UNMISET and Internal Security in East Timor

The first United Nations mission in East Timor (UNAMET) arrived in May 1999. Since then the UN has sent two other missions: UNTAET and currently UNMISET. Each has its own mandate and objectives:

♦ UNAMET - United Nation Assistance Mission in East Timor – May to October 1999. The UN first came to East Timor to organize and carry out the referendum in which the East Timorese people chose independence.

♦ UNTAET - United Nation Transitional Administration in East Timor – October 1999 to May 2002. After the referendum and the violence that surrounded the vote, UNAMET was replaced by UNTAET, with the mandate to govern until East Timor could govern itself. As a transitional government, UNTAET had total sovereignty and absolute power to govern East Timor in every aspect, with no local accountability. (See La’o Hamutuk Bulletins Vol.2 No.1-2, Vol.2 No.4, Vol.2 No.6-7 and Vol.3 No.1).

♦ UNMISET - United Nation Mission of Support in East Timor – May 2002 to June 2004. On 20 May 2002, East Timor officially became an independent country with its own government. Therefore, UNTAET was replaced by UNMISET, with the mandate to give support to the new government until May 2004, supporting the long-term stability and security of the country.

After nearly a year of UNMISET’s presence in East Timor, many still do not understand what UNMISET is or what its mandate or responsibilities are. This article will try to clarify some questions about UNMISET, especially in regard to its responsibilities for the internal security of East Timor.

UNMISET’s Mandate

UN Security Council Resolution 1410, passed 17 May 2002, authorized the formation of UNMISET for an initial period of one year. UNMISET has three main tasks:

✓ “to provide assistance to core administrative structures critical to the viability and political stability of East Timor.”

✓ “to provide interim law enforcement and public security and to assist in the development of a new law enforcement agency in East Timor, the East Timor Police Service.”

✓ “to contribute to the maintenance of external and internal security of East Timor.”

UNMISET has a Mandate Implementation Plan, composed of three programs:

1. Stability, Democracy and Justice
2. Public Security and Law Enforcement
3. External Security and Border Control

The Mission is headed by a Special Representative of the UN Secretary General (SRSG), Indian diplomat Kamlesh Sharma, and a Deputy Representative, Sukehiro Hasegawa from Japan, who also heads UNDP in East Timor. UNMISET consists of a civilian component, which includes the office of the SRSG, Civilian Support Group (technical advisors to East Timor’s government), Serious Crimes Unit and Human Rights Unit, as well as a civilian police component and a military component (see Table 1, next page).

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According to the December 2002 Report of the Secretary-General on UNMISET’s budget for July 2003 to June 2004, UNMISET’s two-year budget is approximately U.S.$517 million. About 62% of this goes to personnel, with 22% spent on civilian staff. Although UNMISET has nearly twice as many East Timorese as international staff, only 0.8% of the budget (3% of the civilian personnel money) pays for local staff (see Graph 1).

Public Security and Law Enforcement

This article will focus on UNMISET’s Mandate for Internal Security and Law Enforcement, which states that UNMISET is responsible to “provide interim law enforcement and public security and to assist in the development of a new law enforcement agency in East Timor, the East Timor Police Service” and to “contribute to the maintenance of the external and internal security of East Timor.” Thus we will look mainly at the mandate and performance of international police, not the military.

According to the Mandate, this program has two objectives:
1. to continue providing executive policing;
2. to support the development of a national police service through training, co-location and timely and coordinated handover of responsibilities.

What does this mean? First, that UNMISET, through its police component UNPOL, will provide police services until the national police is prepared to do so. Second, that it has the responsibility to train and prepare the national police force – Polisía Nasional de Timor Leste (PNTL) – as a professional, democratic, efficient, sustainable and community-based police force. UNMISET has overall responsibility for security in East Timor, with the UNPOL Commissioner and the SRSG as ultimate decision makers in regard to security in the country until operational responsibilities are fully handed over to the East Timorese authorities. “Until that time, they [the national police] would remain under the command of the international police commissioner reporting to my Special Representative,” according to the Mandate Implementation Plan.

UNPOL Component in East Timor

According to UNMISET’s Mandate, “the programme would be implemented by the UNMISET police component, assisted by a small number of civilian experts.” When the Mission was established on 20 May 2002, the UNPOL component was 1,250 officers spread among the 13 districts of East Timor. Following the Mandate’s orders that “downsizing of UNMISET should proceed as quickly as possible, after careful assessment of the situation in the ground,” this number has been gradually reduced according to a plan made at the beginning of the Mission. In March 2003, the UNPOL contingent in East Timor included 662 officers (see Table 2, next page).

Training and Development of the National Police

The East Timor national police force, PNTL, was formed on 27 March 2000 with 50 recruits. Police candidates were recruited and selected by UNPOL in Dili and throughout all districts, and the recruiting process was based on international criteria such as height (at least 155 cm for women and 165 cm for men), and the candidates had to pass medical and other tests. There was no consideration of whether the candidate had been pro-autonomy or pro-independence,
which generated protests from parts of East Timorese civil society. The East Timor police now number 2,530, and another 253 recruits started the training at the Police Academy on 31 March 2003.

As already mentioned, one of the objectives of UNPOL in East Timor is to train the national police force and prepare them to assume full responsibility for the internal security of the country after UNMISET leaves.

The training for the East Timorese National Police is composed of:

- Basic Training: three months classroom training in the Police Academy
- Field Training: nine months “on the job” training
- Specialist Training: such as bomb search, investigations and basic intelligence
- Special Training: given to special units such as the UIR (Rapid Intervention Unit, see page 7) and the UPV (Vulnerable Persons Unit)
- Professional Courses: management and administration.

**Police Academy**

The selected candidates undergo three months of basic training at the Police Academy, where they learn theory and become familiar with police work. The training program was prepared by the UN and covers 54 subjects, with monthly exams. Many national police recruits have only middle school education, so they sometimes have trouble understanding all of the material covered in such a short period.

All officials interviewed by *La’o Hamutuk* agreed that the basic training given to the PNTL is not enough to prepare a professional police force and that three months is a very tight timeframe. The Joint Assessment Mission on the Timor Leste Police Service, held from 18 to 29 November 2002, recognized in its Aide-Memoire: “All TLPS [now

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**Table 2: UNPOL Personnel**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DISTRICT</th>
<th>UNPOL</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dili</td>
<td>482</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baucau</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aileu</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manatuto</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Viqueque</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bobonaro</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liquisa</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oecussi</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufahi</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Covalima</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ermera</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ainaro</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lautem</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>662</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: UNMISET, March 2003*
PNTL recruits receive twelve weeks of basic training in addition to field training. However, it’s widely acknowledged that this is insufficient and further training is required to strengthen basic policing skills.”

