

PETROLEUM FUND TIMOR-LESTE

ADVICES PROVIDED BY

INVESTMENT ADVISORY BOARD (IAB)

IN 2009

*La'o Hamutuk converted this file to text from the scanned version released by the Ministry of Finance and improved graphic quality. Some typographical errors are in the original and we may have added a few more.*

*For more information on Timor-Leste's Petroleum Fund, see*  
**<http://www.laohamutuk.org/Oil/PetFund/05PFIndex.htm>**

*For more information on revising Timor-Leste's Petroleum Fund Law, see*  
**<http://www.laohamutuk.org/Oil/PetFund/revision/10PFRevision.htm>**

**Strictly confidential until the recommendations in this advice have been fully implemented.**

# Investment Advisory Board

Date: 17<sup>th</sup> March 2009

To  
H.E. Mrs. Emilia Pires  
Minister of Finance  
Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste

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**Subject: Proposal to engage Bank for International Settlements (BIS) as an external portfolio manager for the Petroleum Fund**

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As requested by Your Excellency's letter dated 4 February 2009, the Investment Advisory Board has reviewed the proposal from the Banking and Payments Authority (BPA) dated 27 January 2009 to engage the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) as an external portfolio manager for the Petroleum Fund in Timor-Leste.

According to Article 12.2 of the Petroleum Fund Law the Central Bank may select and appoint an external Investment Manager only if the Minister is satisfied that:

- (a) the external Investment Manager is a legal person with sufficient equity capital and adequate guarantees and insurances against operational risks;
- (b) the external Investment Manager has a sound record of operational and financial performance; and
- (c) the references and reputation of the external Investment Manager in the field of fund management are of the highest standard.

The Investment Advisory Board notes that the BIS is an international organization established pursuant to The Hague Agreements of 20 January 1930 and has an authorized capital of SDR 3,000 million divided into 600,000 shares of equal nominal value. The shares of the BIS are held by 55 central banks and the equity capital as of November 2008 was US\$19.1 billion. The BIS is self-insured against operational risks. The BIS Asset Management (BIS AM) manages funds in the form of dedicated mandates and pooled funds on behalf of 23 central banks. The total assets managed by BIS AM as of end December 2008 were USD 29 billion. The BIS offers asset management services in sovereign securities or high-grade assets. The historical performance shows a satisfactory performance.

The BIS is a highly reputable organization and has been managing both its own global fixed income portfolios for 30 years as well as some 15 years experience in managing funds for third parties.

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The Investment Advisory Board notes that the BPA has followed due process in accordance with Article 12.3 of the Petroleum Fund Law. Moreover, the Investment Advisory Board notes that the BPA's external legal counsel, Clifford Chance, has reviewed and signed off the draft contract, which is attached to the BPA's recommendation.

Taken into account the fact that the BIS is a non-commercial institution of the highest reputation, owned by the world's central banks and would most likely protect its reputation by avoiding court proceedings involving negligence of any kind, the IAB recommends to accept the current provisions included in the draft contract.

The BPA refers in its letter to the Minister that the agreed text negotiated by the Ministry of Finance and the BIS as of 4 July 2008 regarding the provisions related to use of derivatives is inconsistent with the text included in the letter from the Minister to the BPA dated 8 September 2008. In order to avoid re-opening negotiations on the investment guidelines, the BPA has notified the Minister that an approval of the Investment Management Agreement (IMA) will signify that the amended wording on derivatives has been accepted. The Investment Advisory Board regards the draft IMA to comply with the Petroleum Fund Law and accordingly finds the final proposal from the BPA appropriate. As the use of derivatives is part of the investment guidelines negotiated between MoF and the BIS, the IAB suggest that the MoF seek to include explicit wording on what type of derivatives are allowed in the contract, without limiting the investment universe negotiated with the BIS.

It is the Investment Advisory Board's opinion that the stipulations in Article 12.2 of the Petroleum Fund Law are fulfilled. Hence, the Board recommends that Your Excellency approves the proposal put forward by the BPA, with the suggested amendments, to appoint the BIS as an external manager of the Petroleum Fund and outsource an initial amount of US\$1 billion in accordance with the final negotiated investment guidelines as presented in the BPA's proposal.

Furthermore, the Investment Advisory Board recommends the Minister to amend the Management Agreement (MA) between the Ministry of Finance and the BPA accordingly. However, the global benchmark, included in Annex 1 of the Management Agreement (MA), should be determined by a fixed ratio between the underlying benchmarks included in the two sub mandates and in accordance with the ratio at the time of transfers of funds to the BIS. These fixed ratios should be followed by a rebalancing regime, i.e. rules and procedures on a monthly basis, to ensure that the BPA has a mechanism to allocate new funds and to reallocate existing funds, subject to changes in the market value of the two sub portfolio as well as due to cash transfers to and from the Fund, to adhere to the fixed ratio determined in the global mandate.

Hence, Annex 1 of the MA should now read as included in the attachment. When the transfer of funds has taken place Annex 1 needs to be updated with the specific ratios and rebalancing regime as outlined above.

**Strictly confidential until the recommendations in this advice have been fully implemented.**

Yours sincerely

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Olgario de Castro". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a prominent initial "O" and a long, sweeping tail.

Olgario de Castro  
Investment Advisory Board  
Chairman

Attachment:

Annex 1 of the Management Agreement between the Ministry of Finance and the BPA

**Strictly confidential until the recommendations in this advice have been fully implemented.**

Attachment

**Annex 1: Qualifying Instruments, Benchmark and Investment Mandate**

This mandate has a hierarchical structure.

The Global Mandate describes the Minister’s overall investment strategy for the Petroleum Fund in terms of a benchmark and eligible instruments, including applicable constraints and limitations.

The Sub Mandates describe in more detail the manner in which the Minister expects the investment of the Fund to be implemented. They describe the management structure of investment portfolios that shall be created, including the style of investment management, risk tolerances, and benchmark against which the performance of each sub-mandate shall be measured and reported, and as at the date of the Management Agreement, the managers appointed to manage the sub-mandates.

**A. Global Mandate**

The BPA is responsible for the operational management of the aggregate Fund according to the following mandate;

*Aggregate Benchmark*

The benchmark for the global mandate shall be the weighted ratio of the two benchmarks included in Mandate 1 and 2 below. Further rules and procedures for a rebalancing regime shall be implemented in order to ensure that the Operational Manager can comply with the global mandate.

*Eligible Instruments*

<b>Asset Class</b>	<b>Allocation</b>
A. Qualifying Fixed Interest Investments under Article 15.1 of the Petroleum Fund Law	Up to 100%
B. Fixed Interest Instruments meeting the conditions in Article 14 of the Petroleum Fund Law	No more than 10%

Eligible currencies for fixed interest investments shall be United States dollars, Australian Dollars, Euro, Great Britain Pounds, and Japanese Yen.

**External managers shall be permitted to use derivative instruments, provided it complies with Article 15.4 of the Petroleum Fund Law.\***

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\* On 3 June 2009 the IAB wrote the Minister about “a typographical error which occurred in the attachment to the IAB’S recommendation of 17 March 2009,” explaining that “The last sentence under “Eligible instruments” was through an administrative oversight not deleted...” and providing a new version without this sentence.

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## **B. Sub mandates**

An initial portfolio of \$1 billion shall be assigned to the Bank for International Settlements.

### **MANDATE 1**

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<b>Manager</b>	Banking & Payments Authority of Timor-Leste
<b>Benchmark</b>	Merrill Lynch US Government Bond 0-5 years index
<b>Eligible instruments</b>	US Government fixed interest instruments
<b>Objective</b>	<p>The investment objective shall be to passively manage the portfolio close to the benchmark, so that in normal circumstances the objective shall be to achieve a return within 25 basis points<sup>1</sup> of the benchmark.</p> <p>The difference in the modified duration<sup>2</sup> between the portfolio and the benchmark shall be less than 0.2 year.</p>

### **MANDATE 2**

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<b>Manager</b>	Bank for International Settlements
<b>Benchmark</b>	<p>The following group of indexes will, together, form the composite benchmark for the Portfolio:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>(a) 52% Merrill Lynch 0-5 Years US Treasury Notes and Bonds Index (“GVQA”);</li><li>(b) 10% Merrill Lynch 5-10 Year US Treasury Notes and Bonds Index (“G602”);</li><li>(c) 7% Merrill Lynch Australian Governments Index (“G0T0”);</li><li>(d) 7% Merrill Lynch EMU Direct Government Index (“EG00”);</li><li>(e) 2% Merrill Lynch U.K. Gilts Index (“G0L0”);</li><li>(f) 2% Merrill Lynch Japanese Governments Index (“G0Y0”);</li><li>(g) 13% Merrill Lynch US Dollar Foreign Government and Supra National, AAA Rated Index (“GSIO”); and</li></ul>

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<sup>1</sup> 100 basis points are the same as 1 percentage point.

<sup>2</sup> By “modified duration” is meant a measure of the percentage decline (increase) in the market value of the Petroleum Fund due to a 100 basis point increase (decline) in the level of interest rates.

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(h) 7% Merrill Lynch US Dollar Foreign Government and Supra National, AA Rated Index (“GS20”).

