through corruption.

This system transferred land ownership from Timorese families and communities to 100,000 - 150,000 non-Timorese private owners.

Land law elaboration

In 2009, the Ministry of
Justice, with the support of
USAID, implemented the
cadastre and registration
system and created the
Special Regime for
Determination of Ownership
of Immovable Property,
Expropriation Law and Real
Estate Finance Fund Law.



These laws were elaborated with very limited community participation.

Land law concept

Establishment of a formal, basic land tenure system to address:

- needs of the modern
- urban sector
- formal land transactions
- <u>Clajkinton</u>

It must also respect traditional land and customs.



- The State.
 - Land "owned" by Portuguese and Indonesian administrations automatically becomes Timor-Leste state property without considering how the occupiers got it.
- People who got certificates during Portuguese and Indonesian times.
- Rich and powerful people.
 People with a lot of land and money can pay taxes and exert disproportionate influence.

Likely consequences of the implementation of the Land Laws

Social, cultural and economic impacts:

- Land will become a commodity with no spiritual value.
- Degradation of our cultural system which is based on collective values.
- Land concentration in the hands of rich and powerful people.
- Increasing cases of eviction.
- Poor people will lose their land.
- Less land available for agriculture and production.
- Emergence of slums, landlessness and homelessness.

Thank you.

You will find more and updated information at

- La'o Hamutuk's website http://www.laohamutuk.org
- La'o Hamutuk's blog http://laohamutuk.blogspot.com/
- Reference DVD-ROM available from our office.

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