UNPOL says that the time period for the training is limited because it has only two years to prepare 2,830 East Timorese national police officers, and it faces time pressures to reach high targets for the numbers of recruits trained. However, the training of the East Timorese National Police didn’t start with UNMISET, but during the UNTAET Mission, in the beginning of year 2000. When UNMISET started in May 2002, the East Timorese police already had about 1,800 officers (see Graph 2, page 6). That means that, in the two years of its mandate, UNMISET was required to train around 1,000 officers, not 2,800.

La’o Hamutuk has just received information that a new curriculum for six months basic training has been developed and will be implemented prior to the end of the Mission. With the new curriculum, the timeframe for the training will continue to be one year, six months basic training plus six months field training. But until now, five months after the Joint Mission made its recommendation, PNTL recruits are still receiving the same three months basic training.

Until May 2002, the training at the Police Academy was entirely given by UNPOL officials and international experts. During this period, besides the short timeframe, communication was another problem in the Academy. Most of UNPOL officers giving the training used English, which most East Timorese recruits do not understand. According to a UNPOL technical advisor, as well as PNTL officers interviewed by La’o Hamutuk at the Police Academy, interpretation further reduces the time for training, apart from the fact that in many cases the interpretation is not very accurate.

After independence, PNTL officers began giving the basic training and now command of the Academy has been handed over to PNTL, following the UN plan. UNPOL officers at the Academy are now technical advisors, in an advisory role, monitoring the classes, helping with administration and giving assistance when needed. They also prepare PNTL instructors and, along with international experts, give specialized training on scenarios, human rights, management and other topics. There are currently 44 PNTL instructors and 31 UNPOL technical advisors in the Police Academy.

Field Training and Executive Policing

The first objective of the Internal Security and Law Enforcement programme is “to continue providing executive policing.” Since the establishment of the national police force, the executive policing in East Timor has been functioning as a “joint service,” provided by UNPOL and PNTL, under the command of the UNPOL Commissioner who reports to the SRSG in East Timor.

The first nine months of “joint service” after graduating from the Police Academy is called “field training” or “on the job training.” The recruits return to the towns where they were selected to put into practice what they have learned in the Academy. During this period, a PNTL recruit works side-by-side with a UNPOL counterpart. After finishing the field training, the recruits are tested and evaluated to become professional police officers. But until the district where they work is handed over to the PNTL command, they keep working with their UNPOL counterparts in this joint service.

According to UNPOL Deputy Commissioner Denis McDermott, UNPOL priorities in East Timor change depending on the context and development of the situation. Police service is part of UNPOL’s mission, but with the development of the national police, PNTL is usually at the front of daily police operations, while UNPOL now mostly monitors and advises, concentrating its activities on training and investigation.

The “field training” and “joint service” described above have had some problems and difficulties:

1. Lack of a Common Language: most UNPOL officers working as counterparts of PNTL officers don’t speak Tetum or Indonesian, and most PNTL officers don’t speak English. This makes communication between East Timorese and UNPOL counterparts difficult, although translators are provided in some cases, especially in the stations. But in daily policing, when PNTL and UNPOL officers are working together in the field, there is usually no one to make the bridge between them. The majority of PNTL officers interviewed by La’o Hamutuk stated that communication is a big problem, especially in the field.

2. Insufficient Knowledge about Local Culture: some PNTL and UNPOL officers interviewed by La’o Hamutuk stated that UNPOL officers lack knowledge about the local culture, which may be a problem in field policing.

This was also acknowledged by the Joint Assessment

### Table 3: 32 Countries provide 741 Civilian Police

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia-Herzegovina</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samoa</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
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<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>38</td>
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<td>Sweden</td>
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<td>Thailand</td>
<td>36</td>
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<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>741</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: SG Report on UNMISET 6 November 2002*
Mission on the PNTL, which reported that “deficiencies in regard to language and culture by some UNPOL staff have hampered the effectiveness of some technical assistance.”

3. Methods: the first three months of training in the Police Academy, whether given by UNPOL or PNTL officers, follows a curriculum prepared by the UN. But when PNTL officers undergo field training, they work with internationals from all over the world (see Table 3), each with his/her own methods of policing and of applying the theory in practice. This confuses the new East Timorese officers, who see different examples of implementing what they have just learned in the Academy. In fact, these differences raise problems even among UNPOL officers working together.

PKF Back-up Support

The Peace Keeping Force (PKF, the military component of UNMISET) has, as a secondary task, to give back-up support to the police “in the event of serious or large scale internal security incidents exceeding police capabilities”. Back-up support normally starts with a request from the District Commander to the UNPOL Commissioner, but the SRSG must make a formal request to the PKF Force Commander.

According to the November 2002 Report of the Secretary-General on UNMISET, UNPOL had, up to that date, required support from PKF to re-establish order on four occasions related to “issue-based security groups” provoking violence. Since this report, the police have requested back-up support from PKF at least three more times: during the civil unrest in Dili on 4 December 2002, and during the two armed incidents in Atsabe and Atabae, in January and February 2003.

The use of military support to deal with internal security affairs is very problematic. Although it may be necessary in cases of extreme threat to security, it should be avoided as much as possible, and its limits and roles have to be very clear. As the name says, it is support given to the police force to re-establish order and provide security, but the responsibility for controlling internal security incidents remains with the police.

Confusion over the roles of police and military are not the only problem with using the military for internal security. The military is not trained to deal with civilians. They are trained to fight wars, to take actions against enemy soldiers, and normally, to kill. To involve the army in civilian disturbances or civil unrest can be very dangerous, and is a bad precedent for a nation building a new democracy. UNPOL requested PKF support seven times in ten months, a very high rate for any country.

There are opinions, even inside PKF, that PKF is doing the police’s work in some places, like Dili, because the police cannot do their own job. In many cases, like in the 4 December incident, people expect the PKF to take action, which shows that the role of UNPOL and PKF is not clear to most people, especially in cases of civil disturbances. The fact that the population so often sees PKF in the streets may increase their confusion.