**Eligible instruments** BIS must invest at least 80 % of the portfolio in accordance with the qualifying instruments defined in Article 15.1 of the

The BIS may invest a maximum of 20% of the Portfolio in deposits with, or debt instruments denominated in Australian Dollar (AUD), Euro (EUR), Japanese Yen (JPY) and Pounds Sterling (GBP) and issued by, entities that have been designated with a long-term foreign currency rating of Baa3 or higher by the Moody’s rating agency or BBB- or higher by the Standard & Poor’s rating agency, provided that the debt instruments are issued outside of Timor-Leste, are liquid and transparent, and traded in a financial market of the highest regulatory standard.

**Objective** The expected outperformance of the portfolio gross of management fees is 25 basis points over the Benchmark performance, on an annual basis over a rolling three year period, while maintaining the ex ante tracking error within 100 basis points.

### **C. Cash management**

Short-term liquidity may be maintained by the Fund for operational purposes but shall be limited to cash received pending investment or allocation to external managers, cash and securities in transition to or between external managers and short-term instruments held to fund appropriations to the state budget account.

The Central Bank shall be accountable for the return on these instruments.

# Investment Advisory Board

Date: 2<sup>nd</sup> September 2009

To  
H.E. Mrs. Emilia Pires  
Minister of Finance  
Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste

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**Subject: Request for an advice on the Petroleum Fund's long term investment strategy and Petroleum Fund Law amendments**

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Further to the Minister's request for an advice on the Petroleum Fund's long term investment strategy and Petroleum Fund amendments dated 25 June 2009, the Investment Advisory Board has discussed the issue in its meeting on 28 August 2009 and has resolved the issue as follows:

- 1) In order to provide an advice to the Minister on the Fund's long term investment strategy and Petroleum Fund Law amendments, risk/return and sensitivity analysis for various Strategic Asset Allocation Options have to be carried out before any advice can be made available.
- 2) These analyses must be available to the Board as a basis for discussions and to underpin the final recommendations given to the Minister and will complement reports provided by Mercer in 2007 and 2008.
- 3) As these issues are complex and require extensive knowledge about the current financial market and various asset classes, as well as access to market data and simulation models, such analyses cannot be carried out internally in the LAB Secretariat (MoF and BPA).
- 4) Hence, the Board will kindly request the Minister to provide sufficient external resources to the Board, in order to ensure that it can carry out its duties properly.
- 5) The best way to ensure the resources to be available, is to allow the Board and its Secretariat to get access to the External Consultant Company, which the Ministry of Finance is in the process of engaging, and draw on their resources in accordance with the contract between the Ministry and the Consultant Company.



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- 6) Attached are Terms of Reference describing the analytical work the Board sees important to carry out, before a final recommendation can be provided from the Board.



Oligario de Castro  
Investment Advisory Board  
Chairman

Attachment:

Terms of Reference

Attachment

## **Terms of Reference**

### **Request from the Investment Advisory Board**

#### **Investment Return and Strategic Asset Allocation Analysis Impact on the Petroleum Fund investments from the financial crisis Petroleum Fund Law amendments**

1. The Republic of Timor-Leste established a Petroleum Fund in 2005 based on the Petroleum Fund Law 0912005. The Petroleum Fund shall contribute to a prudent management of the petroleum resources and a sound fiscal policy for the benefit of both current and future generations.
2. The Petroleum Fund shall be prudently managed and shall operate in an open and transparent fashion, within the constitutional framework of Timor-Leste. According to the Law the Government is the overall manager of the Fund, while the Banking and Payments Authority (BPA) is the operational manager.
3. Timor-Leste is a small, open economy which is heavily dependent on its oil and gas resources. The total population is 1,015 million and the non-oil GDP and non-oil GDP per capita for 2008 are estimated at \$473 million and \$466 per capita respectively<sup>1</sup>. Due to the extensive revenues from oil and gas, the GNI is estimated at \$2,464 million and \$2,428 per capita respectively.
4. The Petroleum Fund balance as of end of June 2009 was \$4.9 billion. The monthly revenues to the Fund are currently estimated at approximately \$100 million, which is far beyond the annual government revenues received from domestic economic activities.
5. Although the size of the Fund is not huge in an international context, it is tremendous compared to Timor-Leste's non-oil sector. The value of the Petroleum Fund is approximately 1000 % of the annual non-oil GDP. The petroleum revenues in 2008 were approximately five times higher than the non-oil GDP, which make Timor-Leste vulnerable to any changes in the international petroleum prices.
6. The Estimated Sustainable Income, which is the benchmark indicating how much to be transferred from the Petroleum Fund to the State Budget on an annual basis in order to sustain the country's Petroleum Wealth, was estimated at \$408 million in 2009. The Petroleum Fund provides for 95 % of the total expenditure in the Government budget.

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<sup>1</sup> IMF projection, Article IV 2008.

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7. Moreover, the volatility in the investment return might also have a huge impact on Timor-Leste's revenue stream. Therefore, the Petroleum Fund is managed prudently. The Petroleum Fund Law requires that not less than 90 % of the portfolio to be invested in debt instruments and deposits denominated in US dollars. These instruments are further defined in Article 15 of the Law. Not more than 10 % of the portfolio may be invested in other financial instruments, provided that the instruments are issued abroad, are liquid and transparent and are traded in a financial market of the highest regulatory standard.

8. Until June 2009 the investments have only taken place in US Government bonds and have been managed by the Petroleum Fund Department of the BPA. The Government is aiming for diversifying the Petroleum Fund portfolio to other currencies, regions and assets through outsourcing of portfolio management to external managers. The intent is to utilize the flexibility that the current legal framework gives to achieve higher expected returns and diversification on the investments, subject to the country's risk-bearing capacity and risk appetite.

9. Hence, the BPA hired the Bank for International Settlement (BIS) as the Fund's first external manager in June 2009. The BIS is responsible for managing \$1 billion in accordance with an investment mandate which includes government bonds of Australia, Japan, the EU and UK in addition to the US. 20% of its portfolio can be invested in non-USD denominated bonds.

10. Moreover, the Ministry of Finance has determined two additional external investment mandates and the BPA has been requested to select these managers according to a global equity mandate and a fixed income mandate. These mandates will constitute 4% and 15% of the total portfolio respectively. With these mandates the flexibility in the current Petroleum Fund Law is fully exploited.

11. The Investment Advisory Board (IAB) is established to give advice to the Minister on the management and investment strategy of the Petroleum Fund. The appointment of the BIS as an external manager and the two additional external mandates outlined above are based on advice from the IAB. The Minister has sent two requests for advice to the IAB recently, which are issues that the IAB need to urgently address.

12. The first letter, dated 25 June 2009, the Minister requests the IAB to provide an advice on the following issues related to the investment policy and strategy:

- a) The optimal strategic asset allocation for the Petroleum Fund and the short, medium and long term investment strategies, having regard to the aim of maximizing the risk-adjusted return and taking into account the purpose of the Fund and Timor-Leste's ability to bear such risk;
- b) Implementation of the Santiago-principles for Sovereign Wealth Funds into the Petroleum Fund Law: and

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- c) Amendments of Articles 14 and 15 of the Petroleum Fund Law taking into account the conclusions under item a and b.

13. The other letter, dated 30 July 2009, requests the IAB to provide an opinion on the impact of the financial crisis on the US market and how it might affect the investment return of the Petroleum Fund in the short, medium and long term. Moreover, the Minister has requested the Board to provide an advice on how best to minimize the adverse effects, if any, on the Fund's investments from the medium and long term effects of the financial crisis. The letter refers in particular to potential interest rates and inflation increase in the US.

14. On the basis of this background, the Investment Advisory Board requests the following analysis:

**1) A Long Term Investment Return Analysis**

Please provide the following analysis:

- a) An analysis of the probability of reaching the following investment return over a period of 5, 10 and 20 years respectively for various asset allocation options (including 100% US Gov bonds 0-5 years):
  - 1) 3% real rate of return
  - 2) 4% real rate of return
  - 3) 5% real rate of return
- b) An analysis of the Petroleum Fund Balance in 2030 under various asset allocation options including a probability/sensitivity analysis with a specific focus on the tail risk.
- c) A key objective of the management of the fund is the sustainability of fiscal spending over a very long horizon (infinite). Please analyze the correspondence between return requirement, associated risk level and the impact on spending over the Government budget, illustrated both through a probability distribution for the Fund's longevity and through an assessment of the volatility of budgeted fiscal spending or other appropriate measures. Under the current spending guideline, the sustainable income is withdrawn from the fund each year. If required, alternative formulations of the spending guideline may be investigated to improve expected longevity of the fund or to smooth fiscal spending given higher financial risk in the fund. Assessment of tail risk should be included. Would choice of asset classes or strategies and their probable distributions impact the estimated risk in the analysis?
- d) Analyse the riskiness in the fiscal spending through the current sustainable income spending rule. Could the Strategic Asset Allocation of the Fund be tailored to address hedging needs in the fiscal spending? How?