The question is: Why does UNPOL so often need support from the military in East Timor? The police should be well prepared, trained and equipped and have enough personnel to ensure law and order in internal security matters. The cases in which the police need military support should be exceptional.

Handover and Downsizing

Operational responsibility for day-to-day executive policing is transferred to the National Police Command gradually, district by district, according to a plan made before the beginning of the Mandate, with the agreement of the Transitional Government. Under this plan, the national police service will assume full executive responsibility for policing in all 13 districts by January 2004, and UNPOL will take on a technical advisory function. Seven of the 13 districts have been handed over to the PNTL command (see Table 4).

With the handover, an East Timorese District Commanding Officer, who reports to the PNTL Commissioner, assumes responsibility for command of routine policing, but UNPOL keeps a few personnel as technical advisors. The performance of PNTL officers is still reviewed by Mobile United Nations Police Teams. And until January 2004, when executive responsibility for all the 13 districts, headquarters and specialized units is handed over, PNTL and UNPOL are under the control of the UNPOL Commissioner, even in districts where PNTL has responsibility for daily operations. As described in the agreement between UNMISET and the RDTL Government on the transfer of police responsibilities “the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Responsibility</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May 2002</td>
<td>Aileu district</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2002</td>
<td>Dili port</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2002</td>
<td>UIR Baucau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2002</td>
<td>UIR Dili</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2002</td>
<td>Manatuto district</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2002</td>
<td>Dili District Court</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep 2002</td>
<td>Security of the Police Academy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 2002</td>
<td>Manufahi district</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 2002</td>
<td>Ainaro district</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 2002</td>
<td>Ermera district</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan 2003</td>
<td>Immigration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan 2003</td>
<td>Maritime unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar 2003</td>
<td>Liquisa district</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr 2003</td>
<td>Lautem district</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2003</td>
<td>Viqueque district</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2003</td>
<td>Dili airport (Comoro)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2003</td>
<td>Bobonaro district</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2003</td>
<td>Border patrol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2003</td>
<td>Covalima district</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug 2003</td>
<td>Oecussi district</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep 2003</td>
<td>Baucau district</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 2003</td>
<td>Dili district</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan 2004</td>
<td>Headquarters</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: UNPOL to PNTL Handover

Source: UNMISET
The La'o Hamutuk Bulletin

East Timorese Commissioner shall, following District/Unit handover, promptly bring all Operational Command and Control matters to the attention of the UNPOL Commissioner, for his appropriate action.”

With the gradual handover of operational responsibilities to PNTL commanders, UNPOL strength has already been gradually downsized. The downsizing plan was drafted according to the handover plan (see Graph 2, next page) and when the national police assume total command the UN police will remain in an advisory role, with 100 technical advisors, until June 2004.

The plan for the handover of responsibilities and downsizing has been questioned many times, since the great majority of UNPOL officials we interviewed believe that with the little training received the National Police are, in some cases, still not ready to assume responsibility. In November 2002 the Joint Assessment Mission recommended that “it may be that the timeline for handover merits further consideration taking into account both the current skill levels of the PNTL officers and relevant political factors.” When La’o Hamutuk asked the Deputy Commissioner of UNPOL about this recommendation, he said that “the agenda for the handover will continue as planned. We have to leave East Timor in 2004, so we don’t have time to delay the handover of responsibilities to the PNTL.” Even though Denis McDermott agrees with the plan, also said that he is “well aware that a lot more work still needs to be done to leave the PNTL in a position to maintain law and order in the future.”

But after the events in Dili, Atsabe and Atabae (see below) UNMISET authorities changed their minds. The Special Report of the SRSG presented to the Security Council on 10 March, recommends several changes in the UNMISET plans in order to address security challenges, including that “... UNMISET would ensure that handover takes place at a pace that does not jeopardize stability….”

The events in Dili, Atsabe and Atabae

Three major events affecting internal security took place in East Timor in the last few months.

On 4 December 2002, a demonstration initiated by students protesting in front of the National Parliament against the attitude of the police during the arrest of one of their classmates the day before was manipulated and directed to attack specific targets symbolic of the Prime Minister or of the unequal wealth of foreigners. During the protest in front of the Parliament three demonstrators were killed, reportedly by PNTL police (see La’o Hamutuk Bulletin Vol.3, No.8).

The ineffective police response to this incident is still unexplained. There are several questions being asked: why did the police shoot into an unarmed crowd? How could the mob have walked around Dili for several hours, and in nearly every incident, the police arrived after the destruction was complete, although they have helicopters, motor vehicles and sophisticated communications equipment? Why did UIR, the unit specially trained to act in civil disturbances, not act to control the protest? Where were the UNPOL counterparts of the PNTL officers who were deployed in front of the Parliament? Why were UNPOL and PNTL officers, plus PKF troops, which gave back-up support to the police in this event, unable to control an unarmed crowd of about 200 people? Why were PKF troops protecting places such as foreign embassies and UN facilities, while nobody, for example, was
protecting the Prime Minister’s house, which was the last target attacked by the mob?

Answers given to La’o Hamutuk by UNPOL officials are quite vague. First they said that the police weren’t able to control the crowd because it split into several groups, heading (on foot) to different targets at the same time. That still doesn’t explain why, with all the equipment and personnel that UNMISET has, they weren’t able to figure out where the groups were heading and block the roads. It was also said that there weren’t enough police personnel to control the crowd of 200 people, even counting PNTL and UNPOL officers posted in Dili, plus the back-up support of the PKF. Regarding the UIR, instead of being deployed to control the crowd, it was deployed to protect the UNPOL Headquarters and the Dili Police Station. A UNPOL official told us unofficially (although his superiors deny this) that, after UIR’s intervention in civil disturbances in Baucau some months before, the command decided to “preserve their image,” and not send them to the streets. Some UNPOL officials told us that “they weren’t prepared” to deal with such an event, even though they are responsible for internal security in East Timor.

What is clear is that the responsible authorities, UNMISET and UNPOL, didn’t take effective action to prevent or control the situation. Why they didn’t is not yet clear. It is clear from the UNMISET Mandate that PNTL is under the command of UNPOL. On 13 December, nine days after the event, SRSG Kamlesh Sharma stated that “some discipline problems were evident within the Timor Leste Police Service, and immediate steps have been taken in order to deal with it.” Mr. Sharma never mentioned who was in command of PNTL that day, nor who was responsible for their training. As a high-ranking UNPOL official told us, “if the PNTL committed any mistakes on 4 December, that’s many people’s fault, and since UNPOL is the one responsible for their training and command, it is the most responsible for the way [PNTL officers] act.”