## **2) Strategic Asset Allocation Analysis**

The IAB considers four optimal asset allocation options, taken into account Timor-Leste's risk-bearing and management capacity:

*Option 1:*

Equities: 25%  
Fixed income: 75%

*Option 2:*

Equities: 40%  
Fixed income: 60%

*Option 3:*

Equities: 60%  
Fixed income: 40%

*Option 4:*

Equities: 80%  
Fixed income: 20%

Please provide the following key information of each of these options, subject to an optimal portfolio and constraints outlined in Articles 14 & 15 of the draft Petroleum Fund Law amendments:

- a) Expected Annual Return over a period of 1,3,5,10 and 20 years with sensitivity/probability analysis
- b) Expected Annual Risk over a period of 1,3,5,10 and 20 years with sensitivity/probability analysis
- c) Probability of a negative return during a time horizon of one quarter, 1,3,5,10 and 20 years respectively
- d) 20 year historical performance (1989-2009) on a quarterly and annual basis
- e) Expected Total Return over the period until 2030 with sensitivity/probability analysis
- f) Expected Petroleum Fund Balance in 2030 with sensitivity/probability analysis

Please also consider the effects of including other financial instruments, such as private equities, real estate etc. in the portfolio.

Discuss model assumptions used in the analysis, including assumptions related to rebalancing of the portfolio, exchange rate risks, risk premium etc.

## **3) Impact from the Financial Crisis**

Please draw three potential scenarios of how the financial market will develop in the short and medium term, discuss the likelihood of these scenarios to take place and recommend strategies to abate the expected adverse effects, subject to limitations in the current PF Law.

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The analysis should include inter alia scenarios of increased global interest rate and inflation, substantial depreciation of the USD and a no growth/deflation scenario as well as any suggestions in terms of short and medium term investment decisions.

### **4) Investments in TIPS**

The Investment Advisory Board has decided to allocate a part of the portfolio to Treasury Inflation Linked Bonds (TIPS). Please advice on a suitable passive investment mandate, preferably using the benchmark G0QI.

The IAB is mandated to assess the operational capacity of East Timor institutions when issuing investment mandates for new instruments. Please assess the operational ability of the Banking and Payments Authority (BPA) to manage an investment mandate for TIPS, including a review of operational procedures, capacity and systems.

# Investment Advisory Board

Date: 2<sup>nd</sup> September 2009

To  
H.E. Mrs. Emilia Pires  
Minister of Finance  
Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste

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**Subject: Request for an advice on the Petroleum Fund's investment strategy and the impact of the financial crisis**

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Referring to the letter dated 30 July 2009, the Minister has requested the Investment Advisory Board to provide an opinion on the impact of the financial crisis on the US market and how it might affect the investment return of the Petroleum Fund in the short, medium and long term.

Moreover, the Minister has requested the Board to provide an advice on how best to minimize the adverse effects, if any, on the Fund's investments from the short, medium and long term effects of the financial crisis.

The dramatic repricing in financial markets has illustrated the view that markets from time to time can be priced significantly higher than the fair value normally considered as a basis for a long term risk premium. An implication from that view is that even long term expected return on e.g. equities varies over time. Hence, the expected returns on equities, fixed income assets with higher credit risks and alternative asset classes, are probably higher now than in the pre financial crisis environment. It is worth noting however that the crisis does not mean that this variation is seen as more predictable than in the pre-crisis environment; evidently, highly priced markets can remain expensive over many years and a shift in sentiment is extremely difficult to consistently predict in advance.

As sentiment shifts towards the prospect of a recovery, US interest rates have increased significantly in 2009, causing a temporarily decline in the bond prices and the portfolio's market value, resulting in a weak performance so far in 2009. Despite the low return during this period, the Board points to the fact that the Petroleum Fund has been invested entirely in short Treasury bonds. The exposure to rising interest rates has been substantially less than for other Sovereign Wealth Funds that hold fixed interest income assets with longer duration.

Funds with longer duration portfolios have been seen to lower duration to our current level as a response to the crisis; not going lower in view of the possibility of an extended period with low rates. In anticipation of a more stable interest rate environment going forward, a somewhat higher duration is favorable due to its associated higher yield to maturity.

A further increase in the US interest rate is still possible, and it may result in a further weak performance of the Petroleum Fund investments in the short term. This effect is, however, temporary, and probably limited as short term interest rates are now close to historically average

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levels. Higher interest rates increase new bonds' coupon rate and the medium and long term investment return. Hence, an increase in the US interest rates will be beneficial for the Fund's overall long term performance if the bonds are retained until maturity.

International financial markets are highly volatile, and to a large degree unpredictable, illustrating the need for a long term perspective on the Petroleum Fund investments. Since the inception of the Fund, the investment strategy has been conservative in order to preserve the value of the Petroleum Fund and to avoid huge fluctuations in the investment return and the Fund's market value.

The Fund benefitted from this strategy during the international financial crisis, and performed better than most other funds throughout the world, as a result of the fall in global stock markets and the decline in the US interest rates. This effect caused a higher investment return in 2007 and 2008 than the expected long term return on US Government bonds. Correspondingly, when the US interest rates increase, as happened in 2009, the short term performance will be lower than the expected long term return.

Another potential impact of the financial crisis on the Petroleum Fund is the way that the economic recovery is financed. Excessive production of additional US dollars has the potential to substantially weaken the US dollar, ultimately even seeing the end of the US dollar as a reserve currency. The Fund's exposure to US dollars will however be diluted as the Fund diversifies the portfolio into other currencies, and this highlights the urgency of the review of the Petroleum Fund Law.

The current Petroleum Fund Law allows investing up to 10% in other financial assets than those defined in Art. 15.1 i.e. mainly USD-denominated fixed income instruments with low credit risk. 4% of this flexibility has already been exploited through investments in other government bonds than US Government bonds, ref. the BIS' investment mandate. Moreover, the Board has advised, and the Minister approved, to allocate 4% to a global equity mandate. The BPA is in process of selecting a global equity manager in accordance with the investment mandate determined by the Minister. Further diversification of the portfolio requires amendments of the Petroleum Fund Law.

The nature of the Petroleum Fund as a public fund, its governance structure and the capacity and skills in the Ministry of Finance and BPA, requires an investment strategy based on a long term strategic asset allocation. Historical data show that such a strategy is likely to be more rewarding in the long term than speculative strategies, such as market timing or tactical asset allocation, which requires a degree of predictability of markets to be successful that is not evident or documented. Note that even funds that pursue such strategies rely on extensive institutional capacity, and operates in an environment that can withstand the political cost of significant periods of under performance relative to long term goals. Being able to pinpoint every turn in the market is not a realistic option for anyone; attempting to do so would in our opinion be a potentially costly strategy.

However, the Investment Advisory Board notes that the ongoing process of adding equity exposure to the portfolio and further diversification of the bond portfolio may benefit from the current market conditions. Introduction of equities to the portfolio and higher yielding bonds may actually turn out to be very beneficial taking into account the timing, although the portion of the portfolio to be allocated to these asset classes is rather small due to constraints in the Petroleum Fund Law.



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Thus, the Board recommends the Minister to pursue the following strategy:

- 1) Continue the work of gradually diversifying the portfolio into various asset classes, subject to the Government's risk appetite, i.e.
  - a. diversify the fixed income portfolio in order to achieve higher expected return, including assets issued by supranationals, assets with longer duration etc.,
  - b. exploit the flexibility that the current Petroleum Fund Law provides to invest up to 10% in other financial instruments than USD-denominated fixed income instruments with low credit risk,
  - c. amend the Petroleum Fund Law to ensure further diversification of the portfolio, subject to Timor-Leste's risk bearing capacity.
- 2) Define a long term strategic asset allocation for the Fund to be gradually implemented, taking into account the capacity, skills and the governance structure of the Fund. Disregard market timing and short term tactical decisions.
- 3) Continue the work on formulating an investment strategy for the fund, therein designing a regime for reviews of the strategic asset allocation that is compatible with the capacity and governance structure for the fund.

The Board will advise the Minister on the long term strategic asset allocation and amendments of the Petroleum Fund, as requested in the Minister's letter dated 30 June 2009. Further analysis and research is, however, required before the Board can provide such an advice.

There is a risk that the credit crises can result in global monetary stimulus, which can bring the world's economy into an inflationary environment. A rising global inflation would hurt the real return of the Petroleum Fund and undermine the real value of the assets. Although a final strategic asset allocation should be designed holistically, weighing each asset class as part of the whole, the IAB finds that inclusion of TIPS is a very likely outcome for the long term as did Mercer in their report from 2007. The IAB has thus initiated the process of including such assets in the portfolio and will submit a detailed investment mandate to the Minister addressing inflation linked bonds in due course.



Olgario de Castro  
Investment Advisory Board  
Chairman

# Investment Advisory Board

Date: 18<sup>th</sup> September 2009

To  
H.E. Mrs. Emilia Pires  
Minister of Finance  
Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste

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**Subject: Request for an advice on depositing part of the Petroleum Fund in cash**

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- Dear Minister,

The Investment Advisory Board acknowledges receipt of your letter dated 15 September 2009 requesting the Board's opinion on a proposal to deposit USD1.2 billion in an account at the Hong Kong & Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC) in connection with an arrangement with Asian Champ Investment Ltd (ACI) described in ACI's letter dated 15 September 2009 signed by Datuk Edward Ong, whereby the Petroleum Fund would receive a return of 7.5% for one year.

The Investment Advisory Board takes this opportunity to thank the Minister for seeking the Board's advice, and advises the Minister to continue to act with the highest vigilance.