Just after the event, UNPOL opened an investigation into the causes of the disturbance and UNPOL and PNTL performance, as well as the actions taken by PNTL officers involved in the killing of the three demonstrators. In February, the UNPOL Deputy Commissioner told La’o Hamutuk that they were only waiting for the results of ballistic tests to complete the inquiry, and that once completed the outcome will be forwarded to the Prosecutor General. By late May, almost six months after the incident, the results of the investigation have not been released, and nobody has been charged.

According to UNPOL officials, however, some things changed after 4 December: UIR has gone through further training in crowd control skills and appropriate use of force, and new equipment for crowd control was acquired and officers received training on how to use this equipment. If they weren’t prepared and well equipped to respond effectively at that time, now they say they are.

The other two events involving internal security occurred in January and February, near Atsabe, Ermera district and Atabae, Bobonaro district, both near the Indonesian border. In both cases armed groups attacked the local population, with seven deaths in Atsabe and two in Atabae. The precise motivation for the attacks is still unknown, but, according to the a UNMISET report “there is an increasing amount of credible evidence to suggest that former militias and armed groups may be establishing bases within the country with the objective of undermining stability.”

Both in Atsabe and in Atabae, the intervention of the military, PKF and the East Timorese Armed Forces (FDTL), confused who has the responsibility to handle such cases. According to Deputy SRSG Hasegawa, these are internal security matters, and therefore the responsibility of the police. But, once more, the police did very little. In Atsabe, FDTL carried out arrests (most of which were overruled by a judge the next day for being unconstitutional) and remained in the area, along with Portuguese PKF, to guarantee security. In Atabae it was PKF, not police, who searched the area after the attacks and arrested suspects. In both cases, the population asked for the presence of FDTL and PKF, because they lack confidence in the police to guarantee their security.

These three events clearly show the fragility and inefficiency of UNPOL’s ability to guarantee internal security in East Timor. In his March 2003 report, the SRSG recommends several changes in UNMISET plans for UNPOL. “The events of recent months suggests that serious deficiencies in Timorese and international capabilities already exists, and can invite further problems,” says the report, which calls for freezing the downsizing of UNPOL and PKF until December 2003, and recommends a revised strategy for the military and police forces. These events made the UN authorities in East Timor officially recognize problems previously identified by many others, including the weakness of training and the problems stemming from the rush to hand over districts in order to meet downsizing schedules.

The suggestions made by the SRSG include:

- √ to adjust the composition and strength of UNPOL and the schedule for its downsizing;
- √ to provide further training to PNTL, especially in crowd control;


![UIR]

The Rapid Intervention Unit or UIR (Unidade Intervensau Rapida) is a special unit of East Timorese police trained to respond to cases of riot, civil disorder and crowd control. There are two UIR units, one based in Dili, composed of 130 officers, and another in Baucau, with 60 officers. UIR officers were recruited from all police officers, but now it’s made only among officers who volunteer to take part in the unit. UIR has already been handed to the PNTL, and the unit receives special training outside the Police Academy. They were first trained by the Portuguese Intervention Corps (CIP), followed by training from Malaysia and Australia. After the 4 December incident, UIR received further training in the use of force and crowd control from Malaysia, a country with a poor record of police respect for human rights.
to include an international police unit specialized in emergency situations and civil disturbances, which will be prepared to act when the situation exceeds the capacity of UIR while it is still under training;

- to increase UNPOL monitoring and advisory presence in districts that have been handed over to the East Timor Government;

- to adjust the planning for handover to take place at a slower pace.

These recommendations were approved by the UN Security Council on 5 May 2003, as part of Resolution 1473.

Conclusion

A stable and secure environment is essential for the development of any nation. And it’s clear that in East Timor there are still many problems regarding security. UNMISET, as the institution responsible for maintaining security in East Timor and establishing sustainable Timorese structures for after it leaves, is responsible to solve these problems.

East Timor has many economic, social and historical reasons for its special security problems: Massive unemployment, a lack of education and other public services; limited mutual respect between government and civil society; frustration with the pace of democratic and economic development; widespread post-conflict and post-traumatic stress; lack of confidence in peaceful processes for change. These problems are the legacy of centuries of colonial rule and decades of military occupation. The three-year UNTAET government and the first year of UNMISET made some progress in addressing these problems, but there is far to go and the responsibility of the international community has not ended.

La’o Hamutuk welcomes Security Council Resolution 1473, which makes important recommendations aimed to address security problems. We also hope that these recommendations are implemented, and do not stay only on paper. The Joint Assessment Mission made similar recommendations back in November, but very little has been done to make them happen.

We know that guaranteeing security in East Timor is not an easy task. If UNMISET is to leave a stable East Timor, however, it is not enough to acknowledge the problems in meetings, missions and reports. The Mission has to fully commit itself to face and resolve these problems, and to make serious investment in training and preparing a professional national police force, able to perform its tasks in the best way possible.

Who is La’o Hamutuk?

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Workshop on Millennium Development Goals in Bangladesh

The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) held a workshop on the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) from 23-25 February 2003 in Dhaka, Bangladesh. This workshop was attended by UN agencies, and governments from Bangladesh, Cambodia, Sri Lanka, Malaysia and East Timor, as well as local and international media and NGOs from Bangladesh, Iran, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, India and East Timor.

The delegation from East Timor included UNDP Deputy Secretary Haoliang Xu, UNICEF special officer Joshiro Uramoto, RDTL Vice-Minister of Planning and Finance Aicha Bassarewan, RDTL Advisor on Planning and External Assistance Management Emilia Pires, and Adriano do Nascimento from La’o Hamutuk, who represented NGOs.

The Dhaka workshop was intended to unify the perspectives and development strategies of countries in the Asia Pacific region to implement the Millennium Development Goals adopted by 189 countries at the September 2000 Millennium Summit at UN headquarters in New York.

What are MDGs?

Millennium Development Goals are a global framework designed by world leaders to address humanitarian problems such as poverty, education and health. A unified commitment has been made to achieve goals and targets regarding development, government, peace, security, and human rights.

In the Millennium Declaration, the heads of state of 189 nations adopted eight goals as a framework for development:

1. Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger
2. Achieve universal primary education
3. Promote gender equality and empower women
4. Reduce child mortality
5. Improve maternal health
6. Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases
7. Ensure environmental sustainability
8. Develop a Global Partnership for Development

The development goals focus on efforts to improve and attain a proper and humane world standard of living in the framework of cooperation between nations.

Perspectives or presentations from the workshop participants

Governments

At the workshop, the six countries’ governments described how the Millennium Development Goals were being implemented in their countries in relation to their overall national development planning.

Emilia Pires discussed East Timor’s national development planning. After describing the condition of the people and the nation, Pires discussed five issues: homelessness in East Timor; the destruction of infrastructure as a result of the war; reconstruction carried out by the UN, international agencies and NGOs; progress in the reconstruction of infrastructure and the creation of a peaceful political process and system. Regarding national development planning, Pires explained that there is a National Development Plan for the next 20 years, where the development framework and strategy are established for each five year period. The main agenda is to overcome poverty, achieve strong and sustainable economic growth, health, education and the prosperity of each person. Regarding MDGs, Pires said that the people of East Timor, through President Xanana Gusmão, participated in the Millennium Summit in New York, and MDGs are an integral part of East Timor’s national development map. She added that the East Timorese government will hold a workshop about MDGs in Dili, which was organized by the East Timorese delegation and held in March.

Civil Society Groups

In a separate session, NGOs from Bangladesh, East Timor, Iran, Sri Lanka, Malaysia and India gave presentations.

Print and electronic journalists also commented on the implementation of MDGs. Most of the representatives of large media said that they lack knowledge and interest in the MDG program because the publicity about MDGs is difficult to present in the media. For this reason, they asked UN bodies to develop partnerships with the media, especially about implementation of projects relating to basic human needs. They also asked the UN to be more open about its activities and how its programs are carried out.

Besides giving their perspectives on MDGs and the work of UN agencies, the Bangladeshi reporters also criticized their government for not providing enough information about its activities. Because the government is not open to the media, journalists must ask for information from international agencies. To overcome this problem, they called on governments and international agencies around the world to build partnerships to address the problems of people at the grassroots.

Civil society groups raised issues about the implementation of the MDGs, and appealed to rich countries to respect the right of developing countries to choose their own development models appropriate to their economic situation and human resources. Groups advocated that all sovereign nations should be able to design their development plans to meet specific national needs, and to build global, regional and national partnerships between wealthy and poor countries. Some warned the UN not just to toss out brilliant ideas, but to actually implement what they were talking about.

Mahfuz Anam is the senior editor of Bangladesh’s Daily Star newspaper, in his fifties. He explained why the media don’t write about the MDGs: “The United Nations has talked about education for years. When I was young, the UN talked about education. And now, 40 years later, the UN is still talking about education. The Millennium Development Goals are a project for the UN themselves, and I do not want to do propaganda for them.”
At the May 2002 Dili donors’ conference the future government of the Democratic Republic of East Timor estimated that it would need an extra $30 million to finance the first year’s national budget. This is in addition to the $42 million it could raise within East Timor. The national budget is used to pay for government offices and the salaries of civil servants and officials. It also pays for government services and functions like defense, public safety, education, health care and infrastructure. It is expected that from 2005 to 2020 sufficient revenues will be received from the royalties from the exploitation of East Timor’s oil and natural gas resources in the Timor Sea to finance the entire budget without external support.

A donor working group consisting of the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the Asian Development Bank, Japan, Portugal, Australia and the United Kingdom agreed to consolidate donor contributions to the national government budget through a facility similar to the outside financial support for the UNTAET Consolidated Fund for East Timor (CFET), which financed the transitional administration (ETTA/ETPA) (see La’o Hamutuk Bulletin Vol.2 No.1-2). The donor working group recommended that the World Bank act as trustee for the new facility, which became the Transition Support Program (TSP). Prior to the donors’ conference, the East Timorese government had not wanted the World Bank to control these funds and had asked the UN to control them instead, but the UN and donors refused. The TSP began in July 2002, a few days after East Timor joined the World Bank.

The donor working group wanted the government and the World Bank to agree on how the money would be spent and monitored. The program was supposedly negotiated between the government, donors and the World Bank. In fact the government presented its draft action plans for the fiscal year (July 2002 until June 2003) to the World Bank. The World Bank then selected those items they considered the most important for the Transition Support Program and specified the timetable for implementing the selected activities.

International organizations finance and administer other programs outside the government budget. These include UN, which finances UNPOL and the PKF, and bilateral projects such as Portugal and education, and Japan and agriculture (See La’o Hamutuk Bulletins Vol.3 Nos.2-3, 6, 7, 8). Altogether this is called the Combined Sources Budget. The government administers the national budget including the areas identified by the Transition Support Program, but the World Bank is supposed to monitor the TSP areas only.

As trustee of the TSP, the World Bank receives funds from donors and transfers them to the government. The donors have each agreed with the World Bank to transfer funds at a certain date. East Timor’s government has signed a separate contract with the World Bank to receive each donor’s contribution. Currently some donors have signed one year agreements with the World Bank and some have signed three year agreements. The World Bank attempted to persuade all the parties to sign three year agreements. The government resisted, fearing that the World Bank would control the funds by transferring the money in small installments and delaying or canceling installments if East Timor’s government failed to meet their conditions. Funds from each donor for each year are transferred soon after the World Bank receives the funds from that donor.

Portugal has not provided funds through the TSP process, but will contribute $3 million dollars directly to the government of East Timor in June 2003 for the 2002-03 fiscal year. The Portuguese embassy here would not explain why Portugal chose not to distribute funds through the TSP or if they placed any conditions on their contribution.

The government had consistently asked for the TSP to enable the transfer of donor contributions to the budget as determined by government. It was under the impression that there would not be any more conditions. However, the World Bank has placed general conditions: the government may withdraw the funds as long as it “has maintained a macro-economic policy satisfactory to the Bank.” The World Bank says that this is a standard phrase, which is in the agreement...
to prevent any major changes in government policy. There are also standard World Bank restrictions prohibiting spending on certain items such as alcoholic beverages and tobacco.

Some of the conditions are specific to East Timor many of which had already been completed when the TSP began. These include:

- Preparing a budget for the 2003 fiscal year
- Limiting the number of civil servants to 16,400
- Allocating more than 35 percent of the national budget to health and education and less than 22 percent to defense and public law and order
- Employing a private management team for its Power Service from 20 May 2002 to 30 August 2002
- Appointing a consultant to prepare terms of reference and performance indicators for the management contract for the East Timor Electricity Authority.