Although the Board cannot, for the reasons outlined below, recommend the acceptance of the proposal, the Board suggests that the Minister request the Banking & Payments Authority to confirm the assumptions on which the Board's conclusion was reached.

The Board has reached its recommendation taking the following matters into account:

- From the wording of the prospectus, in particular the introduction and item (i) and (ii), it is clear that Asia Champ Investments Ltd. is a party to the transaction. From items (ii) and (iii) it is understood that it is this company that promises the payment of 7.5% return and not HSBC.
- The Board has been unable to verify the existence of Asia Champ Investments Ltd in the Singapore online companies registry, and ACI has no internet presence of any kind. Although the proposed arrangement is not a formal appointment of ACI as an external manager, nor presented as an investment in ACI despite their promise of a return, it nonetheless associates ACI with the management of a significant portion of the Petroleum Fund, and therefore the law should be drawn on for guidance. The limited evidence available to the Board suggests that ACI falls far short of the conditions outlined in Article 12.2 of the Petroleum Fund law.

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- The Board notes that the interest rate of 7.5% for a one-year USD deposit is considerably in excess of market rates for cash deposits at highly rated institutions, which as of September 15 2009 are in the range from 0.6% to 1.3%. Thus, the IAB finds it very likely that the proposal contains risks not appropriately reflected in the ACI proposal.
- Although a specific branch of HSBC is mentioned as the depository, the ACI proposal contains no evidence to suggest that HSBC has agreed to be party to the proposed arrangement or to underwrite the risks associated with it. For this and the reasons stated above, the Board is of the opinion that the risks of the proposed investment are with ACI. On this presumption, the investment does not meet the investment criteria set out in Article 15 of the Petroleum Fund law.
- In the rather unlikely event that HSBC actually is the only counterpart in this proposal and is the provider of 7.5% return on a standard cash deposit, the time frame of the proposal (15 days), would normally not be sufficient to conduct a due diligence process on that firm in accordance with acceptable international standards of operational management.
- The documentation provided to the Board appears to describe arrangements under which ACI will have no access to the funds and therefore no opportunity to make a commercial profit, let alone sufficient to justify the agreed level of interest. Bearing in mind that the proposal refers to a bank account mandate, the details of which have not been provided, the Board infers that the proposed account mandate may be drafted in a manner that permits the deposit to be used as collateral for third party business arrangements. Should this be the case, the Board believes that such an arrangement would place an encumbrance on the assets in contravention of Article 20 of the Petroleum Fund law.
- The Board notes, without making any inference about the motives of the parties involved in the ACI proposal, that worldwide there have been a number of reported cases where institutional investors have fallen prey to fraudulent schemes under arrangements involving apparently secure deposits in “blocked accounts” at reputable banks, higher than market interest rates, a rapid decision-making process, and little if any documentation concerning the parties making the offer.

The IAB is of the opinion that all explicit investment decisions in the Petroleum Fund should be institutionalized, that is, the investment strategy should be determined by the Ministry of Finance and all implementation issues, including the selection of counterparties and choice of individual investments, should be managed by the operational manager of the fund in accordance with the procedures established in the Petroleum Fund law and the Management Agreement.

If in the future investment opportunities arise which are not within the existing investment policy, the Board suggests that the appropriate response would be to review the investment strategy before considering specific investment proposals.

**Strictly confidential in accordance with Article 32.2 (d) of the Petroleum und Law**

In light of the various uncertainties inherent in the matters listed above, adherence to due process is seen as necessary to generate supporting-documentation with evidence that a proper analysis and due diligence of proposed investments and the counterparties associated with the management of Petroleum Fund assets has been undertaken.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Olgario de Castro". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a prominent initial "O" and a long, sweeping tail.

Olgario de Castro  
Investment Advisory Board  
Chairman

# Investment Advisory Board

Date: 16<sup>th</sup> December 2009

To  
H.E. Mrs. Emilia Pires  
Minister of Finance  
Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste

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**Subject: Request for advice on the Petroleum Fund's long term investment strategy and Petroleum Fund Law amendments**


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Referring to the letter dated 25 June 2009, the Minister has requested the Investment Advisory Board to provide advice on the Petroleum Fund's long term investment strategy and Petroleum Fund Law amendments.

The Investment Advisory Board has in its meetings on 28 August, 18 September, 6 November, 11 November, 20 November and 15 December 2009 thoroughly considered the request from the Minister and the draft proposal of amendments to Articles 14 & 15 of the Petroleum Fund.

The attached paper containing the advice on the investment strategy and amendments to Articles 14 & 15 of the Petroleum Fund was adopted by the Board on 15 December 2009.

Yours sincerely



Olgario de Castro  
Investment Advisory Board  
Chairman

Attachment:

Review of Articles 14 & 15 of the Petroleum Fund Law

# Review of Articles 14 and 15 of Petroleum Fund Law

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## **Background**

On 25 June 2009 the Minister wrote to the Investment Advisory Board (IAB) seeking advice on proposed amendments to Articles 14 and 15 of the Petroleum Fund Law. The Minister has requested the IAB to provide a proper analysis that underpins the recommendations provided, and with this in mind this discussion paper has been developed to raise issues on the proposed drafting of the two Articles for the Board's consideration as well as offering proposed amendments to the draft text that the Board may wish to consider.

It is understood that the Ministry of Finance is working on other amendments to the Petroleum Fund law, and in submitting this paper the IAB is conscious that the Board has been asked to comment on two Articles without being provided with the details of any other proposed changes to the law. As Articles 14 and 15 incorporate both governance and investment principles, the comments that follow are premised on the governance and management principles that underpin the existing Petroleum Fund law.

This paper sets out the Minister's draft of each section together with IAB's recommendation. The recommendation is supported by the reasons why the IAB has proposed the text as it is.

## Summary

The Investment Advisory Board recommends the Minister to include the following text in Articles 14 and 15 of the new Petroleum Fund Law:

### Article 14 -Investment Rules

- 14.1 The Minister shall establish the investment policy for the Petroleum Fund that shall apply the principles of diversification with the objective of maximising the risk-adjusted financial returns of the Petroleum Fund after taking into account the purposes for which the Fund is established, the constraints under which it operates, and Timor-Leste's ability to bear risk.
- 14.2 The investment policy must provide sufficient liquidity in the portfolio to ensure that funding is available whenever required for transfers to the State Budget or for rebalancing investments within the policy exposure.
- 14.3 The Minister and the Operational Manager shall develop and maintain policies, systems and procedures to ensure that the risks associated with the implementation of the investment policy are identified, monitored and managed.
- 14.4 The management of the Petroleum Fund shall be conducted in compliance with all applicable regulatory and disclosure requirements of the countries in which investments are made.
- 14.5 The Minister shall present a summary of the proposed investment policy of the Petroleum Fund to the Parliament in the Annual Report of the Petroleum Fund each year and prior to decisions on major asset allocation changes. The Annual Report shall include a statement setting out how the provisions of Articles 14 and 15 have been applied during the year.

### Article 15 -Eligible Investments

- 15.1 In order to qualify as an eligible investment under this Article an investment must be issued or situated abroad in an internationally recognised jurisdiction.
- 15.2 Not less than 60 per cent of the amounts in the Petroleum Fund shall be invested in eligible investments in the form of deposits or debt instruments that bear interest or a fixed amount equivalent to interest, provided that:
  - (a) the debt instruments are determined to be of investment grade, or
  - (b) the deposits are held with financial institutions with a rating corresponding to investment grade.
- 15.3 Not more than 40 per cent of the amounts in the Petroleum Fund shall be invested in eligible investments in the form of listed equities, provided that:
  - (a) the equities are traded in a regulated financial market.
  - (b) no holding shall exceed five per cent of the issued capital of the issuing company.

15.4 No more than 5 per cent of the amounts in the Petroleum Fund may be invested in other eligible investments provided that:

- (a) the Minister has included the asset class to which the eligible investments belong in the proposed asset allocation presented to parliament in accordance with Article 14.5, and
- (b) the policies and criteria for selecting, managing and valuing individual financial instruments within the asset class have been approved by the Minister and published.

15.5 The exposure of the Petroleum Fund to

- (a) any one company or issuer, except for a sovereign state, in the form of eligible investments, shall not exceed three per cent of the total value of the Petroleum Fund;
- (b) any one asset class shall, on a net basis, be positive.

15.6 Notwithstanding the provisions of subarticles 20.1 and 20.2, charges arising in the course of market transaction management or participation in security lending programs that are of a short-term nature and consistent with prudent asset management principles shall not be regarded as encumbrances in the course of investing amounts in the Petroleum Fund by the Investment Manager.

15.7 A derivative instrument shall qualify as an eligible investment only if:

- (a) it is used for the purpose of reducing the risk to the Petroleum Fund from the underlying instrument or instruments or to facilitate the efficient implementation of asset exposure; and
- (b) the risk from the derivative instrument is not larger than that which could be had by direct exposure to the underlying assets in accordance with this law; and
- (c) the Minister has established conditions for the operational use of the derivative instrument.

15.8 The Minister shall determine the period within which Investment Managers shall be enabled to dispose of instruments in an orderly manner if they cease to be an eligible investments because of a change in the rating of the financial instrument or the issuer of the instrument.