The agreement also states that if the government does not comply with these conditions the World Bank can stop transferring the money. For this fiscal year this does not mean much, as the World Bank has already transferred most of the funds. However, it could cause problems with the next two years of the Transition Support Program. The World Bank has acknowledged that they might stop funding if there were significant policy changes.

The donor contributions to the Transition Support Program are detailed in the graph on the previous page. The World Bank keeps 2% of all bilateral donor funds. As of April 2003 the World Bank has taken $450,000 and will earn approximately $1,300,000 over the three year period. The World Bank states that this is standard for all trust fund arrangements. World Bank officials we talked to were unable to tell La’o Hamutuk where all the money went. Some of the money has gone to the World Bank’s East Asia and Pacific regional office, and part of this may find its way back to the World Bank office in East Timor.

In addition to money from donor countries, the World Bank contributes $5 million of its own money to the TSP for the first year, and $3 million more for the second year. The Bank has placed additional conditions on its own contribution. Following the regulation of the World Bank’s charter, these funds cannot be used for ‘goods and services’ from within East Timor, but only from outside the country. In practice this does not have any effect since the government imports goods worth more than $5 million per year. Although the World Bank claims to promote poverty reduction, it seems strange that this is to be done without spending any of the money within the country.

The World Bank sees the TSP as a way to influence East Timor’s development. An internal World Bank document from April 2002 states that World Bank’s financial contribution to the TSP is “essential for the success of the Bank’s future operations in the country. Donors are looking to the Bank to play a strong role in the design and negotiation of a program for the post-independence period, 2002-2003 and beyond.”

This is the first year of the Transition Support Program. The government has resisted World Bank attempts to interfere in the national budget through the TSP negotiating process. The World Bank planned to send a TSP appraisal mission in February, comprised of World Bank officials and representatives from the donors, to evaluate the first year of the TSP and plan the second year. The government objected to the mission coming while they were preparing next year’s budget, fearing that the World Bank would become involved in the budgeting process rather than accepting areas chosen by the government. The World Bank agreed to postpone the mission, and it came in April 2003 after the budget was drafted. So far, TSP planning for the second year is a more cooperative process than the first year was.

Worldwide, the World Bank encourages a model of development that promotes dependency on exports and foreign investment. It does this by promoting economic liberalization, which can mean the removal of import and export tariffs, and limiting government regulations on, for example, wages or working hours. It also supports the privatization of government enterprises like electricity and water and reduces government spending by insisting that people pay for services like health and education. Although these policies often hurt the poor, the institution is not open to ideas outside of this framework.

The Transition Support Program is a multi-donor program, but the World Bank occupies an extremely powerful position as the intermediary between the donors and the East Timorese government. The World Bank should remember that the money moving through to the Transition Support Program is not its own money. Donor countries have made grants to East Timor to support development priorities in the national budget and the National Development Plan. The World Bank’s role is to transfer the funds from the donors to the government and monitor a program that has been agreed on by the donors, the World Bank and the government. It should not abuse its position to advance its own agenda, but should keep its promises and respect East Timor’s sovereignty.
How does East Timor’s Government get money to spend?

East Timor’s government receives money from:

- **Bilateral (government) donors.** Most of these come through the World Bank-managed Transition Support Program (see previous article), although Portugal supports the government here directly.

- **Taxes and fees** and other government activities which generate income. Most of this is from wage tax, sales tax, import duties and excise taxes.

- **Oil and gas sales.** This is from early stages of Timor Sea oil and gas development, and is expected to increase significantly in three or four years.

These are shown in the diagram below. The data is taken from several sources, and some of the figures have changed slightly in the course of the year, so they may not be precisely current or exact. Nevertheless, we believe this is an accurate portrayal of East Timor’s funding sources and streams.

The size of each arrow represents approximately how much money is involved.

All figures are in United States dollars, for the current fiscal year (July 2002-June 2003). This data comes from the Medium Term External Financing Requirements (2002-2003) report and other sources.
Who else spends public money in East Timor?

In addition to East Timor’s government programs, many donors fund projects directly. Although these are not controlled by the RDTL government, they are included in the Combined Sources Budget, and are considered when planning programs and allocating resources. There are four main components of the Combined Sources Budget:

1. **The RDTL government budget** (see previous page): $72 million.

2. **The Trust Fund for East Timor (TFET),** supported by many donors; managed by the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank. TFET is smaller than it was during UNTAET. $58 million this year.

3. **Direct aid projects** chosen and managed by such agencies as UNDP, AusAID, USAID, governments and donors. This year, these add up to $96 million.

4. **A small part of the UNMISET budget** — funded from dues assessed of UN member states — pays international advisors who work within the RDTL government and its programs, about $15 million.

About 95% of the UNMISET budget is not part of the Combined Sources Budget. We show it below because it is larger than all other public expenditures in East Timor added together. See Graph 2 on page 2.

All figures are in United States dollars, for the current fiscal year (July 2002-June 2003).

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**Other sources of money included in the Combined Sources Budget**

- **Multilateral and bilateral donors (TFET)**
  - Contributions made over several years
  - $59.4 million

- **Trust Fund for East Timor**
  - World Bank and ADB
  - Managed by donors and contractors
  - $96.2 million

- **Managed by donors and contractors**
  - $15 million

- **Managed by donors and contractors**
  - $96.2 million

- **Trust Fund for East Timor (TFET)**
  - $59.4 million

- **United Nations assessed contributions**
  - $277 million

- **Donor-managed projects**
  - Includes $57.2 million for Technical Advisors (including 200 development posts in government), and $39 million in “capital spending.”
  - For example:
    - Japan and agriculture
    - Portugal and education.
  - (See La’o Hamutuk Bulletins Vol. 3, Nos. 2-3, 6, 7, 8)

- **UN Technical Advisors**
  - 100 “stability” positions in government for international staff.