## Article 14

The Article is included in the law to provide a framework for the setting of the investment policies of the Fund. The drafting is predicated on the Minister being the person with the authority to set the investment policy, based on the following interpretation of the existing law:

- Article 11.1 gives the Government (through the Minister of Finance) the responsibility to determine the investment policies of the Fund.
- Article 11.2 gives the Minister the authority to make decisions about investment strategy after seeking the advice of the IAB.
- The wording of Article 16.1(a) envisages the IAB developing investment performance benchmarks, proactively if it sees fit, without having the authority to decide that the benchmarks thus developed should be adopted.

One of the key documents consulted in the course of reviewing this section was the International Working Group's "Sovereign Wealth Funds: Generally Accepted Principles and Practices", otherwise known as the Santiago Principles. The Santiago principles are an international cooperative effort to identify best practices for Sovereign Wealth Funds particularly in the area of governance and policy.

## Article 14.1

Minister's Proposal	IAB Recommendation
<b>14.1. The investment policies to be established by the Minister in accordance with Article 11.1 shall aim to maximize the risk-adjusted return by balancing expected return against expected risk and taking into account the purpose of the Fund and Timor-Leste's ability to bear such risk.</b>	14.1 The Minister shall establish the investment policy for the Petroleum Fund that shall apply the principles of diversification with the objective of maximising the risk-adjusted financial returns of the Petroleum Fund after taking into account the purposes for which the Fund is established, the constraints under which it operates, and Timor-Leste's ability to bear risk.

### Rationale

The objective of this paragraph is to ensure that the Minister establishes an investment policy that maximises the return of the Petroleum Fund investments after taking account of the inherent risks in international financial markets and constraints affecting local conditions.

The **investment policy** is a formal statement of the risk profile and the asset allocation of the Fund, investment universe and benchmarks, investment principles, such as the use of internal/external managers and investment style, and other issued related to the overall investment policy.

Principle GAPP 18 of the Santiago principles requires that "The SWF's investment policy should be clear and consistent with its defined objectives, risk tolerance, and investment strategy, as set by the owner...". Furthermore, the sub principles refer to the investment policy including the possible use of leverage, use of derivatives, the extent to which internal/external managers are used, including qualitative statements on investment style (active/passive, financial/strategic) or investment themes.

The Petroleum Fund would meet this principle by producing a public document covering the various factors outlined above.

The term "investment strategy" is mentioned in GAPP18, but not referred to in the proposed Article as it is part of the investment policy.

**Diversification** is the process of investing in a range of assets or asset classes with different risks, returns and correlations in order to minimise nonsystematic risk, which is also known as diversifiable risk. Diversifiable risk is that portion of an asset's risk arising from the unique circumstances of a specific security, as opposed to the overall market and is unique to a given asset. Business, liquidity, and default risks fall into this category. It is assumed that any investor can create a portfolio in which this type of risk is reduced or completely eliminated through diversification, namely the combining of several diverse investments in the portfolio.

The expression "**maximising the risk-adjusted financial returns**" reflects the wording in principle GAPP19 of the Santiago principles.

The return received should be taken from the viewpoint of a long-term investor such as the Petroleum Fund, which is the means of managing the financial reserves of Timor-Leste for the benefit of current and future generations. Long-term returns include both income and capital gains. Forecasting the future is an inexact science at best, and for this reason the investment policies cannot be guaranteed to produce actual long-term terms, hence the wording setting an objective, rather than a requirement. It is implicit that the investments in the Fund cannot be expected to produce consistent returns in the short term, hence the requirement to consider the long-term returns.

The requirement for Minister to take various factors into account (the **purposes, constraints and risks**) is intended to broadly parallel a similar set of factors that the IAB must consider in Article 16.3 in order to ensure consistency in the governance framework, though the proposed wording in this paragraph is deliberately broader to enable the possibility that the Minister may take into account factors beyond those that the IAB is required to consider.

The phrase **“Timor-Leste’s ability to bear risk”** has been included in line with the Minister’s proposal. The phrase means that decisions on the risk profile of the Fund should be based on a very broad perspective on how the Fund functions in the economy. Examples of possibly relevant issues include the Fund’s impact on variability in Government income, the fraction of total petroleum wealth transferred to the Fund, the sustainability of the fiscal policy for a given level of risk in the Fund, the operational capacity of key institutions, and the capacity of the fund’s stakeholders to bear adverse outcomes without undermining necessary political conditions for the existence of the fund.

## Article 14.2

Minister's Proposal	IAB Recommendation
<b>14.2 The investment policy must provide sufficient liquidity in the portfolio to ensure that funding is available whenever required for transfers to the State Budget or for rebalancing investments within the policy exposure.</b>	Same

### Rationale

This paragraph is intended to ensure that the Fund will be sufficiently liquid to enable transfer to the State Budget, and to enable rebalancing to take place.

The existing law is drafted on the presumption that the IAB will recommend a strategy that must take liquidity into account (as it is required to do under Article 16.3(c)) and that the Minister will accept and implement the policy, thereby ensuring sufficient liquidity is available. The current paragraph removes the possibility that the Minister may act contrary to the advice of the IAB and decide to invest the Fund in illiquid assets that would prevent transfers to the State Budget.

A further requirement is added that does not have a parallel in the existing law, namely that the Fund must also maintain sufficient liquidity to allow rebalancing of investments to take place "within the policy exposure".

## Article 14.3

<b>Minister's Proposal</b>	<b>IAB Recommendation</b>
<b>14.3 The Petroleum Fund shall be managed responsibly using the principle of diversification to seek wide exposure and avoid excessive risk, subject to sound and internationally well recognized principles for operational control and risk management.</b>	14.3 The Minister and the Operational Manager shall develop and maintain policies, systems and procedures to ensure that the risks associated with the implementation of the investment strategy are identified, monitored and managed.

### Rationale

The principle of diversification (which implicitly includes the breadth of exposure and the reduction of risk) has been moved to Article 14.1 as it is more closely associated with the development of the investment strategy than with the implementation of the policies.

This paragraph has been redrafted to focus on the second half of the Minister's proposal, and to broaden the responsibilities. The recommended text requires that all risks, both financial and operational, are subject to appropriate risk management processes.

A minimum range of ways in which risk can be managed are included, namely through risk management policy, systems and procedures.

The reference to "internationally well-recognised principles for operational control and risk management" has been removed as it is may not be clear which particular principles are to be applied. The requirement to "identify, monitor, and manage" risk implies that a certain standard will be met, in the same sense that the word "management" is used in Article 11.1 without the need to specify "in accordance with international best practice" or similar wording. It also avoid the need to raise the question "Although we are identifying, monitoring managing risk, is it possible that with the benefit of hindsight someone may claim that an international principle could be deemed to have set a higher standard than was applied?"

The requirement to ensure that risks are "identified, monitored and managed" reflects the Santiago principle 19 "The SWF shall have a framework that identifies, assesses and manages the risks of its operations" and GAPP22.1 "The risk management framework should ... enable the adequate monitoring and management of relevant risks ..."

It is intended that the phrase "The Minister and the Operational Manager shall develop ... procedures" should be interpreted to mean that both parties shall work in conjunction as appropriate to implement a risk management framework, as well as individually to manage risk in areas of specific responsibility.

## Article 14.4

Minister's Proposal	IAB Recommendation
<b>14.4. The Petroleum Fund shall be managed in full compliance with all applicable regulatory and disclosure requirements and avoid any real or apparent conflict of interest.</b>	14.4. The management of the Petroleum Fund shall be conducted in compliance with all applicable regulatory and disclosure requirements of the countries in which investments are made.

### Rationale

The intention of this paragraph is to ensure that the investments of the Fund are made in full compliance with appropriate regulatory requirements in the various markets in which the Fund will be investing.

The proposed wording reflects the wording in Santiago principle GAPP 14.4 "SWF operations and activities in host countries should be conducted in compliance with all applicable regulatory and disclosure requirements of the countries in which they operate." The drafting is not intended to suggest the tautology that investment laws must be complied with. Rather it makes a statement that the Fund's investment activities will take place responsibly and transparently in other countries.

The wording about conflicts of interest has been removed because the subject is integral to the principles of good governance, which is mandated by the existing Article 11.4. Paraphrasing the 2004 OECD principles of Corporate Governance (bearing in the they are directed at the commercial sector) the components of good governance are the governance framework; the protection of stakeholder rights (a part of which is the avoidance of conflicts of interest); the provision of reliable and timely information to stakeholders; governing board effectiveness (including monitoring conflicts of interest and the ensuring that sufficient independent non-executives are part of the decision-making process where there is a potential for conflicts of interest).

Several of the Santiago principles address the question of governance, including GAPP6 ("The governance framework for the SWF should ... facilitate accountability and operational independence") and GAPPB ("The governing body(ies) should act in the best interests of the SWF ..."). It is argued that these and other governance-related Santiago principles are included by implication in Article 11's phrase "in accordance with the principle of good governance"

## Article 14.5

Minister's Proposal	IAB Recommendation
None.	14.5 The Minister shall present a summary of the proposed investment policy of the Petroleum Fund to the parliament in the Annual Report of the Petroleum Fund each year and prior to decisions on major asset allocation changes. The Annual Report shall also include a statement setting out how the provisions of Articles 14 and 15 have been applied during the year.

### Rationale

The intention of this paragraph is to recognise the added flexibility in the proposed Articles 15.2 and 15.3, which would allow the Minister a greater degree of discretion about the assets classes in which the Fund should be invested. The intention is to include the proposed provision in the law to ensure that the Minister informs the Parliament on an annual basis how the investment policy and rules outlined in Articles 14 and 15 have been applied and how the Government, going forward, sees changes in the investment policy for the next year. This information should be provided in the Annual Report to ensure a high degree of accountability and transparency.

Moreover, the Minister must inform the Parliament about major assets allocation changes prior to confirming the decision. This may take place through submissions of written reports to Parliament, such as a White Paper or other appropriate documents, as seen fit.

The paragraph is not intended to restrict the Minister's authority to make the investment strategy or to determine the preferred asset allocation (within the constraints of the rest of Article 15) but to provide a means for acquiring broad stakeholder acceptance of the change. It may be seen as an alternative to the explicit review period in the current law to bring the procedures for obtaining stakeholder acceptance more in line with parliamentary traditions in other countries with sovereign wealth funds.

This paragraph has been added to ensure compliance with Santiago principle GAPP18.3 "A description of the investment policy of the SWF should be publicly disclosed."

The words "proposed investment policy" are to make clear the intention that the government not be bound by the summary submitted to parliament to any greater extent than the government is bound by other statements of intention regarding its activities.

The intention of including the proposed investment policy in the Annual Report is to not only inform parliament of the policy in a document which will not be bound by vote, but to provide a forwardlooking section that can act as a benchmark against which the statement of compliance in the following year's Annual Report can be measured.

## Article 15

This Article is included in the law to provide specific guidelines for the investment of the Petroleum Fund. The intention of the guidelines is to set statutory limits on the manner in which parts of the portfolio may be invested, while retaining sufficient discretion for the Minister on advice from the IAB to determine the strategic asset allocation within those limits.

The Article also enables the Fund to engage in asset management activities such as securities lending and the use of derivative instruments under defined conditions.

### Asset Allocation Limits

The inclusion of specific maxima/minima for certain classes of assets in the Law is intended to provide a balance between the role of parliament to set overall limits on the investment strategy and the Minister's/IAB's role in determining the asset allocation strategy at any particular point in time within those limits. Below follows a discussion about the appropriate level of asset allocation limits in the Law and the rationale behind the specific numbers provided in Articles 15.2, 15.3 and 15.4.

### Watson Wyatt Analysis

The Investment Advisory Board has reviewed the report "From Oil to Financial Assets: Planning for a Sustainable Future for Timor-Leste" provided by Watson Wyatt on request of the Ministry of Finance

The Board notes the following key findings in the Watson Wyatt Report:

1. An allocation to equities of at least 25% is required to achieve a long term real return of 3% per annum according to historical experience and our forward looking modelling.
2. A higher allocation to equities provides a higher long term expected return, but also a higher level of expected risk. For example, the expected return in a 1 in 20 poor year under a 25% equities strategy is -9%, whereas it is -28% for an 80% equities strategy.
3. There may be potential diversification benefits from including alternative investments such as real estate, private equity and hedge funds in the portfolio; however allocations to these asset classes also give rise to issues that include the burden on stakeholders' time, higher fees, liquidity risks and general levels of complexity.
4. A level of ESI spending will not be sustainable unless it is coupled with an investment strategy that expects to achieve a real return consistent with that level of spending.

The Watson Wyatt (WW) report illustrates the connection between asset allocation, expected return, spending guideline and the sustainability of the fund construction. The asset allocation should, with reasonable confidence, be able to produce an annual real return similar to the spending guideline over a long time horizon. The actual return would fluctuate from year to year and could deviate substantially from the long-term expectation.



The key findings are summarized in the table below:

**Table 7: Historical returns on a range of investment strategies since 1900**

Historical performance since 1900	100% US Govt Bonds	Current	25% US Equity	40% US Equity	60% US Equity	80% US Equity	100% US Equity
Average real return (% pa)	2.0	2.2	3.4	4.3	5.5	6.8	8.1
Geometric real return (% pa)	1.7	2.0	3.1	3.8	4.7	5.5	6.1
Standard deviation of return (% pa)	5.2	5.1	6.5	8.8	12.3	16.2	20.2
Information Ratio	0.33	0.39	0.48	0.43	0.38	0.34	0.30
Frequency of negative annual return	9%	9%	12%	20%	27%	30%	30%
Frequency of four consecutive negative quarterly returns	0.9%	0.9%	1.6%	2.5%	2.5%	3.2%	3.2%
1 in 20 year poor outcome (% pa)	-1.6	-0.9	-4.7	-6.2	-11.5	-17.2	-22.1

Source: Watson Wyatt Report, December 2009


The table summarizes the historical return and risk figures for various asset allocation options. All asset allocation options which include more than 25% in equities have achieved more than 3% historical real rate of return. The current investment strategy has underperformed the ESI level by 1%, while 25% and 40% equities have outperformed the ESI level of 3% by 0.1% and 0.8% respectively on a historical basis.

The standard deviation of return increases by 1.4% and 3.7% (to 6.5% and 8.8%) from the current asset allocation (5.1%) to the options including 25% and 40% in equities respectively. This means that for 213 of the years the current strategy has given a real rate of return in the interval of -3.1% and 7.1%, while the corresponding intervals are -3.4% and 9.6% and -5% and 12.6% for the 25% and 40% equity option respectively.

The frequency of negative annual return increased from 9.2% to 11.9% and 19.3% respectively for these two asset allocation options. This means that the current strategy as well as 25% in equities has given negative return approximately every ten year while the frequency doubled to every fifth year with 40% allocation to equities. Hence, by moving to 25% equities we can support the current ESI level while keeping the risk level close to what we have been used to so far.

Turning to the forward looking modelling carried out by Watson Wyatt, the figure below shows the expected real return for different asset allocation options subject to these options risk profile. Risk is measured by "5% Tail Conditional Expectations" which shows what the expected return will be for the 5% worst outcomes (every 20 year). The graphs shows that all asset allocations above 25% expect to achieve 3% real rate of return, but the higher the allocation to equities the higher is the expected risk.


### Forward looking risk/return frontier of different strategy returns



Source: Watson Wyatt Report, December 2009

Another aspect that Watson Wyatt has highlighted in its report is the fact that the impact of the year to year growth of the Petroleum Wealth differs from the short to the long term. As Timor-Leste is in the process of transferring wealth from petroleum to financial assets, at the current stage most of national wealth is under the sea, hence the risk-return profile of the financial assets (the Fund) has a relatively modest impact on the risk-return profile. This is shown in the figure below.

### YoY growth in real Petroleum Wealth in 2014 & 2030 (USD millions) Ministry of Finance oil price projection 3.0% ESI spending rate



Source: Watson Wyatt Report, December 2009

The left part of the figure shows that the various asset allocations have no or little impact on the year to year growth in the Petroleum Wealth over the next 5 years. This picture changes dramatically in the right part of the figure which depicts 20 years into the future. This is due to both that the differences in expected returns are put to work for a longer period and that a much larger fraction of total national wealth will be accumulated in the Fund.

### **Short and medium term investment strategy**

Bearing in mind Watson Wyatt's statement that a level of ESI spending will not be sustainable unless it is coupled with an investment strategy that expects to achieve a real return consistent with that level of spending, it is the view of the Investment Advisory Board that the Fund should aim for increasing the exposure to equities to 25% as soon as practicable (1-2 years after the new Law has been adopted). The expected risks are modest, while the increase in expected return will, with a high level of probability, ensure that an ESI level of 3% is sustainable in the long term.

However, adding more risk beyond what is regarded sufficient to achieve an expected real return in accordance with the spending rule is not appropriate at this stage, and hence the IAB recommends the exposure to equities during the next five year period not to exceed 25.30%. The responsibility of fine tuning the actual investment strategy, however, should be with the Minister and her Investment Advisory Board.

The Investment Advisory Board believes that there are three main reasons why the current and immediate risk profile for the fund should be more conservative than a similar fund in a fully developed country. One is the oil price volatility which Timor-Leste is already exposed to, another is the macroeconomic reality of Timor-Leste and a third is the maturity of the responsible institutions and stakeholders.

Timor-Leste's resources are primarily divided between petroleum assets still in the ground and the funds invested in the Petroleum Fund. The future petroleum revenues amount to approximately 70% of Timor-Leste's Petroleum Wealth. The petroleum assets in the ground have a volatile price that adds a level of uncertainty to the total equation before the equity/bond split of the money in the fund is even considered. The overall risk exposure of the total petroleum revenues must be taken into account when considering the appropriate risk level.

The macroeconomic reality of Timor-Leste is such that the Petroleum Fund will comprise a large part of the revenue base of the country and will imply a relatively moderate risk profile in the fund for a long time to come. The appropriate risk profile must be seen in conjunction with the size of the tax base for the Government. The best way to achieve financial stability is to show the world that Timor-Leste can manage the fund prudently for the long term within a strong institutional setting and with a viable economic policy.