- **PKF**
  - UNPOL
  - UN Staff
  - Operational costs
  - (See graph on page 2 of this Bulletin)
Editorial: No Justice, No Peace (continued from back page)

Until the end of 2001, the SCU and SPs were largely dysfunctional, mainly due to lack of institutional backing and political will from the international community (see La’o Hamutuk Bulletin Vol. 2 No. 6-7). Since January 2002, SCU performance has improved markedly, with many investigations and indictments. In February 2003, the SCU indicted former Indonesian Defense Minister Wiranto and other high-ranking Indonesian officers for crimes against humanity, murder, deportation and persecution during 1999. During the first four months of 2003, the SCU indicted 119 people, bringing the total number of indictees to 247 in 60 separate indictments. Two-thirds (169) of those perpetrators remain at large, protected by Indonesia. At this writing, no arrest warrants have been issued for those indicted this year, and only 11 warrants (of 30 requested from 2001-2) have been circulated internationally by Interpol.

Although the indictments are a significant start to the process, they are likely to come to nothing. SCU head Siri Frigaard finished her contract in April 2003; no replacement has been hired. Officials from the UN and East Timor’s government disowned the indictments when they came out, although both later acknowledged the independence of the judicial process. We understand, however, that East Timor’s leaders have discouraged the prosecutor’s office from pursuing these cases, and East Timor’s Ministry of Justice considers the Serious Crimes process a United Nations responsibility. If an Interpol country does arrest one of the perpetrators, many worry that East Timor’s government will not negotiate seriously for his extradition to stand trial here.

Even more troublesome is the lack of international support for the judiciary. East Timor has not had a functioning appeals court since November 2001, due to the inability of the government and the UN to agree on judicial appointments. Consequently, few of the trials already held before the Special Panel have been conclusively concluded; many defendants have been jailed for longer than international human rights standards allow before final conviction. The UN planned for two Special Panels to be able to hold simultaneous trials, but that has never been the case. Since early April, they have not had enough international judges to compose even one Special Panel. Approximately 30 defendants have been convicted by the Special Panels in the past two years (including eight pending appeal), although most of them pleaded guilty. Each contested trial has taken several months. With only a year remaining, how many of the more than 40 defendants awaiting trial, let alone the 169 hiding in Indonesia, will ever face justice?

After months of delay, judge Cláudio de Jesus Ximenes was just sworn in as President of the Court of Appeal, which should enable further judicial appointments. But he is only on a six-month UNMISET contract, and his hiring at an international salary (he is an East Timorese who has been a judge in Portugal for 21 years) is resented by others in the judicial system. Who will pay his salary after UNMISET leaves?

The lackluster performance of the UN courts here has been matched by downplaying of justice concerns at the political and international levels. In April, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan acknowledged that “relations between Indonesia and Timor-Leste will also be enhanced by bringing to justice those in the two countries who are accused of serious crimes committed in 1999; again, political commitment is essential if this objective is to be achieved.” But he recognized that “the judicial process dealing with serious crimes will remain incomplete by June 2004. … Strong political commitment will also be essential. … It is crucial that these indictments for serious crimes be respected, on grounds of principle and of precedent, and that the individuals involved face trial.”

The recent strong words of the Secretary-General do not match the UN’s record. Although Indonesia promised in April 2000 to cooperate with the justice process in East Timor, they have never kept their promise. UNTAET never pushed the international community to press Jakarta, and Indonesia was glad for the excuse to do nothing.

For the past three years, the international community has waited for Indonesia’s ad hoc Human Rights Courts, using this fundamentally flawed process as an excuse for their own inaction. After extensive delays at every step, and numerous procedural flaws, that process is now almost finished. The prosecution and the judges viewed the perpetrators as loyal Indonesians seeking to quell a rebellious province — most were charged only with failing to prevent crimes by East Timorese against each other. Eleven of 14 defendants have been acquitted; the five convicted (including the only two East Timorese defendants) were given very light sentences, four less than the legal minimum. The process is so defective that even the pro-Indonesia UN Human Rights Commission expressed “its disappointment at the way in which the trials are being carried out.” But the Commission — continuing the wishful thinking that has diverted attention from meaningful justice since 2000 — “encourages the Government of Indonesia to take the necessary steps to improve the current legal processes in a transparent way, in order to ensure that justice will be done.”

It is clear that Indonesia has never intended to do justice, shielding military and civilian officials from accountability before the courts in Jakarta and Dili. That has been obvious to decision-makers in Jakarta, in Dili, in New York, and in the capitals of the UN Member States. By pretending not to see it, and by failing to act to achieve justice in any meaningful way, the international community continues its complicity in Indonesia’s crimes, and prevents many East Timorese people from emerging from victimhood to rebuild their lives and country.

The Commission on Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR) is often portrayed as part of the justice process; by supporting CAVR donors and governments create a distraction from their lack of support for justice. The truth-seeking, victim statement-taking, public education, and community reconciliation programs of the CAVR are useful, but they have little to do with justice. CAVR cannot hold the thousands of people who committed serious crimes accountable. CAVR’s Truth Report will contain important information about Indonesia’s crimes in East Timor — although everyone here knows that their illegal military occupation killed 200,000 East Timorese and raped and tortured countless more; and indictments already issued by the Serious Crimes Unit contain many specifics about 1999.

When the CAVR report comes out at the end of 2004, the Serious Crimes Unit and Special Panels will no longer exist.
The limited international financial and organizational support that currently exists for justice will be exhausted; political will may have practically vanished. The report will be useful for researchers and historians who study East Timor, but it will not help end the cycle of impunity.

For the past two years, East Timor’s President, with support from other government officials, has often said that East Timor’s government cannot take the lead for justice – that his nation’s relationship with Indonesia and with militia leaders (and the refugees still under their control) takes priority over prosecuting the major criminals. We understand his perspective – but it serves neither justice nor East Timor’s people to emphasize confession and reconciliation among the small fish while the big fish swim free. Blaming the victims of Indonesia’s crimes — whether they were oppressed or manipulated to be oppressors — does not help those who suffered move on with their lives. And impunity for the big fish only encourages them and their followers to commit crimes against humanity throughout Indonesia and the world.

La’o Hamutuk agrees that the responsibility for justice lies first with the international community, and we reiterate our call for an international tribunal for East Timor, and for effective pressure on Indonesia to cooperate with the Serious Crimes process here. We also call for an extension of international support for the Special Panels as a hybrid international-East Timorese court with universal jurisdiction, until all those indicted are brought to trial. We make this call on the community of nations – beginning with Australia, the USA, Britain, Japan and others who supported Indonesia’s occupation. But East Timor’s government and parliament must also be strong, supporting justice rather than obstructing it.

Our call is echoed by most East Timorese people, and many in the international solidarity movement, including in Indonesia. We invite them to work with us to press our government and theirs not to abandon accountability for crimes against humanity.