Another consideration is the maturity of the responsible institutions and stakeholders in Timor-Leste to manage the Fund in a way which ensure as low operational risks and headline risks as possible. As the capacity and skills are increasing, although from a low starting point, the maturity of the stakeholders at large may hopefully cease to be a constraint within the short and medium term.

### **Asset allocation limits in the Law**

The Board believes there should be limits in the Law to force a broader anchoring of the risk profile with key stakeholders, in particular the National Parliament. The IAB sees that as paramount to achieving a stable environment for economic development in Timor-Leste. The reason is that there should not be too large deviation between what is written as a limit in the law and what is actually implemented in the portfolio.

On this basis, the Board recommends including the following asset allocation limits in the Law:

- Article 15.2 (minimum allocation to fixed instruments): 60%
- Article 15.3 (maximum allocation to listed equities) : 40%

In practice, asset allocations in the Law, under normal circumstances, would not constrain the Government's flexibility to pursue an appropriate investment strategy, but may prevent a future Government from changing the adopted investment strategy without properly anchoring the risk profile among the stakeholders. The Board believes an investment limit of 40% in listed equities would provide the necessary flexibility.

The Board would not recommend leaving it completely open in the Law and for the incumbent Government to decide how much to allocate to equities. This is necessary in the present context where there are insufficient demonstrated abilities of successive governments and the National Parliament in comprehending and living with various risk-return profiles.

However, the Board believes the Management Agreement between the Ministry of Finance and the BPA should be the instrument to regulate and fine tune the investment strategy, within the limits set out in the Law, based on decisions made by the Minister after receiving advice from the IAB.

In conclusion, the Board regards it prudent to allow up to 40 % in listed equities in the Petroleum Fund Law.

#### Statement from the Chairman. Mr. Olgario de Castro:

The chairman has the view that philosophically there are no technical reasons why asset allocation limits should be legislated by Parliament.

Furthermore independent advice on Asset allocations by the Board should not be conditioned or constrained by artificial limits imposed by legislation but on considered studies and assessment of the risk profiles of the stakeholders of the Fund.

## Article 15.1

<b>Minister's Proposal</b>	<b>IAB Recommendation</b>
<b>15.1 In order to qualify as an eligible financial instrument under this Article, such instrument must have been issued abroad, regulated according to internationally recognized standards and satisfy the other requirements in this Article.</b>	15.1 In order to qualify as an eligible investment under this Article an investment must be issued or situated abroad in an internationally recognised jurisdiction.

### Rationale

The intention of this paragraph is to set broad guidelines that must be met by all Petroleum Fund investments.

It seems there are two: first that the investments must be situated abroad. This is one of the fundamental premises on which the PF was founded.

Second, the investments must be issued or be situated in countries where there is a reliable and safe legal system. This provision is included to restrict investments to countries that have reliable and safe legal systems, thereby ensuring that the Petroleum Fund will be able to minimise its legal risks. It is included to ensure that investments are made where the legal system will not cause loss in the case of a default and/or enable the Fund to fully protect its interests in countries where contracts, including financial contracts, will be reliably resolved by the legal system, should that prove necessary.

The words 'internationally recognised' have been used to allow investments in a range of markets with functioning legal systems on which reliance can be placed without raising the need for the management of the Petroleum Fund, at various levels, to be required to interpret more specific wording on an ongoing basis. In practice, the wording may be interpreted to mean that instruments that are included in a recognised industry benchmark index will be deemed to be issued from a jurisdiction recognised at least by an entity with the capability of making such judgements, namely the index provider.

The wording of the Minister's recommendation referring to 'financial instruments' has been removed to reflect the intention in a later paragraph to invest part of the Fund in real estate and/or other asset classes that may not be financial instruments.

The reference to regulatory standards has been removed because private equity and real estate, for example, are not regulated.

## Article 15.2

<b>Minister's Proposal</b>	<b>IAB Recommendation</b>
<b>15.2 Not less than 20/40/60 percent of the amounts in the Petroleum Fund shall be invested in financial instruments or deposits that bear interest or a fixed amount equivalent to interest, provided that: (a) the financial instruments are determined to be of investment grade by a leading international rating agency; or (b) the deposits are held with an entity with a long term rating corresponding to investment grade as determined by a leading international rating agency."</b>	15.2 Not less than 60 per cent of the amounts in the Petroleum Fund shall be invested in eligible investments in the form of deposits or debt instruments that bear interest or a fixed amount equivalent to interest, provided that: (a) the debt instruments are determined to be of investment grade, or (b) the deposits are held with financial institutions with a rating corresponding to investment grade.

### Rationale

The intention of this paragraph is to regulate the investments that the Petroleum Fund may make in fixed interest instruments.

There are two categories of fixed interest investments permitted under this paragraph:

- Debt instruments, in the form of bonds or bills, which pay interest either in the form of a regular stream of coupons, or through the amortisation of a discount.
- Bank deposits.

The existing restriction on the issuer being a government or supranational has been removed, and the proposed drafting permits investment in instruments issued by any issuer that have been classified as investment grade. Investment grade bonds are generally more appropriate for conservative investors. These bonds typically provide the highest degree of principal and interest payment protection, and they are generally the least likely to default. Below investment grade bonds may be suitable for more aggressive investors willing to accept greater degrees of credit risk in exchange for significantly higher yields. Historically (10 years up to 2007) 2.09% of corporate investment grade (Moody's) instruments have defaulted, compared with 31.37% of non-investment grade corporate instruments, with the equivalent figures for S&P being 4.14% and 42.35%.

The meaning of the term "investment grade" is specific and well-recognised, namely all debt instruments:

- Rated as Baa3 or better by Moody's. A Baa3 debt instrument (the minimum permissible rating) is defined as "[lacking] outstanding investment characteristics and have speculative characteristics as well."
- Rated as BBB- or better by Standard and Poor's and Fitch. A BBB- debt instrument is defined as "Adverse economic conditions are more likely to lead to a weakened capacity of the issuer to meet its financial commitment."

These ratings are long-term ratings. Short term instruments are separately rated with the minimum rating to be classified as 'investment grade' being P-3 (Moody's), A-3 (S&P) and A3 (Fitch). The reference to 'long-term' to define the credit rating has been removed, so that a short-term bank deposit would be benchmarked by the bank's short-term credit rating.

The interpretation of 'investment grade' has been intentionally left undefined to avoid the operational issues associated with detailed legal requirements being placed on individual instruments, when the management focus by the IAB and the Minister should be on asset classes. The intention is to allow investments to be considered in light of both the rating of the issuer as well as the rating on the instrument itself. For example, non-rated bonds issued by a well-rated sovereign are excluded from the list of eligible investments in the current law, even though they share the same characteristics of rated bonds issued by the same sovereign. On the other hand, a risky instrument issued by a well-rated entity would be excluded under the definition.

For comments to the specific asset allocation limits, please see the initial discussion under Article 15.

## Article 15.3

<b>Minister's Proposal</b>	<b>IAB Recommendation</b>
<b>"15.3 Not more than [100-20/40/60] per cent of the amounts in the Petroleum Fund may be invested in equities, provided that: (a) the equities are listed and openly traded in a financial market of the highest regulatory standard; and (b) no holding represents more than five per cent of the outstanding shares of any individual company."</b>	15.3 Not more than 40 per cent of the amounts in the Petroleum Fund shall be invested in eligible investments in the form of listed equities, provided that: (c) the equities are traded in a regulated financial market. (d) no holding shall exceed five per cent of the issued capital of the issuing company.

### Rationale

The intention of this paragraph is to regulate the investments that the Petroleum Fund may make in listed equities.

All investments in listed equities shall take place in regulated markets. This will, as a general rule, contribute to the liquidity and transparency of pricing and valuation information, so that equities may be bought and sold in an orderly manner (as will be required for rebalancing purposes) and will be subject to regulatory oversight. Furthermore, the value of the assets as reported from time to time by the Petroleum Fund will be a reliable reflection of what the market believes to be their underlying value.

Furthermore, the Petroleum Fund will not obtain a significant holding in any one company. The objective implicit in this statement is that the Petroleum Fund will not take strategic positions in a company that may bring about obligations over and above those of a small passive investor. This requirement also provides statutory clarity that the Petroleum Fund will not be used to make strategic or politically motivated investments.

For comments to the specific asset allocation limits, please see the initial discussion under Article 15.



## Article 15.4

Minister's Proposal	IAB Recommendation
<b>"15.4 Not more than [y] per cent of the amounts in the Petroleum Fund may be, in accordance with all procedures laid down in this Act, invested in other financial instruments, including private unlisted equities and real estate."</b>	15.4 No more than 5 per cent of the amounts in the Petroleum Fund may be invested in other eligible investments provided that: (a) the Minister has included the asset class to which the eligible investments belong in the proposed asset allocation presented to parliament in accordance with Article 14.5, and (b) the policies and criteria for selecting, managing and valuing individual financial instruments within the asset class have been approved by the Minister and published.

### Rationale

The intention of this paragraph is to permit the investment of a limited amount of the Petroleum Fund in any other investments other than investment grade fixed interest and listed equities.

The paragraph has been drafted in a manner that allows the Minister maximum flexibility in choosing the investments but balances that flexibility with strict accountability and transparency rules.

The remainder of the PF law sets operational limits on what the Minister may do. The Minister may not, for example, make a decision to invest in an ad hoc manner in an asset class which has not previously been advised to parliament (proposed Art 14.5). Nor may the Minister make a decision to invest in a new asset class, or change the mandates for existing investment classes without first seeking the advice of the Investment Advisory Board (Art. 11.2) whose advice will be published.

Furthermore, the proposed wording requires that the Minister determine and publish the rules for investing in financial instruments within an asset class before making the investment, so that the actions may be carried out with the highest standard of transparency (Art 32.1).

Bearing in mind Watson Wyatt's statement that there may be potential diversification benefits from including alternative investments, but that allocations to these asset classes also give rise to issues including the burden on stakeholders' time, higher fees, liquidity risks and general levels of complexity, the IAB recommends to limit the exposure to other eligible instruments than fixed interest investments and listed equities to maximum 5%. The IAB believes that higher risk exposure primarily should be achieved by changing the benchmark in the equity portfolio (Small value, REITS) rather than bearing the cost of more complex asset classes. However, there could be a rationale to have a "safety valve" in the law in case there are issues which are not predictable at the current stage.

## Article 15.5

Minister's Proposal	IAB Recommendation
<b>15.5 The total exposure to any individual company or issuer, except for a sovereign State, in the form of investments in debt instruments, shares or any other individual securities, assets or deposits, may not in total exceed three percent of the amounts in the Petroleum Fund.</b>	15.5 The exposure of the Petroleum Fund: (a) to any one company or issuer, except for a sovereign state, in the form of eligible investments, shall not exceed three per cent of the total value of the Petroleum Fund; (b) to any one asset class shall, on a net basis.

### Rationale

The intention of this paragraph is to limit the exposure of the Fund, firstly by limiting the amount that may be placed into a single financial investment. It is intended to cap the loss at 3% of the Fund's total value in the event of an unexpected catastrophic failure of an individual company or financial institution. For example, it would not be possible for the Fund to withdraw a time deposit at a leading bank that found itself in financial difficulty.

In the 2008-9 global financial crisis governments stepped in to prevent systemically important banks from failing. However, the implicit guarantee that governments have given to large banks is being questioned, and a review of issues such as whether any institution should be 'too big to fail' may lead to moves to reduce or remove the moral hazard that governments have incurred. Accordingly, it is believed that the Fund should limit its exposure to individual entities as a matter of policy.

Based on the Fund's current size of about \$5 billion, the three per cent limit would be about \$150 million.

Secondly, the intention to limit the exposure by preventing short positions to be taken against an individual asset class. By including the words "on a net basis" the intention is to permit short positions in individual instruments that may be taken in the normal course of active management, but not so much as to short an entire asset class.

The provision will also, by implication, prevent the Fund from borrowing (i.e. going short in cash) to finance investments in other asset classes.

An asset class is a group of securities that exhibit similar characteristics, behave similarly in the market, and are usually subject to the same laws and regulations. The three major asset classes are equities (stocks), fixed-income (bonds), and cash equivalents (money market instruments). Other asset classes include real estate, commodities, and possibly derivative instruments such as options and futures contracts, natural resources, and precious metals. Asset classes can be analysed into asset class categories, for example, equities can be analysed by size (large-cap, mid-cap and smallcap) or style (growth, blend, value). A blend of asset classes and asset class categories is necessary for diversification purposes.

## Article 15.X

Minister's Proposal	IAB Recommendation
None	15.6 Notwithstanding the provisions of subarticles 20.1 and 20.2, charges arising in the course of market transaction management or participation in security lending programs that are of a short-term nature and consistent with prudent asset management principles shall not be regarded as encumbrances in the course of investing amounts in the Petroleum Fund by the Investment Manager.

### Rationale

The intention of Article 20 is to prevent the State from entering into contracts that mortgage the Petroleum Fund assets or its future income stream. On the other hand, the transfer of assets through the world's clearing and settlement systems, or maintaining a margin account, in the normal course of trading are normal practices in terms of the Fund's investing operations. These operational arrangements may potentially and incidentally expose the assets to liens or charges, and a strict interpretation of Article 20 in the light of information that may come to hand about such arrangements in future may prevent the effective implementation of the investment policy.

In the meantime, Article 20 has been strictly applied to the global custody agreement and the existing investment management agreement (IMA), and is reflected in the provisions of the BPA's standard IMA to be used in future. However, the BPA does not have the ability to dictate or contract out of the terms of third-party contracts on which the BPA's counterparts rely in order to carry out their obligations.

This proposed paragraph also provides explicit authority to implement a lending programme, given that the lack of specific authority in the current law and questions of encumbrances have prevented the Fund from potentially adding millions of dollars of revenue to its income.

The paragraph is also intended to include the fact that in the course of asset management the assets under management may be subject to liens and encumbrances in the course of delivery and settlement as the result of various market agreements and conventions.

The emphasis on the drafting is on the short term, and that the arrangements must be consistent with those used by a prudently managed fund.

The wording, in part, reflects the wording in Santiago principle GAPP19.2 "The management of the SWF's assets should be consistent with what is [sic] generally accepted as sound asset management principles". The word "sound" has been replaced with "prudent" to maintain consistency with the use of the same word in the existing Article 11.4.

## Article 15.6

<b>Minister's Proposal</b>	<b>IAB Recommendation</b>
15.6 A derivative instrument qualifies as a financial instrument for purposes of this Law only if it is used for the purpose of reducing the overall risk associated with the underlying instrument or instruments or to facilitate efficient implementation of asset exposure. The risk associated with the use of a derivative instrument shall not be larger than that entailed with direct exposure to the underlying assets in accordance with this law.	15.7 A derivative instrument shall qualify as an eligible investment only if:  (a) it is used for the purpose of reducing the risk to the Fund from the underlying instrument or instruments or to facilitate the efficient implementation of asset exposure; and  (b) the risk from the derivative instrument is not larger than that which could be had by direct exposure to the underlying assets in accordance with this law; and  (c) the Minister has established conditions with respect to the operational use of the derivative instrument.

### Rationale

Derivatives are widely and legitimately used in financial markets to manage risk and financial exposures. On the other hand, derivatives can also be used for highly speculative purposes, and difficulties arising from this latter approach have tainted the word 'derivative'.

It is the intention of the proposed wording to restrict the use of derivatives to legitimate management purposes, bearing in mind that the standard of prudence must be applied to all the Fund's investments. For this reason, the proposed wording is designed to prevent the use of derivatives to obtain financial leverage.

The reference to "the direct exposure to the underlying assets" as the reference point is designed to benchmark the use of derivatives with the underlying assets.

The objectives of this Article can be summarised as follows:

1. Investing in derivatives as a long term investment vehicle should in general not be allowed (because it is believed that the potential added value does not outweigh the increased complexity and operational risk)
2. Derivatives should be allowed to (quickly) reduce risk in the portfolio if that should be warranted
3. Derivatives should be allowed for operational or transitional purposes, i.e., when using them is the least costly way of making changes in the portfolio, or if using derivatives is the normal way of gaining exposure to an asset.
4. When derivatives are allowed, they should not be used so that the exposure (i.e., expected return and risk) in the portfolio can be very different from what is otherwise (without the use of derivatives) allowed under this law.

Given the variety of derivatives available, the role of this Article is to serve as guidance to the Minister when drafting the management agreement and investment guidelines to the operational manager.

The variety of derivatives also means that the references to reducing risk have been intentionally left open to interpretation - guidelines for reducing risk with one type of derivative could, for example, be inappropriate for another type.

As a guideline and notwithstanding other factors, one interpretation is that risk could be measured in terms of the numeraire of the Fund.

## Article 15.8

Minister's Proposal	IAB Recommendation
None.	15.8 The Minister shall determine the period within which Investment Managers shall dispose of instruments if they cease to be eligible investments because of a change in the rating of the financial instruments or the issuer of the instruments.

### Rationale

This proposed Article addresses the same issue as Article 15.2 of the current Petroleum Fund law:

*"The investment Manager shall dispose of an instrument if it ceases to be a qualifying instrument because of a change in the rating of the instrument or the issuer of the instrument within one month of the instrument ceasing to be a qualifying instrument"*

The objective of the Article is to permit time for the disposal of investments that change in rating without causing the manager to be in breach of the law during that time.

The current law defines a disposal period of thirty days. While this period is a fair operational time, the requirement may have had negative impacts because of forced sales during times of severe market stress as has recently been the case, and during which a number of financial instruments have regained value following a sharp fall. For this reason, the Board believes that it may be inappropriate to retain the thirty day period during which investments may end up being sold at "fire sale" prices.

Accordingly it is proposed that the Minister, taking account of general economic and financial market conditions, may determine an appropriate disposal period from time to time. It is not intended that the Minister become involved in day-to-day operational issues by being required to determine the relevant time period on a case-by-case basis. According the use of the plural has been used with a view to the Minister having a policy rather than an operational role. It may be appropriate for the general period to be regulated in the Management Agreement with provision for specific exceptions to be granted on request of the BPA.

The possibility of giving the operational manager the ability to determine the disposal period was considered. In light of the fact that the period is specified in the current law, and to preserve a balance of powers, it was decided that on balance the authority to set the disposal period should rest with the Minister.