The final United Nations mission in East Timor has only one year remaining. The time for procrastination and realpolitik is over. If there is political will, there can be justice. If not, the people of East Timor will never have peace.

Listen to La’o Hamutuk’s Radio Program
Interviews and commentary on the issues we investigate -- and more!
In Tetum and Bahasa Indonesia
Every Friday at 3:00 pm on Radio Rakambia.
Every Saturday at 11:00 am on Radio Timor Leste and Radio Timor Kmanek

CD-ROM on East Timor’s Oil and Gas

Oil and gas under the Timor Sea between East Timor and Australia are essential to East Timor’s economic future.

Although these resources will bring much-needed money to East Timor, they also bring danger. Around the world, oil and gas development often comes with war, corruption, dictatorship, repression and environmental destruction.

To help explain these issues, La’o Hamutuk has compiled information and documents in a “website” which does not require connection to the internet. Most of OilWeb is English, although it includes much in Bahasa Indonesia and some Tetum and Portuguese. OilWeb includes:

Overviews, information and analysis about history, companies, geology, finances, development options, economics, and environmental consequences. In-depth articles relating to East Timor or other parts of the world.

Complete text of all treaties and agreements relating to Timor Sea oil development and boundaries since 1971, as well as the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea.

Articles and analysis, from the La’o Hamutuk Bulletin and other publications.

Movie “Don’t Rob Their Future” (English, 17 min.) which explains the boundary issue in simple terms.

Audio drama (Tetum, 15 min.) of the history of Australia-Indonesia-East Timor negotiations.

Profiles of oil companies and oil fields, including annual reports, financial information, and background.

Fact Sheets from the governments of East Timor, Australia and Northern Territory, UNTAET and the oil industry.

Australian Parliament hearings and debate on the Timor Sea Treaty, including 65 testimonies, the committee’s report, and transcripts of seven hearings and the Parliamentary debate on treaty ratification.

Commentary on the boundary issue, including the Portugal v. Australia ICJ case and analysis by many experts.

OilWatch Network information about consequences and popular resistance, including cases from around the world.

Edition 1.2 of the OilWeb CD-ROM is now finished. La’o Hamutuk distributes OilWeb at cost to East Timorese NGOs and their supporters and for $50 to others. It is available from our office or by mail.
This month marks one year of East Timor’s independence, and one year before the end of the UN Mission in Support of East Timor. Indonesian troops and their militia proxies ended their reign of terror here three and half years ago, but little progress has been made in holding them accountable for their crimes. La’o Hamutuk is worried that impunity may prevail, since neither the international community nor East Timor’s government has the political will to hold Indonesia and its leaders accountable for their crimes against humanity.

Justice is a difficult problem, compounded by the fact that East Timor’s largest neighbor continues to deny responsibility for its 1975 invasion, quarter-century of occupation, and scouring the earth during 1999. East Timor must coexist with Jakarta, and Jakarta’s government is a respected member of the United Nations, the world’s most populous Muslim nation and an economic power.

Unfortunately, justice may become the latest East Timorese victim of the desires of the West and Australia to satisfy Indonesia. Last month, the UN Human Rights Commission, with agreement from East Timor’s government, took Indonesia’s human rights violations off its agenda. The UN then elected Indonesia to a three-year term on the Human Rights Commission, and Australia has proposed them as a permanent member of the UN Security Council. International political will to end impunity, always limited, is fading rapidly.

The victims of Indonesia’s crimes in East Timor – virtually the entire East Timorese population – demand that our government and the international community press for justice, but that demand is not well-received by those in power. We appreciate that East Timor needs a peaceful border, and a good-neighbor relationship is in the long-term interests of both peoples. But protecting criminal generals – even if they retain power at the moment – does not serve the citizens of either nation. Indeed, many of the TNI master-criminals have been promoted, and they continue to inflict terror in Aceh, Papua, and elsewhere.

As democracy evolves on both sides of the border, the rule of law and civilian authority over military power need to be reinforced at every opportunity. East Timor needs friendly relations with all 235 million Indonesian people, not a few dozen military and Suharto-era criminals.

That said, the primary responsibility for justice lies with the United Nations and the international community. These crimes violated the UN Charter and resolutions of the UN Security Council since 1975; in 1999 they were in direct contradiction of the agreement between Indonesia, the United Nations and Portugal. The international community must take responsibility for justice, but the government of East Timor (and, hopefully, Indonesia) should give them full support. We are disappointed that all three appear to be resisting efforts toward justice.

The first Indonesian and UN investigations of the 1999 violence named high-ranking military and government officials, and recommended an international tribunal. We believe that an international tribunal, backed by the political will to compel Indonesia’s cooperation, is still the best option. But the governments of the world, unwilling to take decisive action or confront Indonesia, gave Jakarta a chance to prosecute its own. They have watched and waited for more than three years, even though it has long been clear that the Indonesian government has no commitment to justice.

From October 1999 until May 2004, the United Nations has responsibility for security in East Timor, and for punishing perpetrators of crimes against humanity and other serious crimes. UNTAET established the Serious Crimes Unit (SCU) to investigate and prosecute, and the Special Panels (SPs: courts with international and East Timorese judges) to try the perpetrators. These agencies continue under UNMISET, still authorized, funded, staffed and managed by the United Nations, although they are now in the office of East Timor’s General Prosecutor. Unless other arrangements are made, they will go out of existence when UNMISET ends in June 2004.

What is La’o Hamutuk?

La’o Hamutuk (Walking Together in English) is a joint East Timorese-international organization that monitors, analyzes, and reports on the principal international institutions present in Timor Lorosa’e as they relate to the physical, economic, and social reconstruction and development of the country. La’o Hamutuk believes that the people of East Timor must be the ultimate decision-makers in this process and that this process should be democratic and transparent.

La’o Hamutuk is an independent organization and works to facilitate effective East Timorese participation. In addition, La’o Hamutuk works to improve communication between the international community and East Timorese society. La’o Hamutuk’s East Timorese and international staff have equal responsibilities, and receive equal pay and benefits. Finally, La’o Hamutuk is a resource center, providing literature on development models, experiences, and practices, as well as facilitating solidarity links between East Timorese groups and groups abroad with the aim of creating alternative development models.

In the spirit of encouraging greater transparency, La’o Hamutuk would like you to contact us if you have documents and/or information that should be brought to the attention of the East Timorese people and the international community.